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ABSTRACT 
          The lack of widespread success in existing water quality trading programs may be 
attributed, in part, to a limited correspondence between the institutional and hydrologic 
circumstances in “typical” watersheds and the open-market trading system envisioned in 
standard economics presentations of pollution trading. This thesis explores two aspects of 
the disparity between the theory and practice of water quality trading programs using 
modeling results from a case study of the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin phosphorus 
emissions trading program.  
          First, recognizing that hydrological systems and Total Maximum Daily Load 
(TMDL) objectives for a particular watershed may be quite complex, the Hung and Shaw 
(2005) Trading Ratio System (TRS) is broadly interpreted to enable firms to trade 
allowances upstream and across tributaries within a specified multi-zone management 
area. Specifically, the possibility of upstream and cross-tributary trading is investigated 
by modeling a “Management Area” (MA) policy proposed for the Upper-Passaic River 
Basin TMDL (Obrupta, Niazi, and Kardos, 2008).  
          Second this study raises concern that the canonical theoretical presentation of 
tradable pollution allowances, in which firms buy and sell pollution allowances based on 
marginal abatement costs relative to the market determined price, is inappropriate for 
cost-effectively meeting a TMDL in a typical watershed. Such open-market exchange 
programs have been effective in settings, such as the U.S. Acid Rain Trading program 
that are characterized by large numbers of potential traders with heterogeneous abatement 
technologies across firms, and heterogeneous present capacity to meet standards. 
However this type of a trading mechanism is less amenable to point-source-to-point-
 
 
source trading programs characterized by a small number of potential traders in a 
watershed, with discrete and homogeneous abatement technologies across firms, and 
most, if not all, firms not having the present capacity to meet the specified standard. In 
such settings, managers may be reluctant to not upgrade (and buy permits) or to develop 
excess treatment capacity (and sell permits) because of the relative lack of buyers and 
sellers in a thin market.  
          Using the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin phosphorus emissions trading program as 
a case study, I simulate trading scenarios under different market mechanisms. Based on 
the simulations of Marginal Cost Trading, cost savings accomplished under an open 
market mechanism range from 0.59% to 1.04% of total costs relative to the no-trade 
baseline. Given positive transactions costs, it is unlikely that a vibrant trading market 
would result in such circumstances, consistent with the disappointing level of water 
quality trading observed to date. On the other hand, the simulation results of Optimal 
Trading results suggest that if WWTPs are able to jointly optimize their capital 
investment levels, the costs savings can increase dramatically (up to 13.10% of the 
baseline total cost).  
          This cost-saving potential leads to the argument that a structured bilateral trade 
system in which profitable trading opportunities are identified and implemented with 
multiyear contracts between firms, would more likely approximate cost-effective 
outcomes than an open-market, price directed system. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Current Development in Water Quality Trading 
Encouraged by the success of the United States acid rain program in accelerating 
reductions of sulfur dioxide pollution, as well as in providing substantial savings relative 
to command-and-control measures, environmental policymakers have been promoting 
market-based "cap and trade" approaches that allow flexibility across firms in meeting 
aggregate pollution levels.  In particular, much attention has been given to the topic of 
water quality trading (WQT) in the United States following the issuance of the U.S. 
EPA’s policy guidance documents for water quality trading in 1996 and 2003.1  A 
comprehensive 2004 survey of existing water quality trading programs within the United 
States provides an overview of the breadth of initiatives. According to the survey, there 
were more than 70 WQT initiatives in the United States during 2004 (Breetz et al., 2004), 
which is up from around 25 just a few years earlier (King and Kuch, 2003).  Fostered by 
these market initiatives, many “pilot” discharge permit trading programs have been 
launched in an effort to meet the objectives of the Clean Water Act (U.S. EPA, 2004).  In 
2006, the EPA reported that at least ten states had a trading framework in place or in 
development (U.S. EPA, 2006). Additionally, the agency reported 24 examples of trading 
that has occurred in the United States in programs or individual trades.
2
  Beyond these 
trades, many additional WQT initiatives exist, including many that have not yet recorded 
                                                          
1
 The EPA Water Quality Trading Policy is available at 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingpolicy.html (accessed Febrary2009). 
2 A geographical allocation of these trading programs is available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingmap.html (accessed March 2011). 
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trades or that have recorded trades subsequent to the EPA’s 2006 assessment (Rowles, 
2008).  
While water quality trading (WQT) can be applied to manage various types of 
pollutants, the primary efforts to date have concentrated on nutrient trading. Such trades 
involve traditional National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) point 
sources (e.g. municipal wastewater treatment plants) and, in many cases, nonpoint 
sources such as agriculture. In addition, existing programs are also trying to address other 
pollutants, including sediment and toxics, and some programs are allowing trading 
among related pollutants (e.g., oxygen reducing pollutants, including nutrients and BOD) 
(Breetz et al., 2004; Kibler and Kasturi, 2007).  
The canonical trading model rests on the ideal of open markets, in which firms 
buy and sell pollution allowances based on continuous marginal abatement costs through 
a price mechanism. If there is substantial diversity in marginal abatement cost functions 
across firms, gains from trade are expected. For example, there might be some 
dischargers for whom it is costly to reduce pollutant levels, while for others, their present 
technology may be such that additional reductions in pollutant levels could be achieved at 
relatively low cost. In such instances, discharge permit trading would allow one 
discharger to "over control" for a pollutant at a low cost, selling excess pollution 
equivalents via allowances to another discharger that is not able to reduce pollutants as 
cost-effectively. Through the trade, the buyer can achieve their share of pollution control 
3 
 
responsibility at a lower cost, while the seller of allowances can recoup part of their 
abatement costs.
3
  
Despite the theoretical promise of water quality trading and enthusiasm for this 
market-based approach, WQT to date has met with very limited practical success.  Most 
of the WQT programs have stagnated at a pre-trading stage of development. While plenty 
of new guidelines, regional trading institutions, and computer simulations of trading, and 
even some WQT software and websites have been developed, very little actual trading 
has taken place (King, 2005).  According to the U.S. EPA Water Quality Trading 
Evaluation Report in 2008, only 100 facilities have participated in trading nationally, and 
80 percent of trades have occurred within a single trading program (the Long Island 
Sound Program). Moreover, relatively few trading programs have been scaled up from 
pilot projects to permanent programs, and even fewer can claim to have had a significant 
impact in improving water quality or reducing pollutant control costs (U.S. EPA, 2008).  
Hence, in the eyes of the many critics, the enthusiasm for WQT is supported only in 
concept by its potential to generate cost savings and by ideological arguments about the 
superiority of market-based solutions.  
Why is WQT not working well in the reality? 
There could be various reasons behind the limited success in the development of 
WQT.  It may simply be the case that the potential cost savings for allowance trading 
programs are too low to cover the cost of establishing a trading program (Zhao et al, 
                                                          
3
 The term allowance, instead of credit or permit, is used so as to avoid confusion with the use of 
these terms in other contexts of water quality regulation. The term permits plays a central role in 
Clean Water Act regulations through respective National (NPDES) and State (SPDES) Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System permitting authority. In the water quality literature (Boisvert et.al, 
2009), some discussions of credits restricts this term to end-of-year trading of firms' unused 
emissions. 
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2009).  A number of institutional and program design factors have also been identified as 
possible sources of the limited trading in water quality markets, including:  lack of 
regulatory coverage (Faeth, 2006); lack of a binding cap on emissions (Selman et al. 
2009); limited numbers of trading opportunities (Obrupta et al., 2008); imposed market 
structures (Woodward et al., 2002a, b; 2003); and high transactions costs associated with 
complex administrative requirements (Devlin and Grafton, 1998). From a behavioral 
perspective, individual water treatment plants may choose to over-comply and not trade 
in response to local demographic pressures (Earnhart 2004a, b), to account for a margin 
of safety or to otherwise minimize regulatory risk (Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz 2006; 
Selman et al., 2009), or to protect opportunities for future growth (Hamstead and BenDor 
2010). 
While there are undoubtedly a number of institutional or behavioral factors that 
inhibit water quality trading, this thesis focuses on two fundamental modeling issues that 
arise when extending economic-theoretic constructs of pollution trading to the actual 
hydrological conditions of a water quality trading program.  Although these issues prove 
to be intertwined in the empirical analysis of this thesis, for clarity I address these points 
separately here. 
First, an (often implicit) assumption in economic theoretical presentations is that 
there are enough potential trading partners to allow the establishment of a competitive 
market, in which firms buy and sell pollution allowances based on marginal abatement 
costs relative to the market-determined price.   However, as is evident in the case study 
used in this thesis – a point-source to point-source phosphorus trading program in the 
Upper Passaic River Basin in New Jersey (United States) – this assumption is 
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questionable.  In the Upper-Passaic River Basin, there are only 22 Waste Water 
Treatment Plants (WWTPs) subject to a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) 
determination for phosphorus.  Further, because water flows downstream and there are 
multiple branches of rivers within the Upper-Passaic River Basin, the application of the 
prevailing Trading-Ratio-System for water quality trading (Hung and Shaw, 2005) results 
in only one to 10 potential trading partners for each WWTP.  
Recognizing the potential cost-saving gains associated with expanding the 
number of trading opportunities, I broadly interpret the Hung and Shaw (2005) Trading 
Ratio System (TRS) to enable firms to trade allowances upstream and across tributaries 
within a specified multi-zone management area.  Hung and Shaw show that the TRS can 
cost-effectively meet water quality requirements at all points in a watershed through 
trades that reallocate permits from upstream to downstream sources. Whereas in a pure 
TRS-based zonal system the exchange rate between firms within a zone is one (i.e., a unit 
of emissions from one source has the same effect on downstream water quality as other 
sources within the zone), “other ratios potentially could provide policy makers with an 
additional degree of freedom” (Tietenberg, 2006). I investigate this possibility by 
modeling a “Management Area” (M.A.) policy that has been proposed for the Upper-
Passaic River Basin TMDL (Obrupta, Niazi and Kardos, 2008). The M.A. approach is 
motivated by the fact that TMDL regulations are often oriented toward avoiding critical 
“hot spots” (i.e., localized areas with unacceptably high degraded water quality due to 
high concentrations of a pollutant). M.A.s group pollution sources with a common 
endpoint at one of these hot spots, and may or may not have trading ratios equal to unity 
between sources. Within a M.A. bidirectional trades are allowed. Trading between MAs 
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is consistent with TRS-type trading rules wherein only downstream sales of allowances 
are allowed. 
A second concern related to thin markets is the discrete nature of capital 
investments.  Water quality trading models typically presented in economic-theoretic 
presentations conventionally assume that marginal abatement costs are continuous and 
smooth.  For example Hung and Shaw assume that abatement cost is “increasing and 
strictly convex”, consistent with the marginal cost approach utilized by Montgomery 
(1972, “convex and twice differentiable), Tietenberg (2006,“continuous cost function”) 
and others.  While marginal abatement cost is a useful theoretical construct, actual 
pollution abatement decisions often do not occur at the margin.  Adding additional 
chemicals or other small changes allow additional abatement control in some instances, 
but, given initial capital configurations, there can be limits to such opportunities. 
“Generally, pollution controls are feasible to implement in relatively large 
installments that [can] reduce multiple units of pollutants.  Point sources in 
particular tend to purchase additional loading reduction capability in large 
increments.  For example a wastewater treatment plant upgrade or plant expansion 
may be designed to treat millions of gallons a day”  (US EPA, 1996, p. 3-2). 
This discrete nature of capacity makes is unrealistic to assume a continuous cost function. 
In other words, by assuming continuous abatement costs, each discharger is necessarily 
modeled as if he/she operates based on one particular fixed upgrade level and without 
need to consider the long run allocation of capital investment. 
Recognizing the discrete nature of capital upgrade cost, it is necessary to 
decompose the total abatement cost into two major categories: (1) Operation and 
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Maintenance (OM) Cost, considered as the variable cost of abatement, including the cost 
of chemicals, electricity, payroll and all other administrative costs; (2) Capital Investment 
Cost, considered as the fixed (sunk) cost of abatement, including the cost of design and 
installation of fixed abatement facilities, as well as all other costs related to the physical 
expansion of treatment plant.  It is because these two types of costs have disparate 
properties that the distinction of which is essential for the cost saving analysis.   
For any fixed level of abatement facility, the Operation & Maintenance Cost is 
assumed to be at least first order continuously differentiable — it changes smoothly 
within the physical capacity, corresponding to continuous changing abatements. For 
example, an extra pound of reduction by a point source could be achieved by increasing 
the amount of chemicals used in its treatment process (U.S. EPA, 1996). The 
differentiability of the OM cost makes it valid to use the Marginal Cost which refers to 
the cost of implementing one more unit of emissions reduction, where the unit can be any 
small measure, such as a pound of nutrient.  
While marginal cost is a useful theoretical construct, it is not a particularly useful 
concept in the characterization of fixed capital investment.  As with most fixed capital 
investments, the cost of facility upgrades would be occur in several discrete jumps rather 
than continuously varying to accommodate all specific abatement levels.   
Hence, the capital investment cost, or the fixed (sunk) cost of abatement should 
appear in a step-wise pattern where the functions are not differentiable at the jumps 
(kinks)
4
.   
                                                          
4
 The concept of incremental abatement cost introduced by the EPA is analogous to the marginal 
cost in dealing with discrete capital investments. Incremental abatement costs are similar to 
marginal abatement costs, the only difference being the units of change being considered. As 
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          In addition, this more comprehensive approach to deal with abatement cost would 
naturally identify the two sources of cost savings: (1) Savings in the Operation and 
Maintenance Cost (variable cost savings)—is achievable when trades occur in the 
direction of high marginal-variable-cost firms paying lower marginal-variable-cost firms 
to undertake abatement in the short run.  (2) Savings in the Capital Cost (fixed cost 
savings)—is achievable when efficient firms upgrade and sell permits to less efficient 
firms so that they can avoid expensive abatement investments by buying permits.  
In the case of Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin phosphorus emissions trading 
program, and probably other watershed based programs, there exist complex issues 
related to how the market structure can support the two types of cost savings through the 
trading subject to the limited number of trading opportunity. The savings in operation & 
maintenance cost are, at least conceptually, attainable under regular market conditions, 
especially when there is a noticeable difference in marginal variable costs across firms. 
Comparatively, the realization of capital costs savings under an open market framework 
is more challenging.  In practice, firms that choose to upgrade, base their decision in part 
on the presupposition that demand exists for their unused permits. In a similar manner, 
firms that choose to postpone costly upgrades, rely on the projection that an ample supply 
of permits exists. Hence, for firms to be able to make the optimal investment decisions, 
the market must secure a stable demand of permits for those that should undertake 
upgrades, as well as an ample supply for others that should postpone upgrades.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
above, marginal abatement cost refers to the additional cost associated with increasing abatement 
by one, usually small, unit. Incremental cost is defined as the average cost of incremental 
reductions. For example if additional abatement cannot be undertaken for small units, such as a 
pound at a time, but instead requires a discrete capital investment, marginal costs would be 
incalculable. However, incremental costs could be calculated by dividing the total costs of 
increasing abatement by the increment of abatement that occurs. If 100 pounds of abatement cost 
$2,000, the incremental cost would be $20 per unit. 
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This issue does not arise in large scale trading program such as the nation-wide 
acid rain program in the United States. Firms can receive the proper assurances under the 
open market mechanism with large number of potential traders. This is because the 
market is sufficiently large and fluid, such that any individual discharger’s decision to 
upgrade its facility will not have a noticeable effect on the market’s supply and demand 
for permits. 
In comparison, the Passaic phosphorus trading program at watershed level involve 
a relatively few potential trading partners. Firms are not guaranteed that a supply of 
permits will be available at any price; those that opt not to upgrade will have to make the 
premature investment nonetheless. As a result, the actual upgrade decision made by each 
firm under open market conditions will likely deviate from the optimal portfolio of 
capital investments.  
This potential, in conjunction with the subsequent demonstration of cost savings 
associated with trades that account for discrete fixed costs, leads me to argue that a 
structured bilateral trade system in which profitable trading opportunities are identified 
and implemented with multiyear contracts between firms, would more likely approximate 
cost-effective outcomes for the Passaic phosphorus trading program than an open-market, 
price directed system.  
Study Objective and Organization of the Thesis 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the assessment and design of typical 
water quality trading programs at watershed level. The non-tidal Passaic River Watershed 
is used as a case study to investigate the size of potential cost savings associated with 
allowing phosphorus emissions trading amongst Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP) 
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to achieve a significant reduction in ambient phosphorus levels.  The new elements that 
this study is adding on are:  
1. A Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming Model (MINLP) is developed to 
minimize total abatement cost, accounting for the optimal allocation of 
dischargers’ facility upgrades, and thus the potential total savings are 
measured from both “OM savings” and “Capital Cost savings”.  To the 
best of my knowledge, capital cost saving is not often considered 
explicitly in assessing the potential cost savings of water quality trading. 
By counting for capital cost sharing, this study extends the conventional 
framework for assessing the benefits of the effluent trading program.  
2. To conduct computer simulations of various trading scenarios, a 
Management Area (M.A.) approach is specified in order to link emission 
permit trading to ambient water quality. The specification is a 
generalization of the one proposed by Hung and Shaw (Hung and Shaw, 
2005), to increase the flexibility of trading by allowing multiple source 
Management Area.  
3. This study hypothesizes some of the difficulties in achieving the optimal 
allocation of capital upgrades among dischargers, and proposes a trading 
structure which might outperform the traditional open-market-trading in 
terms of extracting savings on the long-term capital costs.   
 
In all, this study argues that the failure to account for capital cost sharing might have 
been a source of the numerous failures in water quality trading. As such, I hope this study 
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could convey a message that a reconsideration of trading structures are needed for typical 
watersheds.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 begins with a 
simple numerical example of emissions trading, as well as the mathematical treatment of 
the spatial effects using the Management Area Approach. For comparison purposes, two 
mathematical models are designed with each characterizing different trading frameworks. 
The first is a convex programming model adopted to formulate the standard marginal-
cost trading framework where firms are assumed to operate based on their present 
facilities. The second is a mixed-integer nonlinear programming model developed to 
incorporate discrete capital investments so that optimal allocation of fixed-cost upgrades 
is explicitly considered. For each model we also discuss the relationships among 
marginal abatement costs, trading ratios, and the prices of permits.   
Chapter 3 begins with some background information specific to the case study, 
including a brief description of the non-tidal Passaic Watershed and its major wastewater 
treatment plants. The remainder of Chapter 3 is devoted to identifying the data required 
for the empirical analysis. To begin, there is a discussion of the TMDLs and the trading 
ratios, including the discussion on how to identify appropriate Management Areas that 
account for some special characteristics of the Passaic watershed. This is followed by a 
discussion of the data and procedures used to estimate both capital and operating cost 
functions that can be used to calculate phosphorus abatement costs for each of the major 
wastewater treatment plants. Chapter 3 concludes with a description of some properties 
of plants’ abatement costs. 
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Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the empirical modeling results including the 
patterns of trades, cost savings and possible price ranges, from several policy scenarios. I 
then briefly discuss the implication of comparative statics from these modeling results. 
The final chapter, Chapter 5, contains a brief summary of the findings and 
provides a discussion of the policy implications of this research. I raise the practical 
concern that the canonical theoretical presentation of tradable pollution allowances, in 
which firms buy and sell pollution allowances based on marginal abatement costs relative 
to the market determined price, is inappropriate for cost-effectively meeting a TMDL in a 
typical watershed. Consequently I argue that a more structured multi-year contract is 
suggested to the policy makers.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL 
COST SAVINGS FROM EFFLUENT TRADING PROGRAMS 
Introduction 
In Chapter One, it was suggested that the lack of widespread success in existing 
water quality trading programs may be attributed, in part, to a limited correspondence 
between the institutional and hydrologic setting in “typical” watersheds and the open 
market trading system envisioned in theoretical economics presentations of emission 
trading.  As noted some time ago by Hoag and Hughes-Popp (1997), translating theory 
into practice may necessitate a reexamination of “the main principles associated with 
water pollution credit trading theory…to identify factors that influence program 
feasibility” (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997, p,253). The intent of this chapter is to bridge 
the gaps between theory and practice of water quality trading by constructing a 
mathematical framework that is well suited to assess the potential cost savings of an 
actual “point-source to point-source” effluent trading program.   
The discussion begins by reviewing the canonical benchmark of cost-
effectiveness subject to a predetermined environmental objective, originally developed in 
Montgomery (1972). Subsequently, a theoretical model specified by Hung and Shaw 
(2005) is introduced as the foundation for the construction of the water quality trading 
framework to meet this cost-effective condition.  Then, to accommodate two practical 
aspects in water quality trading, the Hung and Shaw Trading Ratio System (TRS) is 
modified as follows: (1) A mathematical model is developed that combines multiple 
“single-market ambient permit systems” with Hung and Shaw’s TRS to formalize the 
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“Management Area” (M.A.) water quality trading approach recently suggested by 
Obrupta, et al. (2008) for the Upper Passaic River; and  (2)  the canonical equi-marginal 
abatement cost principle, which solves the short-run cost minimizing objective, is 
extended to explicitly address the optimal allocation of fixed capital investment as well as 
the optimal abatement and trading decisions among dischargers.  
To accomplish the latter, total abatement costs are decomposed into continuous 
variable costs and discrete fixed costs by introducing a set of integer variables, which 
allow the optimal investment vector to be solved by the Mixed–Integer Nonlinear 
Programming. Proceeding with these two modifications, the corresponding relationships 
among marginal abatement costs, trading ratios, and the price of permits are discussed. 
Finally, this chapter is closed out by raising an empirical question: can individual firms 
and the entirety of firms within a watershed achieve notable additional cost savings from 
trading if they are allowed to make optimal investment (upgrades) plans above and 
beyond standard marginal cost trading opportunities?  
Spatial Effects and the Cost-Effective Benchmark 
The basic cost minimization objective of pollution abatement policy is to 
minimize the sum of pollution abatement costs Ci across i firms, subject to an 
environmental constraint. Evidence suggests that pollutants in a watershed are typically 
non-uniformly mixed, non-assimilative pollutants, with the resulting spatial distribution 
of water quality and environmental damages depending not only upon the level of 
emissions, but also upon the locations and biophysical and hydrologic diffusion and 
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transfer characteristics of the emissions  (Tietenberg, 1980; 1985).
 5
  Therefore, in the 
modeling framework, it is necessary to account for the spatial effects of the pollutant at 
the point of measurement vis-à-vis the source of the pollutant.  For instance, due to 
dilution, dispersion, and other biophysical interactions, the impacts of a pollutant on 
ambient water quality at a given receptor are expected to decline as the hydrological 
distance between the discharger and the receptor increases. At the extreme, receptor sites 
upstream will be unaffected by the downstream discharger’s emissions. Hence, for 
nutrient management at the watershed level, the spatial distribution of dischargers relative 
to receptor sites is critical to cost-effective program design because the fate and transport 
of the pollutants must be considered explicitly.  
Fortunately, from a theoretical perspective, the issue of non-uniform mixing and 
spatial distribution of pollutants is readily accommodated. This can be achieved by 
defining a diffusion (or transfer) coefficient, dij that measures the contribution of one unit 
of emissions from the ith discharger or source to the total load of effluent at the jth 
receptor (Montgomery 1972; Hung and Shaw 2005). Formally, let ei indicate an amount 
of emissions from source i, and let eij indicate the corresponding amount measured at the 
jth receptor after discharger i emits ei. Then,  
    
i
ij
ij
e
e
d                                                                                                         -------(2.2-1)  
If ijd  equals "zero", the ith discharger has no effect on the jth receptor (as in the case of 
being upstream or on a separate tributary). A ijd  of “one” indicates that the unit of 
                                                          
5
 Tietenberg (1985) categorizes the nature of pollutants into three classes: uniformly mixed 
assimilative pollutants, uniformly mixed accumulative pollutants, and non-uniformly mixed 
assimilative pollutants.  
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pollution from the ith source does not diminish in any way by the time it reaches the jth 
receptor (for this reason, iid  should always equal to one). An intermediate coefficient of, 
say, dij = 0.5 would indicate that one additional unit of pollution for discharger i results in 
one-half a unit of pollution at receptor j. For a region or watershed with i stationary 
sources of pollutants and j receptor points, the dispersion of water emissions for the i 
sources can be specified by an i by j matrix of diffusion coefficients (Montgomery 1972):  
 
After properly accommodating the spatial effect of a pollutant, the cost-effective goal can 
be characterized by the following mathematical formulation, which minimizes the 
combined costs across all dischargers subject to predetermined environmental constraints 
Ej at each receptor site.  This canonical minimization problem will be referred as 
Problem A-1. 
 
                                     
n
i ii
r
rC
i
1
)(min                                                          ------(2.2-2) 
PROBLEM (A-1):        subject to:    
ji
n
i iijj
Ereda   )(1
0       }...3,2,1{ mj             ------(2.2-3) 
                                     0ir ;                }...3,2,1{ ni                                     ------(2.2-4) 
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Suppose there are n dischargers and m receptors, Equation (2.2-2) is the objective 
function of the cost minimization problem, where (.)iC  is the abatement cost function for 
discharger i and the argument ir  is the amount of emission reduction achieved by 
discharger i. Equation (2.2-3) gives the environmental constraints where ijd  is a diffusion 
coefficient from discharger i to receptor j, jE  is a predetermined environmental standard 
at receptor j, and 0ie  is referred to as the uncontrolled emission rate by source i. Note that 
ir , jE and 
0
ie  are all measured in terms of load. Finally, the "a" parameter is used to 
represent background pollution (Tietenberg 2006). 
To simplify the notation, the canonical minimization problem can be rewritten as 
Problem A-2 below in which the argument of cost function is converted to the final 
effluent ie  by the relation iii ree 
0 . Furthermore, for ease of presentation, the 
background pollution is assumed away in this study, hence "a=0 ":  
                                    
 
n
i ii
e
eCZ
i
1
)(min  ,                                                 ------(2.2-5) 
PROBLEM (A-2):        subject to:                                                    
                                    j
n
i iij
Eed  1           }...3,2,1{ mj                               ------(2.2-6) 
                                    
],0[ 0ii ee  ;        }...3,2,1{ ni                                        ------(2.2-7) 
 
Note that the only choice variables in the objective function are the final effluent of each 
discharger. The discharge constraint is given in inequality (2.2-6), where Ej is a specified 
environmental standard at receptor j, also measured in terms of load. The inequality 
imposes the constraint that the diffused aggregate pollutants from all dischargers to each 
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receptor site must meet the environmental standard at that receptor site.  As previously  
0
ie  
is initial unregulated effluent at i.  Hence equation (2.2-7) imposes the restriction that 
the equilibrium effluent level must lie in a closed interval between zero and 
0
ie . The 
lower bound of zero indicates that a firm cannot do better than be emission-free while 
upper bound 
0
ie corresponds to the level of emissions that a profit maximizing firm would 
produce in the absence of regulations or other pollution abatement incentives.  Hung and 
Shaw (2005) refer to this as the “primary” pollution level while Tietenberg (2006) 
describes this as the “uncontrolled emissions rate”. 
The Lagrangian for this cost-effective benchmark is
6
:   
K(ei, λi, αi,  βi ) =   
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n
i iii
n
i ijj
m
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eeeedEZ
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)0()()( 
   
(2.2-8) 
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
0
1
   ii
n
j ijjii
dZeK  ;    }...3,2,1{ ni                                      ---(2.2-9) 
0)(
1
   ii
n
j ijjii
dZe  ;    }...3,2,1{ ni                                 ---(2.2-10) 
0
1
   i
n
i ijjj
edEK   ;      }...3,2,1{ mj                       ---(2.2-11) 
0)(
1
   i
n
i ijjj
edE  ;     }...3,2,1{ mj                                                         ---(2.2-12) 
00  eeK ii  ;     }...3,2,1{ ni                                                              ---(2.2-13) 
0)( 0  eeii  ;      }...3,2,1{ ni                                                                     ---(2.2-14) 
00  ii eK        }...3,2,1{ ni                                                                  ---(2.2-15) 
0)0(  ii e     }...3,2,1{ ni                                                                           ---(2.2-16) 
                                                          
6
 The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are written in type II K-T representation. 
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If the equilibrium occurs in the interior, the complementary slackness conditions for 
Problem A-2 imply that 0i  
and  0i  for all i, and so  
n
j ijji
dZ
1
 , 
indicating that the least cost solution occurs when each discharger’s marginal abatement 
cost is equal to the sum of its shadow prices of the total load constraints at all affected 
zones weighted by diffusion coefficients. 
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To gain an intuitive grasp of his result, assume that j is the only receptor of 
concern. In this case, the interior solutions given by the first order necessary conditions, 
would yield a spatially-adjusted "equi-marginal" result:   
 )(
)(1)(1
)( jkk
k
kk
kji
ii
ij
j
ii eMC
e
eC
de
eC
d
eMC 





                                              ---(2.2-17) 
which reduces to the standard least-cost equi-marginal conditions )()( kkii eMCeMC  for 
the special case of 1 kjij dd  associated with pollutants characterized by uniform 
mixing.  Equation (2.2-17) shows that the cost-effective allocation of the pollution 
abatement (if interior) for a non-uniformly mixed pollutant occurs at the point where 
spatially differentiated marginal abatement costs for two emission sources (i and k) 
relative to the binding receptor (j) are equal, corresponding to Tietenberg's observation 
that “..it is not the marginal costs of emission reduction that are equalized across sources 
in a cost-effective allocation… it is the marginal costs of pollution reduction at each 
receptor location that are equalized” (2006, p. 34). 
                                                          
7
 For generality, one can think that the shadow prices are zero at those affected zones for which 
total load constraints are not binding.  
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Figure 2.2-1 The Equi-marginal Condition 
This spatially adjusted equi-marginal condition can be depicted using simple 
geometry. Figure 2.2-1 depicts two spatially-adjusted marginal abatement cost curves
8
 
(relative to receptor site j) where the total, spatially-adjusted abatement (relative to 
receptor site j) required is 400 units.  Assume that firm i and k are the only two sources of 
emissions in the watershed and j is the only receptor of concern.  For simplicity, we 
further assume that two firms have the same level of spatially-adjusted initial pollution 
level (400 units), and that the initial allocation of pollution abatement strategies is that 
each firm reduces its spatially-adjusted effluent by half (i.e. (200, 200)).  In contrast to 
this restricted case, the spatially adjusted equi-marginal condition implies that, the cost-
effective equilibrium is at (100, 300), where the two spatially adjusted marginal cost 
curves cross, corresponding to emissions reductions by source i of 300 units and source k 
                                                          
8 All the effluent units in this chapter are spatially-adjusted relative to receptor j, unless otherwise 
noticed.  
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of 100 units. The cost savings associated with moving from the initial allocation (200, 
200) to the cost-effective equilibrium (100, 300) is depicted by the shaded area in Figure 
2.2-1. 
Standard Trading Model and Trading Ratio System (TRS)  
In Section 2.2, the fundamental characteristic of cost-effective pollution 
abatement -- equating spatially adjusted marginal abatement costs across firms after 
accounting for spatial effect and transport – was identified.  The original suggestion that 
tradable pollution rights could achieve least-cost allocation of resources was provided 
independently by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968a, b) 
9
 Drawing from Coase’s seminal 
work on property rights (Coase, 1960), Dales proposed his concept for a market for fully 
transferable pollution rights within the context of water quality.  
The early literature on trading pollution rights focuses on the comparison between 
two basic pollution control systems, namely, the ambient permit  system (APS) and the 
emission permit system (EPS) (Montgomery, 1972).  In the APS the commodity traded is 
the right to emit pollutants in terms of pollutant concentrations at a set of receptor points. 
Instead, under the EPS, firms can trade emission licenses, allowances, or permits which 
confer the rights to a discharger to emit pollutants up to a certain rate.   
Neither of the two trading systems is “optimal from all points of view” (Atkinson 
and Tietenberg, 1982, p. 103).  From a purely theoretical perspective, the ambient permit 
system can yield a cost-effective allocation of abatement for non-uniformly mixed 
                                                          
9
 Dales' application was for water quality and involved only trading amongst polluters. Crocker’s 
vision of a market pricing system for emission rights was oriented to atmospheric pollution and 
involved trading between polluters and pollutees. Montgomery (1972) subsequent theoretical 
presentation of trading adopted Dales approach. This cost effectiveness focus has been followed 
since then in the pollution trading literature. 
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assimilative pollutants. In a result that Tietenberg (2003) calls “remarkable”, 
Montgomery proved that this least-cost outcome is independent of how the initial permits 
are allocated across dischargers or sources. That is, theoretically at least, any initial 
permit allocation rule across dischargers still engenders the cost-effective allocation after 
trading.   
“[T]he logic behind this result is rather straight forward. Whatever the initial 
allocation the transferability of permits allows them ultimately to flow to their 
highest-valued uses.  Since those uses do not depend on the initial allocation, all 
initial allocations result in the same outcome and that outcome is cost-effective” 
(Tietenberg 2003, p. 401). 
The important implication of this invariance result from the perspective of economic 
theory is that such independence implies that there need not be a conflict between 
political feasibility, or equity, and cost-effectiveness.  Further, ambient standards are 
always met.   However, the implementation of the APS would be a challenging matter. In 
practice, both environmental authorities and sources would have to overcome some 
formidable administrative barriers due to the inherent complexity of an APS.  In order for 
the ambient standards to be met everywhere, complete assurance that trade would not 
violate the ambient water quality requires a large number of separate markets, potentially 
up to one for each receptor.
10
  The traded permits would have to be defined in terms of 
the reduction in concentration achieved at a specific receptor. Each of these receptor-
specific permits could be traded independently of the others. Since an increase in 
                                                          
10 Fewer than j receptor-specific markets would leave some receptors unprotected; raising the 
possibility that trades would trigger violations at one or more of them. 
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emissions is not legitimized until all required offsetting credits are obtained, the 
expansion could be jeopardized by problems in any one of these markets. Problems could 
arise, for example, when few sellers exist in one or more of the markets. Markets with 
few sellers provide less assurance that competitive prices will prevail. When permit 
prices are not competitive, the transactions generally will not lead to a cost-effective 
allocation. (Tietenberg, 2006). The transactions cost of having to deal in several markets 
simultaneously could also pre-empt otherwise desirable trades. (Stavins, 1995). 
Emissions permit systems ensure direct control over emissions and are 
administratively simple, with trades based on the amount of pollutants emitted at the 
source rather than the level of ambient water quality at one or many receptors 
downstream.  By not having to operate in many receptor markets simultaneously, the EPS 
can avoid the main practical limitation of the APS. Nonetheless, the EPS has both 
theoretical problems in that its ability to achieve a cost-effective solution via market 
trading is dependent upon the initial allocation of permits: 
“[a]n extremely restrictive (and sometimes unattainable) condition is required to 
ensure that the market equilibrium is also the least-cost solution. This finding is 
particularly disturbing on two counts.  First, the environmental authority may 
not be able to find an initial allocation of permits that ensures an efficient 
outcome.  And second, should such an allocation exist, a substantial degree of 
flexibility in the choice of this initial allocation may be lost. Such flexibility can 
be extremely important in designing a system that is politically feasible (as well 
as efficient)” (Krupnick, Oates, and Van De Verg, 1983, p. 234). 
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That is the allocation invariance principle derived by Montgomery for the APS does not 
pertain to the EPS. Further, Hahn (1986) argues that, in practice, EPSs are also quite 
susceptible to market manipulation: 
“Whether EPS is viewed as one market in N differentiated products, N markets in 
different commodities, or some number of ‘quasimarkets’ related to air quality 
receptors the issue of market manipulation still remains” (Hahn, 1986, p 6). 
In an effort to search for a more pragmatic alternative that will garner the benefits 
of both the emission permit systems and ambient permit systems while minimizing their 
respective shortcomings, a number of “trading rule” systems have been proposed in the 
literature. The unifying feature of these structured rules of trade is that emissions are 
traded under the constraint that ambient targets are not violated (Boisvert, et al., 2009). In 
general, all of these trading rules have pros and cons of their own. For instance, the 
Pollution-Offset System (POS) developed in full by Krupnick, et al. (1983) requires that 
exchange rates are endogenously determined in the environmental quality simulation 
model to ensure that the proposed transaction would not violate the predetermined 
environmental quality standard at any receptor point. Addressing a possible shortcoming 
of the POS, McGartland and Oates (1985) subsequently created the Modified Pollution 
Offset System (MPOS) which imposed an additional non-degradation constraint that 
prohibited the worsening of pre-trade environmental quality at any receptor. Yet with this 
condition, the MPOS still suffers from a free-rider problem (Hahn, 1986; McGartland and 
Oates, 1985; Hung and Shaw, 2005) in that one discharger can increase effluent at no 
cost as long as the ambient environmental standard is not violated.  Another proposed 
trading rule is called the Exchange-Rate Emission Trading System (ERS), in which the 
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environmental authority sets exchange rates ex ante equal to the ratios of the discharger’s 
marginal abatement costs in the least-cost solution (Forsund and Naevdal, 1998; Klaassen 
and Forsund, 1994; Hung and Shaw, 2005). This places a huge burden on administrators 
in that they must have full information on dischargers’ abatement cost functions to set 
exchange rates and to choose the initial distribution of permits that will lead to a cost-
effective solution after trade. (Klaassen, 1996). 
Noting the various shortcomings in each of these systems, Hung and Shaw (2005) 
instead proposed a trading-ratio system (TRS) for water quality trading that sets trading 
ratios between sources equal to the exogenous, hydrologically determined, diffusion 
coefficients among dischargers. Hence, trades of pollution rights are limited from 
upstream to downstream sales.  Hung and Shaw argue that the TRS is particularly well-
suited for water-related nutrient trading  in that “problems with hot spots and free riding 
can be avoided, and the burdens on both dischargers and the environmental authority 
should be relatively light” (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 83).   
By utilizing the property that water flows to the lowest level uni-directionally, 
Hung and Shaw effectively link emission permit trading to ambient water quality by 
setting the trading ratio equal to the exogenous diffusion coefficient among dischargers.  
Under their presentation of the TRS, the environmental standards must be met at all 
sources, (i.e. each discharger is also a receptor, so n=m ) and the authorities sequentially 
issue discharge permits for each receptor area working from upstream to downstream 
based on the environmental standard. These modifications are captured in the constraint: 



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i
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kikiii dET                                                                                   ------(2.3-1) 
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where iT are the aggregate tradable permits for a discharger i, and k (< i) indicates 
dischargers upstream to discharger i. For the most upstream discharger, authorities will 
set   ii ET  , because there is no possibility of buying permits from other dischargers. In 
the TRS, Hung and Shaw assume that the trading ratios at which trade takes place are 
equal to the diffusion coefficients defined in equation (2.2-1), and therefore, the notation 
kid  can also be used to denote the trading ratio. The effluent from discharger i must be 
below the environmental standard, iT , but if i purchases permits from k, then i can 
discharge more effluent.   
On the other hand, discharger i can also sell permits to downstream sites. In this 
situation, site i is selling its right to discharge units of effluent, and unless it also buys 
some permits from upstream, it must then meet a more stringent environmental standard. 
Thus, the amount of final effluent emitted by source i must be reduced by the number of 
permits sold to downstream sites,   
n
ik ik
. Since the reduction in emissions due to the 
sale of a permit must occur at the point of sale, these sales need not be weighted by the 
trading ratios. After controlling for the effect of both sales and purchases of permits on 
the final allowable effluent and rearranging the trading constraint becomes: 
                                                            -------(2.3-2) 
 
Where ki  ( ik ) is the number of permits sold by k to i (i to k) following the 
aforementioned directional trading rule that sales can only occur downstream. The 
effective trades from the buyer’s point of view are adjusted by the trading ratio, kid . 
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Finally, with equation (2.2-6) replaced by the new trading equation (2.3-2), the basic 
trading model under Hung and Shaw’s trading ratio system can be specified as 
                                    
n
i ii
e
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)(min                                                     ------(2.3-3) 
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 PROBLEM (B)         
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Hung and Shaw prove that the cost-effective model (Problem A-2) in which the 
environmental authority minimizes the aggregate costs subject to environmental 
constraints is the same as the model (Problem B) in which the environmental authority 
minimizes aggregate costs subject to the trading constraints under the TRS. They further 
prove that this least cost allocation of abatement responsibilities can be attained through 
competitive markets using the TRS. 
Zonal and Management Area Approach  
In the emissions trading literature, a trade-off is often perceived between the 
desire to protect the ambient quality and the desire to create as many as possible trading 
opportunities to maximize potential gains from trade  (Tietenberg, 2006).  A concern is 
that “overly restrictive” trading rules inevitably limit trading opportunities and narrow 
down the market, creating the potential for market imperfection and strategic behaviors, 
which may undermine the efficiency of water quality trading (Tietenberg, 2006). Hung 
and Shaw's TRS is a fairly restrictive trading rule which emphasizes only the one side of 
this trade-off: although the TRS can cost-effectively meet water quality requirements at 
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all points in a watershed through trades that reallocate permits from upstream to 
downstream sources, it greatly restricts trading opportunities as the TRS only allows 
trade to occur uni-directionally. For instance, if there are no relatively low-cost plants 
upstream on any reach in a watershed, there will be no opportunities to trade.   
One appealing way to expand the trading opportunities under the TRS is the 
trading zone approach.  The notion of "zone" is not novel in the pollution management 
literature. At least as early as 1973 in a discussion of tax policies, Tietenberg introduced a 
zonal approach to manage the air quality. He suggested:  
"...the area in which an air pollution control policy is to be implemented is 
divided up into zones. Within each zone the tax rate is the same for all emitters 
of a particular pollutant, but the tax rate varies across zones. Each zone has a 
predetermined air quality standard. Using existing air diffusion models, which 
express the ground level of steady state concentrations in a receptor zone as a 
linear function of emissions in all other zones, it is possible to compute uniquely 
the zonal pattern of emissions which is compatible with the air quality 
standards." (Tietenberg, 1973, p. 202)   
In a 1978 article, Tietenberg similarly defines a tax zone as follows: "a tax zone 
will be defined as the geographic area within which all emitters pay the same tax rate" 
(Tietenberg, 1978, p. 267).  As discharge allowance trading began to be widely studied as 
an alternative to managing the environmental quality, the zonal approach was 
transplanted from emission taxes to emission trading.  Thereafter, "trading zones" have 
become a parallel concept to "tax zones", within which the trades take place on a "one-
for-one basis" (e.g. Tietenberg, 1980).  
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Clearly, by grouping multiple dischargers into zones and allowing both upstream 
and downstream trades within each zone, environmental authorities can create more 
trading opportunities and likely increase the potential for cost-savings. However, since 
one-to-one bi-directional trading within the zone is typically inconsistent with 
hydrologically determined diffusion rates, it will likely compromise the water quality at 
some locations and potentially lead to “hot spots”, a point of concern that has been raised 
in previous evaluations of the zonal approach (Obrupta et al., 2008). The term "hot spots" 
describes localized areas with unacceptably degraded water quality due to high 
concentration of a pollutant.
11
  
To some extent, Hung and Shaw's presentation eliminates hot spot concerns by 
assuming that each discharger/receptor constitutes a separate zone and placing a water 
quality constraint on each zone. Yet, they do argue that the TRS can be incorporated with 
cases where the watershed is divided into zones with more than one discharger,   
"in general, the number of dischargers in a zone should be greater than or equal to 
one, although we assume that there is only one representative discharger in each 
zone" (Hung and Shaw 2005, p. 88). 
Beyond allowing the possibility of multiple dischargers per zone, they do not specify how 
exactly the multi-discharger zones are to be divided or the patterns of trade allowed 
within each zone.  
Indeed, there has been a persistent ambiguity regarding what would be the proper 
way to trade within a zone.  In the original definition of the "trading zones", Tietenberg 
                                                          
11
 The US EPA (2004) notes that one concern regarding water quality trading is the potential that 
trades will create hot spots immediately downstream of pollutant sources that purchase credits.  
Reflecting this concern, trading programs must be designed to avoid the creation of hot spots. 
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described trades to take place on a "one-for-one basis" within each zone.  In the context 
of water quality management, using one-to-one trading ratio within a zone is equivalent 
to assuming that a unit of emissions from one source has the same effect on downstream 
water quality as each of the other sources within the same zone. Some previous studies 
such as such as Sado, et al. (2009) have followed Tietenberg's canonical 
conceptualization of trading zone.  Hung and Shaw (2005) also treat emissions from 
various sources within a zone as having equal effects on water quality:  
"A zone can be defined as an area in which the dispersion characteristics of 
effluents and the environmental effects of any unit of effluent are very close. 
Then, by using a water quality model, the zonal water quality standards can be 
converted into the total load standards of effluents that cannot be violated within 
each zone." (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p.86) 
While this approach is appropriate for the special case in which diffusion 
coefficients are indeed one-to–one, adopting unitary trading ratios for intra-zone trading 
cannot, however, guarantee ambient water quality at the least cost when such an 
assumption is not valid.   
The adoption of the counterfactual assumption of unitary trading ratios then poses 
a challenge of how to divide a watershed into zones.  It might seem natural to assume that 
the hot spot issue could be mitigated by using small zones---as long as all sources within 
each zone are closely clustered, all sources within each zone might be expected to have 
similar diffusion coefficients.  In a crude way, this argument suggests an inverse 
relationship between hot spots and zone size. Yet, contrary to the possible expectation 
that small zone sizes would afford better control over concentration, Spofford (1984, p. 
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82) as well as Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982, p. 120) find empirical evidence that 
smaller zone sizes did not effectively alleviate the hot spot problem. In addition smaller 
zones without inter-zone trading significantly increase watershed-wide abatement cost as 
they restrict trading opportunities substantially.  Given the shortcomings of the traditional 
approach, it is useful to explore a more flexible zonal system which does not have restrict 
intra-zone trading to be one-to-one. Along these lines, Tietenberg suggests that "allowing 
other ratios (non-unitary) potentially could provide policymakers with an additional 
degree of freedom"  (Tietenberg, 2006 p. 94). 
Obrupta, Niazi and Kardos (Obrupta, et al., 2008), who are collaborators on the 
Upper Passaic River Basin Trading project examined in this thesis, propose a 
hydrologically-based zonal approach, which they call the "Management Area (M.A.) 
approach", using  the Upper Passaic River Basin Trading Program as a case study.   The 
M.A. approach is designed to ensure the avoidance of hot-spots. Yet, in comparison with 
the TRS which stipulates that the seller must always be upstream of the buyer, the M.A 
approach increases trading opportunities and potential market size by utilizing an 
important fact that, in practice, only some locations pose a hot-spot concern. Different 
locations in the watershed show varying sensitivity to water quality impacts from certain 
pollutant or pollutant concentration. 
"certain locations are more vulnerable to hot-spot effects than other locations in 
the watershed........... (Therefore) water quality is protected on the basis that high 
phosphorus at some, not all, locations is a hot-spot concern as determined from 
water quality studies conducted throughout the watershed." (Obrupta, et al. 2008 
p.952)" 
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According to their proposed framework, each M.A. is delineated so that its outlet 
represents the only hot-spot concern in that M.A. Because, by design, there are no hot-
spot concerns beyond the M.A. outlets, trades are allowed both upstream and downstream 
within the same management area. Such trades should be subject to a trading ratio in 
order to equalize the load traded and account for differences in attenuation of load from 
each waste water treatment plant (WWTP) relative to the management area outlet 
(Obrupta, et al.,2008). Trades across M.A.s would have to be conducted in 
correspondence with defined trading ratios between M.A.s. 
This study incorporates the Management Area concept into the TRS by 
developing an explicit mathematical framework to investigate the economic aspects of 
various management area configurations.  To do so, the M.A. approach needs to be 
generalized and consolidated systematically. Specifically, explicit answers to the 
following three questions must be given:  1) how is a watershed to be divided into 
M.A.s? ; 2) what are the trading ratios appropriate for intra-management area trading? ; 
and 3) What are the trading ratios to be used for inter-management area trading? 
How to divide a watershed into M.A.s? 
The demarcation of Management Areas can be broken into two steps, as follows: 
Step One.  Identifying the "critical locations" based on the hydrological conditions in the 
watershed.  
Some locations such as reservoirs and highly populated areas, are of great 
importance from a water use perspective, and hence may involve more restrictive criteria 
to accommodate designated uses. The critical locations should also include those that are 
particularly vulnerable to hot-spot effects and so must be protected by a predetermined 
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standard.  In other words, the water quality at locations that are not identified as critical 
must not experience notable degradations in ecological well-being. As an example, an 
extensive water quality simulation study (Omni Environmental 2007a) based on the Non-
Tidal Passaic River Basin identifies two critical locations in which excessive phosphorus 
concentrations are more likely to stimulate algal blooms. Other locations are not deemed 
to be critical as high concentrations of phosphorus in those areas are not expected 
stimulate algal growth due to other limiting factors such as light availability or high 
stream velocity. After identifying all the "critical locations", the second step is to 
delineate management areas based on those critical locations. 
Step Two. Management Areas are delineated in such a way that each critical location is 
the end-point of one M.A., which is also the "sole outlet" of that M.A..
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These specific rules of M.A. demarcation yield an important result that all water 
flowing out from an upstream M.A. into the downstream M.A. necessarily passes through 
the critical location at the end-point of the upstream M.A. In this sense one can think the 
end-point as a Customs points that export all effluents from upstream M.A. to 
downstream M.A. Therefore, the amount of discharge exported from an M.A. can always 
be measured equivalently by the "effective discharge" at its end-point.  
To formulate this problem mathematically, think of a management area as a set of 
dischargers with }....,{ 21 jnjjj  being a source in the upstream management area J 
and [j] denoting the end-point of j’s M.A.  Similarly let }....,{ 21 knkkk  represent 
sources in the downstream management area K. Note that an M.A. is considered upstream 
                                                          
12
 By the M.A. delineation, each critical location is an end-point and each end-point is a critical 
location, hence, with the context of this and subsequent chapters the terms "end-point" and 
"critical location" can be used interchangeably.  
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to another M.A. if the endpoint of the former is upstream to the latter.
13
 Further, in order 
to facilitate the discussion, the point sources are alphabetically ordered from upstream to 
downstream. For instance, in the remainder of this presentation, management area J is 
always upstream to management area K without additional specification.  
Then there exists a following multiplicative relation of diffusion rates between a 
source in J and a source in K
14
: 
kjjjjk ddd ][][                                                                                   ------(2.4.1-1) 
Equation (2.4.1-1) says the diffusion rate from j to k is equal to the diffusion rate from j 
to its end-point [j] multiplied by the diffusion rate from [j] to k.  Multiplying both sides of 
the equation by the effluent ke , equation (2.4.1-1) becomes: 
kjjjjjkj ddede ][][                                                                  ------(2.4.1-2) 
Equation (2.3.1-2) can be further reduced to equation (2.4.1-3) by defining a notation 
][ jje , which denotes the relative impact on end-point [j] as a source j in J emits ej. 
Formally, Jj , ][][ jjjjj dee   (hereafter ][ jje  is referred to as the "Effective 
discharge at [j] contributed by j"):  
kjjjjkj dede ][][                                                                      ------(2.4.1-3) 
Equation (2.4.1-3) states that je units of discharge at source j in upstream M.A. has the 
same impact on source k in the downstream M.A. as ][ jje  units of "effective discharge" 
                                                          
13
 For the special case in which one endpoint is neither upstream nor downstream of the other, 
one cannot clearly order the M.A.  This special case is ruled out in this study.    
14
 Note that this multiplicative relation is guaranteed because the endpoint is always the sole-
outlet of the M.A.  
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by the end-point [j].  By the same token, the total discharge exported from management 
area J can be measured by Je , which is equal to the sum of the effective discharge 
contributed by all sources in J relative to the endpoint, that is:  



Jj
jjJ ee ][                                                                                               ------(2.4.1-4) 
This equivalent measure of discharge plays a vital role in designing the proper trading 
ratios.  
What are the trading ratios for intra-M.A. trades?   
As discussed above, the way each M.A. is delineated guarantees that each M.A. 
end-point is the sole outlet of its M.A. This makes it possible to hydrologically separate 
M.A.s  In other words, as long as the water quality at the critical location is ensured, the 
allowances trading within its M.A. would not jeopardize the water quality in other M.A.s.  
For this reason, the trading ratios for intra-M.A. trading are designed to adequately 
protect the water quality at its end-point. In particular, let 1k  and 2k be two sources 
within the management area K (i.e.  Kkk 21, ). Suppose 1k  sells one allowance to 
2k , then 1k  has to discharge 1ke units less, while 2k  can discharge 2ke units 
more.  Equation (2.4.2-1) guarantees that this trade has zero net effect at their common 
end-point (i.e. ][ 1k = ][ 2k  ):   
0][][ 222211  kkkkkkK dedee                                               -------(2.4.2-1) 
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Finally, solving for equation (2.4.2-1), the intra-M.A. trading ratio 
21kk

 is set equal to 
the diffusion rates from seller 1k  to buyer’s end-point ][ 2k  divided by the diffusion 
rate from buyer 2k  to its endpoint ][ 2k .  
][
][
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21
kk
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kk
d
d
e
e
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


             
                                                        -------(2.4.2-2)
        
The design of trading ratio 21kk
 ensures that allowing trade to be both upstream and 
downstream within an M.A. will not affect the water quality at its end-point; however, 
pollution concentration levels of other areas within the same M.A. might increase as a 
result. Nevertheless, these elevated concentrations do not result in "hot spot" by the 
explicit designs of the M.A.s. From this sense, one can think the trading system within 
each M.A. as a bare-bones version of the ambient permit system, whereas the problem of 
transaction complexity is avoided since there is only one market for emission allowances. 
Formally, the idea of allowing intra-M.A. trades relative to a single end-point is 
essential for the proof of the following Proposition: (The proof is provided in the 
Appendix One) 
 
Proposition 1:  
Intra-M.A. trading constraints support the cost-effective allocation of allowances 
subject to the water quality at the M.A. end-point. 
 
Proposition 1 ensures that, ceteris paribus,  the water quality at the endpoint of 
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the M.A. is strictly protected by Intra-M.A. trading constraints, so that when the water 
flows out of each M.A. and enters the downstream M.A., the water quality is within the 
predetermined standard set for effluents or concentrations of effluents at the M.A. 
endpoints. Moreover, it claims that the cost-effective benchmark in which the 
environmental authority minimizes the aggregate abatement costs subject to 
environmental constraints is the same as the model in which the environmental authority 
minimizes aggregate abatement costs subject to the Intra-M.A. trading constraints. 
What are the trading ratios for inter-M.A. trades?   
Similarly, the trading ratios for inter-M.A. trades are designed to preserve the 
water quality at each zonal endpoint. And since only the buyer's endpoint is subject to the 
negative impact by the trades, ensuring the water quality at the buyer's M.A. endpoint is 
adequate.  Formally, let j be the seller and k be the buyer from different management 
areas J and K respectively ( KkJj  , ) and so [k] is buyer k's M.A. end-point, 
je is the change of effluent from j,  ke is the change of effluent from k.  Equation 
(2.4.3-1) guarantees that the trade has zero net effects at the buyer's end-point [K].   
0][][  kkkkjj dede                                                                   -------(2.4.3-1) 
Solving equation (2.4.3-1), the inter-M.A. trading ratio ik  is: 
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

                                                                               
-------(2.4.3-2) 
Comparing equation (2.4.3-2) with equation (2.4.2-2) shows that the trading ratio for both 
intra-M.A. trades and inter-M.A. trades are described by the same simple relation------the 
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trading ratio is equal to the relative diffusion rates to the end-point of buyer's M.A. (see 
equation (2.4.3-3)), or formally, 
][
][
kk
kj
jk
d
d

  ,         
][
][
22
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21
kk
kk
kk
d
d

                                                        
-------(2.4.3-3) 
For this reason, unless otherwise specified, I adopt the convention “t” to indicate the 
trading ratio in the remainder of this thesis for both inter- and intra-M.A. trading.. 
To gain an intuitive understanding of the inter-M.A. trading process, it may be 
helpful for the reader to imagine such trades to be comprised of two steps, differentiating 
between reallocation of allowances within an M.A. and trades that occur between M.A.s.  
That is, one can apply a multiplicative effect over diffusion from j to [k], using the 
upstream end-point [j] as intermediary: 
]][[][][ kjjjkj ddd                                                                                     -------(2.4.3-4) 
Hence, Equation (2.4.3-5) can be derived by substituting Equation (2.4.3-4) into (2.4.3-1): 
0][]][[][  kkkkjjjj dedde                                                      -------(2.4.3-5) 
And since we have ][kkkK dee  , and  ][ jjjJ dee  , equation (2.4.3-5) can 
be further reduced to equation (2.4.3-6):  
 0]][[  KkjJ ede                                                                       -------(2.4.3-6) 
Finally, the equivalent trading ratio ]][[ kjt between the two end-points [j], [k] can be 
solved from equation (2.4.3-6): 
 
]][[]][[ kj
J
K
kj d
e
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t 



                                                                       
-------(2.4.3-7) 
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Equation (2.4.3-7) demonstrates that the inter-M.A. trading between two sources j and k 
is as if the two M.A. end-points [j] and [k] were trading the "effective allowances" under 
the Hung and Shaw's TRS-----the trading ratio is set equal to the natural diffusion rate 
between the two end-points.  This result can be further interpreted as if there were an 
imaginary broker at each M.A. end-point who buys (sells) allowances from (to) another 
broker following the TRS and sells (buys) them to (from) the sources within its M.A.  In 
other words, one can think of the inter-M.A. trading as being carried out into two steps: 
allowances are traded across M.A.s by "brokers" at each M.A. end-point under the TRS, 
and the allowances are distributed to local sources within their respective M.A.s based on 
Intra-M.A. trading constraints. 
Hung and Shaw's TRS guarantees that, in the first step, effective allowances can 
be traded between M.A. end-points cost-effectively, while meeting the environmental 
quality at all end-points.  Since the cost-effectiveness of the second step can also be 
ensured by proposition 1 discussed earlier, the entire inter-M.A. trading process is 
consummated cost-effectively subject to the environmental standards at all M.A. end-
points. The above is formally expressed in proposition 2.  
 
Proposition 2: 
The inter-M.A. trading system supports the cost-effective allocation of allowances 
among the whole watershed subject to the water quality constraints at all M.A. 
endpoints.   
 
The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix One. 
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To incorporate the Management Area Approach, Hung and Shaw's trading model 
(Problem B) shall be re-written into the following set up:  
                                      
n
i ii
e
eC
i
1
)(min
 
                                                      -----(2.4.3-8) 
                                     subject to:   
                                   i
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k ikki
n
k kii
te    11  ( i = 1, ..., n)           -----(2.4.3-9) 
 Problem (C)               
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t   ki,                                                         ----(2.4.3-10) 
],0[ 0ii ee                                                                   ----(2.4.3-11) 
0, ikki TT      ki,                                                     ----(2.4.3-12) 
As noted previously, for k and i both in the same M.A. the trading equation (2.4.3-
9) now allows some trades to take place in both directions. The actual rule of trading is 
explicit given by the ratio of exogenously determined natural diffusion rates. (equation 
2.4.3-10) Further, because the trading ratio between any two sources is always equal to 
the ratio of natural diffusion rates to the buyer's M.A. endpoint, each summation 
arguments is "1 to n", which contrast with the Hung and Shaw formulation in Problem B 
that uses a summation process that distinguishes between upstream and downstream 
trading opportunities.  Note that the above model specification is designed to be concise, 
so it does not explicitly indicate which trades are precluded. Implicitly, trades are 
precluded where trading ratios are zero.    
To sum up, in this section, the Hung and Shaw (2005) Trading Ratio System 
(TRS) is broadly interpreted to enable firms to trade allowances upstream and across 
tributaries within a specified multi-discharger Management Area. The chapter 
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demonstrates that aggregating firms with non-unitary exchange rates into “Management 
Areas” focusing on meeting environmental objectives at specific endpoints and adopting 
a TRS system between management areas can achieve cost-effectiveness given 
predetermined environmental standards at those end-points. The biggest merit of this 
Management Area approach is that the environmental authority can have the flexibility to 
choose exactly which locations are to be protected while the cost-effectiveness always 
holds, subject to  that selection.  In comparison, in a typical zonal approach, with one-to-
one trading within a zone, control authorities would have to increase the amount of 
required emissions reductions for the whole watershed to create a margin of safety for the 
critical locations, which defeats one of the central purposes of a zonal permit approach--
the prevention of over-control (Tietenberg, 2006).  Moreover, from a programming 
perspective, the M.A. approach is convenient for considering various hydrological 
configurations, because it only involves re-grouping the M.A.s based on different critical 
locations.  
Incorporating Fixed Upgrade Costs  
The primary benefit of water quality trading that attracts consideration by policy 
makers is the potential to control pollutants at an overall lower cost to society.  The 
trading model discussed in previous sections rests on the rationale of marginal cost 
trading, by which one point source can over control for a pollutant at a relatively low 
marginal cost, selling the over control as "allowances" to another point source that is not 
able to reduce pollutants as cost effectively. Through the trade, the second point source 
can achieve its share of responsibility at a lower cost, while the first point source can be 
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compensated for the additional costs incurred.  The net cost savings from marginal cost 
trading are indicated by the shaded area in figure 2.2-1.  
In reality, there exists a second, perhaps more significant, source of cost savings. 
Through allowance trading, dischargers are given greater flexibility to determine their 
effluent level which could enhance planning for capital upgrades. In practice, most 
treatment plants have to design their abatement technology and make capital investments 
targeting on one of a few final concentration ranges, rather than accommodating every 
specific concentration determined by the permits trading.   Because of these discrete 
“jumps” in facility upgrades, it is reasonable to assume that the capital costs (CC) costs 
generally increase in step-wise pattern.  A simple capital cost structure of this type is 
represented below. 
 
Figure 2.5-1  The capital upgrade costs 
The optimal decisions of fixed capital investments can be described by 
considering the capital investment cost curves for the two firms i and k (Figure 2). 
Suppose that firms have  a ”low” (L) existing capacity to treat or reduce emissions, and 
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each has the opportunity to invest in a “high” treatment capital investment: firm i can 
remain at a low level of capital spending (CCi(L))  on its abatement facility, which will 
only enable i to reduce its emission to as low as 300 (spatially adjusted).  If i wants to 
abate its emission even further, it would have to incur a higher level capital spending to 
upgrade its facility represented by CCi(H). Similarly, firm k can remain at its low level of 
capital spending (CCk(L))  spending and high spatially adjusted emission level (more than 
310 units), or undertake a higher level of capital spending (CCk(H)) to be able to reduce its 
spatially adjusted emission below 310 units. As in the previous discussion related to 
Figure 2.2-1, assume that the initial allocation of pollution abatement strategies is that 
each source reduces it spatially-adjusted effluent by half (i.e. (200,200)) -- that is they are 
each allocated the right to pollute up to 200 units at receptor j.  Given the capital cost 
configuration in Figure 2.5-1, there will be incentives for trade up to the point where firm 
k has a spatially adjusted emission level higher than 310 by buying permits from firm i, 
and discharger k has a spatially adjusted emission level less than 90 to supply permits for 
i. With such a reallocation, firm k would not have to incur high level capital spending.  In 
other words, only one firm needs to upgrade to a high level of capital cost and the other 
can avoid upgrading through trade. If no trade had been possible, each discharger would 
have abated 200 units, and they both would have to incur high levels of capital costs to 
upgrade each of their abatement facilities.  
As such, the optimal abatement allocation should be re-characterized as one that 
minimizes the sum of the firms’ total abatement cost, namely, the combination of both 
“continuous” variable cost (operation and maintenance cost) and the “discrete” capital 
investment cost.  Once the variable cost and capital investment cost are considered at the 
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same time, the spatially adjusted "equi-marginal" condition that derived from the 
marginal cost trading may no longer give the least-cost results.  
 
Figure 2.5-2 Deviation of the equi-marginal condition 
The above graph demonstrates the optimal abatement allocation in which the total 
abatement cost is minimized.  As in the previous discussion, the vector ),( kjij ee (100, 
300), corresponding to point *1e  the variable abatement costs are minimized (see Figure 
2.2-1). However, when both variable costs and fixed capital costs are considered together, 
the vector ),( kjij ee (100, 300) might not be the optimal allocation as it will induce 
high-level capital costs for both firms.  Discharger k could avoid upgrading if trading 
arrived to abatement allocation *2e  or anywhere at its right; and discharger i could avoid 
upgrading if trading achieves ),( kjij ee (300, 100) or anywhere at its left.  Offsetting 
these potential capital costs savings is the fact that the further that the emission vector 
deviates from vector ),( kjij ee (100, 300) the greater the variable abatement cost. 
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Accounting for both effects, the optimal abatement allocation must come from one of the 
three “candidates”: 
),( kjij ee (100, 300): Firms’ variable costs are minimized 
),( kjij ee (90, 310): The “edge” where firm k just gets enough permits to avoid 
upgrade 
),( kjij ee (300, 100): The “edge” where firm i just gets enough permits to avoid 
upgrade 
By comparing aggregate abatement costs at these three vectors, the least-cost 
allocation of pollution, or here pollution abatement responsibilities, can be identified. In 
this arbitrary example, suppose capital cost savings at ),( kjij ee  (90, 310) outweigh the 
efficiency lost in variable cost (represented by the shaded area), then ),( kjij ee  (90, 
310) is the optimal allocation of abatements.   If it does not, then the optimal allocation 
would be the interior solution ),( kjij ee  (100, 310). 
In discussing the importance of considering fixed capital costs in trading, I 
recognize that capital cost considerations are not a novel issue in the pollution trading 
literature. Rose-Ackerman (1974), amongst other earlier studies, raised concerns about 
market incentives, specifically taxes, vis-à-vis substantial, discrete fixed costs likely to 
arise in water quality treatment.  Later studies differ in the way to incorporate the 
lumpiness of abatement cost. Eheart designed an early computer iteration to optimize the 
abatement allocation accounting for the discrete costs (Eheart, 1980). He argued that, 
given the discrete nature of the possible treatment increments available, some dischargers 
were obliged to operate at a higher treatment level than the minimum requirement. Yet, 
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Eheart did not make a clear distinction between variable abatement costs and lumpy 
capital upgrade costs. Instead, the marginal cost was approximated by the total cost 
divided by last technology step’s corresponding incremental reduction achieved, the idea 
of which is echoed by Caplan (2008). In Caplan's investigation into what would be an 
appropriate approximation to firms' WTP for additional allowance, he similarly assumed 
that firms will only operate at the full capacity for each upgrade steps. Indeed, as I will 
discuss deeper in Chapter 5, Caplan's notion of "Average Cost" becomes less relevant 
once the variable component of abatement cost is introduced. In an empirical study, 
Rowles (2008) also seems to have imposed the similar type of "none-or-maximum 
capacity" type of assumption.  
Hanley et al. (1998) accounted for the apparent ‘lumpiness’ of investment in 
abatement equipment by specifying the abatement cost to be "piece-wise linear stepped 
functions". In addition to the case of “none-or-maximum capacity”, they also envisaged 
another scenario:  
"…the reduction of each discharge could vary continuously between zero and the 
highest level of cut considered feasible, the associated cost being that of the ‘next 
step’".  (Hanley, et al. 1998, pp 216) 
Reflecting on these two scenarios, they note that the total abatement costs in the “none-
or-maximum capacity” scenario are always higher since the constraints on abatement 
activity are more binding. They acknowledge that: "the actual situation depends on the 
method of reduction to be employed in each case, so that, ceteris paribus, real aggregate 
costs would probably lie in the region between those suggested in these scenarios" 
(Hanley, et al.,1998, pp. 216-217)   
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In comparison, Liao, Onal and Chen (2008) clearly distinguished between 
variable cost and capital cost. They decomposed total emission control cost into variable 
costs and fixed costs of installing equipment. Yet they imposed linearity of cost functions 
in order to derive the Average Shadow Prices which are based on average rather than 
marginal changes in pure integer linear programming problems. As an improvement, 
Sado et al. (2007) relaxed the linearity assumption of the variable abatement cost. 
However, this study did not explicitly incorporate the fixed capital upgrade cost into the 
optimization problem.  
In addition to the several ways to deal with the lumpy capital costs, these studies 
also have different strategies to characterize the potential trading patterns. Eheart, et al. 
(1980) identified the potential market prices by finding a least-cost envelope in a study in 
Wisconsin.  Bennett et al. (2000) adopted a similar approach to estimate the cost-savings 
for nitrogen trading on Long Island Sound.  Specifically, "nitrogen control projects are 
selected in ascending order of cost until the required nitrogen reduction is achieved in a 
given area" (Bennett, et al., 2000, p. 3714).  By focusing simply on deriving the least-cost 
envelope they could not specify who should be trading with whom, other than expressing 
that firms with costs above the uniform price would be seller while firms below this 
threshold would likely be buyer.  Hanley, et al. (1998) as well as Liao, et al. (2008) 
applied a Mixed Integer Programming method to identify the minimum aggregate cost of 
cutting pollution to a given amount. The former focused on a one-point-ambient system, 
while the latter did not deal with the spatial effects of trading. Hence, neither of them 
addressed who should be trading with whom.   
The contribution of this study is to bring these issues to the forefront in a formal 
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empirical exploration of factors that could improve the cost-effectiveness of trading 
programs and enhance the viability of water quality trading. This study extends previous 
work on discrete abatement costs in three important ways: (1) It makes a clear distinction 
between variable abatement cost and fixed upgrade costs; (2) It relaxes the previous 
assumption that a firm's variable abatement cost needs be linear so that the marginal 
abatement cost can vary even if the upgrade level is fixed, allowing for an interior 
solution; (3) It directly incorporates the trading equation into the least cost model so that 
the pattern of trades can be identified explicitly.  
To investigate these issues, a second modification to the standard model (problem 
B) is needed to account for discrete fixed costs associated with upgrading to enable 
treating effluent to a lower concentration level.  In setting up the standard model, Hung 
and Shaw assume that the abatement cost function is “increasing and strictly convex”, 
consistent with the marginal cost approach utilized by Montgomery (“convex and twice 
differentiable"), Tietenberg (“continuous cost function”) and others. However, as 
suggested, the continuity of abatement cost is somewhat an unrealistic assumption and 
total abatement cost should be decomposed into variable costs and fixed capital 
investment costs.  In other words, total abatement cost function should be seen as being 
controlled by two arguments, the continuous variable ie  and discrete variable ix  which 
denote final effluent level and capital investment level respectively. Specifically, 
equation (2.5-1) describes the decomposition of total annual abatement cost: 
)()(),( iii
x
iiii xCCeOMxeC
i                                                                  -------(2.5-1) 
The total annual abatement cost, ),( iii xeC , is determined by continuous variable ie  and 
discrete integer variable ix . The right hand side )(
ix
iOM  denotes the Annual Operation 
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and Maintenance cost (variable cost) of firm i with investment level ix , at final effluent 
level ie , and )( ii xCC denotes the Annual Capital Cost of firm i when it upgrades the 
capacity to the level ix .  Note further that ix  is used as a superscript in the annual 
Operation and Maintenance (OM) cost function. This is because the facility upgrade of a 
firm may affect the variable cost function of that firm.  Although, how exactly the OM 
cost functional form evolves with different upgrade levels remains an open empirical 
question.   
Further assume that the maximal abatement capacity of each firm is determined 
by its own facility upgrade level ix . Hence, each firm's maximal achievable level of 
abatement is bounded by a function of its upgrade level ix  :  
)( iii xe                                                                                                           -------(2.5-2) 
Consequently, we have the following cost minimization problem, which considers 
explicitly the allocation of fixed capital investment, as well as the optimal abatement 
decisions among dischargers:  
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0)( iiii eex  ;      ( i = 1, ..., n )                                              ---(2.5-6) 
                             ki , 0ik                ki,                                                         ---(2.5-7) 
                             ii Zx               ( i = 1, ..., n )                                                    ---(2.5-8) 
The first inequality constraint (2.5-4) is equivalent to that presented in problem B 
(constraint 2.3-4). The second inequality (2.5-6) gives the constraint of maximal 
abatement capacity, equivalent to the lower bound of effluent level. In (2.5-8), each level 
of upgrade ix  belongs to a subset of integers iZ . Note that each integer set iZ may differ, 
meaning each firm faces a different spectrum of upgrade choices.  In addition, since the 
capital investment is irreversible, each firm can only upgrade but never downgrade their 
facility level. Consequently, if firm i has a certain level of existing capacity to remove 
pollutant, than "0" must not be in its choice set iZ  
For the bench mark specification (Problem A), Montgomery (1972) has shown 
that the optimal vector of effluents exists. Hung and Shaw (2005) prove that trading 
constraints in problem B (equation 2.3-4) are exactly the same as the environmental 
constraints in problem A (equation 2.2-6).  Therefore the optimal effluents allocation 
exists under the TRS and is exactly the same as the least cost effluents allocation under 
the cost-effective bench mark defined by problem (A).  Moreover, Hung and Shaw also 
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prove that the competitive equilibrium coincides with the optimal solution in problem B, 
concluding that the market equilibrium under TRS can always achieve cost-effectiveness 
both through simultaneous trading and sequential bilateral trading.  It is important to note 
that most of these "nice" theoretical results demonstrated by Montgomery as well as 
Hung and Shaw rely heavily on the differentiability of the objective functions. Yet, as we 
relax the assumption of continuity in our analysis, we can no longer apply the similar 
kind of "derivative arguments".    
Then, does an optimum always exist for problem D?  The answer is yes. Since the 
objective function apparently has discontinuous arguments in problem D, it takes us a 
short detour to make the following arguments.  
For any given vector of feasible upgrade allocation ).......,( 21 nxxxX  , the 
upgrade level of each firm is fixed and so the capital investment cost of each firm is 
constant. Hence the objective function becomes   
n
i
iii xeC1 ),(  which would be 
continuous. And since the constraint set is compact 
n , the Weierstrass theorem 
guarantees the existence of minimum value for   
n
i
iii xeC1 ),( .  In this manner one can 
also think of this minimization problem as a two-stage search process----search the 
minimum abatement costs for each chosen upgrade allocation, and then search the 
optimal upgrade allocation that gives the global minimum cost.  This argument is valid as 
there are only a finite number of feasible upgrade vectors. 
A more challenging question is: can one achieve the optimal solution in problem 
D through competitive equilibrium?  Again, without differentiability of the cost functions, 
we cannot adopt the usual proof by applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to show the 
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shadow price for each firm coincides with the market price of permits for that firm. 
Indeed, how to achieve this optimal under market conditions involves fairly complex 
issues, which I would like to defer to Chapter 5.  For the moment however, I will discuss 
the range of prices that might be attained in the spot market, given one specific upgrade 
allocation ).......,( 21 nxxxX  .  
Relationship Between the Integer Model and the Basic Model  
The standard model specified in section 2.2 rests on the ideal of open markets, in 
which firms buy and sell pollution allowances based on marginal abatement costs through 
a spot price mechanism.  It is as if all firms have made their capacity choices, and so each 
firm minimizes only the annual variable costs of pollution abatement. In this sense, the 
standard model in section 2.2 captures only one specific branch of the integer model.  i.e. 
once each firm's upgrade level is fixed by the specific investment vector
15
 
).......,( 21 nxxxX  , the integer model (problem D) is boiled down to the standard convex 
programming model (Problem D ).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 This specific investment vector is associated with the upgrade requirement of each firm such 
that each firm has existing capacity to abate to the designated concentration level by itself.   
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Note that once vector X is fixed, the domain of the objective function above 
becomes a convex set, in addition, all the constraints are linear functions, hence the 
Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa constraint-qualification is trivially satisfied. Therefore, as long as 
the cost functions are convex on the domain, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions will give us the 
constrained global minimum. 
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker equation for this model is:   
K(ei, Tki, λi, αi,  βi ) 
=   
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---(2.6-7) 
By solving for the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (written in type II K-T representation),  
0 iiiii ZeK  ; (i = 1,…,n)                                   ---(2.6-8) 
0 kikiki tK   (k = 1,...,n; i = 1,…,n)                       ---(2.6-9) 
0)(  kikiki t   (k = 1,...n; i =1,…,n)                        ---(2.6-10) 
0
1
   i
n
ik ik
n
k kikiii
TteK   (i = 1,…,n)                                    ---(2.6-11) 
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0)( 0  eeii  (k = 1,...n; i =1,…,n)                                                                  ---(2.6-15) 
0)(  iiii exK   (i = 1,…,n)                                                                     ---(2.6-16) 
0))((  iiii ex   (k = 1,...n; i =1,…,n)                                                           ---(2.6-17) 
Suppose that the cost functions are monotonic decreasing with final effluent ( ie ), 
it must be the case that every firm utilizes all its tradable permits, so the trading equation 
is binding (i.e.   
n
k
iik
n
k kikii
Tte
11
).  Then, each firm has a positive shadow 
price λi,  Hung and Shaw show that these shadow prices are the prices of the permits at 
the respective points.  Moreover, when trade takes place between k and i (e.g. Tki is 
strictly positive), the following equality results:  
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which states that the 
ratio of shadow prices (as well as the ratio of prices of permits) between k and i, is just 
equal to the transfer coefficient between these two plants.  In the interior, the 
complementary slackness conditions ensure that multipliers αi , βi  are all equal to zero, 
and hence, the shadow price of a unit of effluent at site i, is equivalent to the marginal 
abatement cost at site i. ( i.e. iiiiii ZMC    ). 
There are two corner situations that would make the permit price deviate from the 
marginal abatement cost: If the final effluent of plant i is bounded by the initial untreated 
effluent level (i.e. )00 eei , multipliers αi would be nonnegative. Then 
iiiii ZMC   , showing that the permit price at firm i could be less than its 
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marginal cost.  On the other hand, if the final effluent of plant i is bounded by its physical 
removal capacity (i.e. 0)(  iii ex ), multipliers  βi  would be nonnegative. Then 
iiiii ZMC   , showing that the permit price at i could be higher than its 
marginal abatement cost.   
In all, the results from Kuhn-Tucker condition can be summarized into six facts 
related to willingness to pay and willingness to sell an allowances in an ex post spot 
market. The term, "ex post", refers here to the short-run or spot-market trading case in 
which the market trading takes place after firms make their capacity choices.  
(1) For a discharger operating at an interior solution, its willingness to pay (WTP) and 
willingness to sell (WTS) are unique, being equal to its marginal cost of abatement.   
(2) Trade between any pair of the "interior" dischargers has a unique price ratio which 
follows  
i
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][
][
  
(3) For a discharger constrained by the “primary” or uncontrolled emission rate 0ie , it is 
willing to sell the excess allowances at any positive price. In other words, WTS is NOT 
unique. On the other hand, WTP is trivial as the firm is not allowed to increase its 
effluent any further.    
(4) For a discharger who has reached its physical abatement capacity but has not yet met 
the required environmental standard, its willingness to pay for additional permits is 
higher than its marginal abatement cost. Indeed, if one assumes that the penalty of non-
compliance is infinite, then the firm's WTP is not bounded from above. 
16
 
 
                                                          
16
 This results from the assumption that the firm cannot upgrade its treatment capacity in the short 
term. 
56 
 
(5) Trade between an "interior" discharger and a discharger operating at the “edge” of 
its capital upgrade does not have a unique price ratio, while it is bounded from above 
(below) by  the "interior" discharger's WTP (Or WTS).  
(6)  Trade between any pair of the "edge" dischargers does NOT have a unique price 
ratio, the actual trading price of permits depends on bargaining between the two 
dischargers. The possible price ranges from zero to positive infinity.  
In closing this section, I would like to reiterate an important point: The above 
WTP and WTS relationships are derived under a spot market environment, where firms 
trade emission allowances marginally according to the market price. Since firms cannot 
expand their abatement capacity in the short run, they need to make their capacity choices 
before entering the spot market.  From a programming perspective, the resulting ex post 
cost minimization problem only yields the local minimum on one specific branch of the 
integer capacity choices. To find the potential global least cost, one has to consider all 
feasible combinations of discrete investment choices. A mixed integer nonlinear 
programming model based on the setup in problem (D) can provide a solution. It is 
toward this objective that the next two chapters are directed.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF THE COST FUNCTIONS AND THE 
DATA FOR THE UPPER PASSAIC RIVER BASIN CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
Several components are needed in order to assess the potential cost savings 
associated with implementing a phosphorous trading program in the Upper Passaic River 
Basin relative to a uniform standard for emissions. Data for the environmental standards 
and the allowable effluent for each source are required as parameters of the cost 
minimization problem. The transfer coefficients or trading ratios between each pair of 
sources must be obtained to identify trading opportunities throughout the watershed. 
Finally, in order to conduct the cost minimization "globally", it is necessary to have 
empirical specifications of both operating & management and capital cost functions over 
the entire feasible domains. The purpose of this chapter is to develop and describe the 
data and functional specifications needed to assess cost savings associated with a trading 
program that conforms to the management area approaches discussed in the preceding 
chapter and for which minimum cost solutions can be obtained using a Mixed-Integer 
Nonlinear Programming model.  
A Geographical Overview of the Passaic Upper River Basin 
The Upper Passaic River Basin encompasses 803 square miles, with 669 square 
miles of the watershed in northeastern New Jersey and the remainder extending 
northward in New York State. Approximately one-quarter of New Jersey’s population 
lives within the boundaries of the basin.  
As shown in Map 3.2.1, the Passaic River initially flows south, then turns and 
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flows in a north-easterly direction, and then turns east and finally south before reaching 
Newark Bay. The formal terminus of the Upper Passaic River Basin is Dundee Dam, 
which separates the Upper, Non-Tidal Passaic River from the tidal part of the Passaic 
River. The Dead River joins the Passaic at the point where it first changes direction, and 
begins flowing in a northeasterly direction. At the watershed’s center, the Rockaway 
River flows into the Whippany River, and in turn, the Whippany River flows into the 
Passaic. The Wanaque River begins in the northern part of the watershed, providing the 
primary water supply for the Monksville and Wanaque Reservoirs. Some of this natural 
supply is retained in these reservoirs, which serve as a drinking water supply for Newark, 
a city located outside the watershed.  The remainder, augmented by waters from a 
number of other minor tributaries, flows into the Pompton River, which subsequently 
joins the Passaic. Below this confluence, but above the Dundee Dam, the Singac Brook 
and the Peckman River join the Passaic River.  
In dry periods with low water inflow, a water intake (Wanaque South Intake) at 
the south end of the Pompton river, near the confluence of the Pompton and the Passaic,  
diverts water through a pumping station to the Wanaque Reservoir, which is located 
upstream of the Pompton River. This is to maintain the water level in the reservoir. The 
reservoir is the primary source of water for consumers in Newark. This diversion 
fundamentally alters the hydrology of the watershed (Obrupta, et al, 2008):  in an 
extremely dry season, the quantity of water diverted can be so great that the pumping 
station actually draws water from the Passaic, which is a few hundred feet downstream 
from the pumping station. Under these extreme diversion conditions, the Wanaque 
Reservoir actually receives water from the Upper Passaic. Thus, in certain drought years, 
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this large reservoir essentially obtains water from nearly all areas of the watershed, most 
of which are naturally downstream. High quality water in the watershed’s reservoirs is 
essential in maintaining people’s health in the region, as well as for maintaining habitat 
for aquatic species and for providing recreational opportunities for residents. Because all 
streams and the reservoirs are connected by waterways, the water quality of reservoirs is 
inextricably tied to that of the streams and rivers.  As is discussed below in this chapter, 
the trading ratios used in the water quality trading program are designed to account for 
the variation across several diversion scenarios, and, hence, to ensure that water quality 
standards are met at the Wanaque reservoir as well as at Dundee Lake and Dam. 
 
Map 3.2-1: The Upper Passaic River Basin. The square boxes indicate the 22 Wastewater 
Treatment Plants included in this study. 
Source: NJDEP, Omni Environmental 
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A brief background of the case study 
The rivers and streams in the watershed flow through some highly urbanized areas, 
although there are some areas (primarily in the North) of the watershed that remain 
forested (see Map 3.3-1). As the case of many watersheds in urban or urbanizing areas 
throughout the country, the quality of surface water within the Passaic River Watershed is 
threatened by population pressure. Several years ago, the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) funded watershed characterization and assessment 
studies of this watershed (North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, NJDWSC, 
2002). These studies revealed that surface water quality standards for nutrients, dissolved 
oxygen, PH, temperature, pathogens, metals and pesticides are often exceeded. 
Consequently, most of the water resources within the watershed have been classified as 
being "impaired" under Clean Water Act, Section 305d, which states that “impaired water 
bodies are those that cannot meet numeric or narrative ambient based water quality 
standards established for the designated use or uses (e.g. recreational, water supply, 
aquatic species) for that water body.” (EPA website, accessed in 2009) 17 For the Upper 
Passaic River Basin phosphorus is of particular concern at this time: a 2005 report by 
Najarian Associates documented that current discharges of phosphorus from Waste Water 
Treatment Plants (WWTPs) along the Passaic River pose one of the most serious threats 
to the quality of the Wanaque Reservoir. Although water from the Passaic River accounts 
for only 6% of the total inflow into the reservoir, Najarian Associates (2005) estimates 
that 35% of total phosphorus load in the reservoir comes from the Passaic River. Much of 
                                                          
17 
Depending on the degree to which designated uses are supported, States place assessed waters 
into the following categories (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2000b): (1) fully supporting 
overall use; (2) threatened overall use; (3) partially supporting overall use; (4) not supporting 
overall use; and. (5) not attainable.  
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this phosphorus loading comes from large WWTPs that release water into the Passaic 
River (NJDWSC, 2002). Thus, reducing phosphorus loads from these WWTPs has been 
identified as a critical element in improving the water quality of the reservoir.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 3.3-1: The land use of the Passaic Watershed     
(Source: TRC Omni Environmental Corp ) 
To maintain water quality, the NJDEP has targeted 22 of the largest municipal 
WWTPs in the watershed for improvements in water quality by limiting their discharges 
of effluents into rivers in the watershed. As shown in Map 3.2-1, eight of those WWTPs 
are located on the Upper Passaic River, coded from P1 to P8, working from upstream to 
downstream, while other WWTPs are located on various tributaries: three of these 
WWTPs are on the Dead River (D1 to D3); five are on the Whippany River (W1 to W4) 
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and Rockaway River (R1); one WWTP, (P9), is located on Signac Brook and two others 
are on the Peckman River (P10 and P11). Finally, the Pompton River has three WWTPs 
coded as WQ, T1 and T2.   
The size of the plants varies significantly across WWTPs. The largest WWTP is 
W4, with an average flow around 12.58 Million Gallons per Day (MGD), whereas the 
smallest WWTP, P4, has an average flow around 0.12 MGD.  The current phosphorous 
concentrations treated by WWTPs range from 0.16 mg/L (WQ) to 3.28 mg/L (P5).  Only 
five out of 22 WWTPs, (P3, W1, W2, WQ, T1) currently treat phosphorous 
concentrations to below 1 mg/L. The details for each of the 22 WWTPs regarding the 
flow levels and phosphorous concentrations are reported in Table 3.3-1.  
To establish the proper cap for the effluents, a Total Maximum Daily Load 
(TMDL) rule for phosphorus was adopted for the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin in April 
2008 (NJDEP, 2008). The TMDL specifies the maximum amount of a pollutant that a 
water-body can receive and still meet water quality standards, as well as an allocation of 
that load among the various sources of that pollutant
18
 (U.S. EPA, Section 303d, TMDL 
program guidance ). For the Upper Passaic River Basin, the final TMDL rule specifies 
that: 
“Except as necessary to satisfy the more stringent criteria…or where watershed 
or site-specific criteria are developed…phosphorus as total P shall not exceed 
0.1 [mg/l] in any stream, unless it can be demonstrated that total P is not a 
                                                          
18
 "Water Quality Standards are the foundation of the water quality-based pollution control 
program mandated by the Clean Water Act. Water Quality Standards define the goals for a 
waterbody by designating its uses, setting criteria to protect those uses, and establishing 
provisions such as antidegradation policies to protect waterbodies from pollutants". (U.S EPA, 
Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/waterquality/standards/ ) 
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limiting nutrient and will not otherwise render the waters unsuitable for the 
designated uses.” (NJDEP, 2008, p. 15) 
While this rule is intended to satisfy the water quality objectives of the Clean 
Water Act, concern was expressed by policy makers and WWTP operators in the Upper 
Passaic River Basin that meeting such a TMDL for total phosphorus may be extremely 
costly under a standard regulatory strategy, where water quality concentrations are 
uniformly capped throughout the watershed and every WWTP is required to treat to a 
unique concentration level for Phosphorus.  Each of these concerns has been addressed 
through the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin Water Quality Trading Project (PRB-WQTP), 
of which this thesis research is a part. 
As part of the TMDL and the PRB-WQTD studies, a hydrodynamic model and a 
water quality model were developed for the Upper Passaic River Basin (Omni 
Environmental, 2007a). Using the terminology developed in Chapter 2, this study, 
coupled with the Najarian Associates’ (2005) LA-WATERS model, identified the 
Wanaque Reservoir and Dundee Lake as potential hotspots. That is, this hydrodynamic 
study demonstrated that total phosphorous was not considered to be a limiting nutrient in 
other areas of the watershed due to specific hydrological characteristics such as the speed 
of water flow, depth of water, and streamside shading. Based on this hydrodynamic study 
and the flexibility allowed in the TMDL language quoted above, the NJDEP proposed 
watershed criteria be established in only those two locations as the best means to ensure 
protection of the designated uses in the watershed (N.J.A.C 7:9B-1.5(g)3). The watershed 
criteria were proposed in terms of a seasonal average concentration of the response 
indicator, chl-a, specifically, a seasonal average of 10 μg/L chl-a in the Wanaque 
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Reservoir and a seasonal average of 20 μg/L chl-a in Dundee Lake (NJDEP, 2008).  
Further reflecting concerns for political fairness, the effluent caps for wastewater 
treatment facilities were set on an equitable basis to be a long term average (LTA) 
effluent concentration of 0.4 mg/l of total phosphorus for all wastewater dischargers 
rather than specifying individual effluent standards for each WWTP. 
With respect to phosphorus treatment, only six of the 22 major WWTPs in this 
watershed (those marked by an asterisk [*] in Table 3.2.1) presently treat for phosphorus 
before discharging effluent into streams, and most of these are relatively small in terms of 
daily flow. Moreover, four of the six WWTPs that currently remove phosphorus will also 
need some additional capital investment as the NDJEP requirements are beyond the 
current capacity for treatment. Consequently, if each WWTP is forced to meet the 0.4 
mg/L total phosphorous concentration requirement, it is anticipated that there will be a 
heavy financial burden on many WWTPs, subsequently falling largely on water users and 
taxpayers throughout the watershed.  
Thus, in an effort to achieve the intended environmental benefit at lower cost, 
both the government and the industry are interested in determining the extent to which a 
water quality trading program can reduce the costs of meeting the water quality standards.  
With this in mind, an active coalition of point sources, the NJDEP, a basin-wide public 
interest group, trade associations, and a team of experts from Rutgers and Cornell 
Universities were assembled to investigate the feasibility of an emissions trading program 
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under the US EPA funded PRB-WQTP. Much of the data needed for empirical 
specification in this thesis has been developed by this study team.
19
  
                                                          
19
 In particular, the environmental standards and the trading ratios for the study are to be 
generated through the combined efforts of the EPA, the NJDEP, Rutgers University and Omni 
environmental L.L.C.  
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Notes:
 #
This is the TMDL adopted on April 24, 2008; 
*
 Plants that currently  
have some capacity to remove phosphorus; 
**
Average weighted by flow.
  18,505  1.62  4,569  
W1 *   Whippany  1.90    4,862  0.84  2,315  
W2 *   Whippany  3.03    5,186  0.56  3,704  
W3  Whippany  2.03    18,505  2.8 3  2,473  
W4  Whippany  12.58    114,192  2.98  15,327  
R1 *   Rockaway  8.81    39,180  1.46  10,734  
WQ *   Wanaque  1.00    487  0.16  1,218  
T1 *   Pompton  0.86    838  0.32  1,048  
T2  Pompton  5.33    34,744  2.14  6,494  
P9  
Preakness  
Brook  
7.47    
51,652  2.27  9,602  
P10  Passaic  2.46    23 ,004  3.07  2,997  
P11  Passaic  1.26    8,636  2.25  1,535  
Total          401,535  2.13 **   75,650  
  
Table 3.3- 1. Data for Municipal Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP)   
        Phosphorus  
Map Code  
for WWTP  
River  
Flow  
(MGD)  
   
Load  
(lbs/Y)  
Concen tration  
(mg/l)  
TMDL  
0.4mg/l   
(lbs/year) #   
D1  Dead  1.76    16,780  3.13  2,144  
D2  Dead  0.15    845  1.85  183  
D3  Dead  0.31    1,804  1.91  378  
P1  Passaic  1.00    8,011  2.63  1,218  
P2  Passaic  0.36    1,831  1.67  439  
P3 *   Passaic  1.57    2,869  0.60  1,913  
P4  Passaic  0.12    559  1.53  146  
P5  Passaic  2.41    24,079  3.28  2,936  
P6  Passaic  0.90    4,057  1.48  1,097  
P7  Passaic  2.61    20,909  2.63  3,180  
P8  Passaic  3.75  
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Model Parameters 
The management area model, based on meeting water quality objective at the 
Waunakee Intake and Dundee dam, provides a framework for the subsequent discussion. 
Recall that the final mathematical framework adopted in the case study is specified in 
Chapter 2 as Problem (D):  
                            
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n
i iii
xe
xeCZ
kiii
1
,,
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n
i iii
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k kii
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Problem D           
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ii
ik
ki
d
d
t 
                                                                                    
---(3.4-3)
 
   
0)( iiii eex                                                                             ---(3.4-4) 
                             ki , 0ik                                                                                  ---(3.4-5) 
                              ii Zx      ( i = 1, ..., n )                                                              ---(3.4-6) 
where ki is the number of permits sold by k to i;  ei is the final effluent at i measured in 
terms of load, (the effluent load after treatment at i); ix  is an integer indicating the level 
of fixed capital upgrade for discharger i;  )( i
xi
i eOM  is the annual OM cost function at 
upgrade level ix for source i; )( ii xCC  is the annual capital cost associated with upgrade 
level ix ; 
0
ie  
is the initial unregulated effluent at i;  
kit  is the trading ratio between seller k 
and buyer i, whose value depends on the demarcation of management areas; i  is the 
predetermined effluent cap for discharger i also measured in terms of load.  The choice 
variables, ei , ix and ki , are endogenously determined in the model. Effluent caps i and 
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natural diffusion rates ][ikd  are exogenous parameters to be specified in the following 
sections.   
Effluent Caps (Initial Allocation of Discharge Allowances) -- i  
In the mathematical model developed in Hung and Shaw, the effluent load caps 
are derived by taking into account background and natural levels of pollutant and inflow 
from upstream sources adjusted for transfer coefficients.  In this analysis, however, the 
effluent caps are derived based on the New Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NJPDES) in which the background and natural levels of pollutant and the 
effluent from upstream sources are adjusted for natural diffusion rates, in a way that is 
consistent to Hung and Shaw's framework. In addition, the TMDL approach also includes 
a margin of safety to account for seasonal variation in water quality and the potential for 
un-modelled variation on water quality. Formally, The TMDL calculation is: 
 
TMDL = WLA + LA + MOS 
 
where WLA is the sum of waste load allocations (to point sources), LA is the sum of load 
allocations (nonpoint sources and background), and MOS is the margin of safety. (The 
U.S. EPA website, accessed in 2009 ). Referring to this framework, the TMDL study for 
the Passaic River basin concluded that the WLA for total phosphorus, expressed in terms 
of long term average effluent concentration, was 0.4 mg/l for each of the 22 WWTPs in 
order to achieve water quality goals in the Wanaque Reservoir and Dundee Lake.
20
  
                                                          
20
 A notable exception is dischargers downstream of the Pompton / Passaic River confluence 
(hereafter referred to as Confluence) whose LTA will be limited to 0.4 mg/l on a seasonal rather 
than annual basis (NJDEP, 2008).  This additional complication is not addressed in this thesis. 
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Note that the discharge allowance i  in problem (D) is measured in load as 
transactions must occur in units of mass, rather than in concentrations for trading to be 
viable.  Therefore, the 0.4 mg/l concentration restriction established by the TMDL study 
needs to be translated to the effluents caps in units of mass.   Here I use a recent history, 
three years (2005-2008), of actual discharger flow, rather than permitted flow, as the 
basis for conversion. For the Passaic Watershed, the actual discharger flows on average 
are about 63% of the permitted flows. Thus, if permitted flows were used instead to 
determine allocations, sellers would receive allowances for more pounds than they 
actually could emit, posing a risk to the water body and having a fundamental effect on 
the supply and demand for permits. Also the prior history of actual discharger flow, 
rather than actual discharger flow determined at the end of the trading period, provides a 
practical basis for allocations because potential buyers and sellers have clearly defined 
allocation before making any trades. It would increase uncertainty to design a credit 
trading such that allocations were not known until after trades had been agreed to 
(Shabman, Stephenson and Shobe 2002). Using a recent history of actual discharger 
flows, termed "Anticipated Actual Discharger Flow (AADF)",
21
 as the basis for 
allocations helps to clearly define property rights, an essential precursor for a successful 
trading program. (See Boisvert, et al. (2010) for a discussion of the importance of clearly 
establishing property rights in a well-functioning trading program). In this case study, the 
AADF is equal to the average of the actual daily discharger’s flow from 2005-2008. 
Finally, the effluent cap i is converted based on the following formula: 
 
                                                          
21
 Anticipated Actual Discharger Flow refers to the average flow from a discharger over the past 
three calendar years prior to the start of watershed trading. 
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)()/(4.03,046.063)/( MGDAADFLmgYlbs ii   
where effluent caps are in pounds (lbs). per year, which is the product of a conversion 
coefficient 3046.063143, 0.4 mg/l long term average concentration and Anticipated 
Actual Discharger Flow in million gallon per day. The conversion coefficient is 
calculated based on the formula below: 
milligram)per  37(pound1/453,592.gallon)million per  (liters103.7854365(day)3,046.063 6 
 
Demarcation of the Management Areas 
The structure and trading ratios in problem D are intimately related to the 
identification of critical locations in the watershed and the organization of management 
areas. In this section I explore three different management area configurations consistent 
with meeting the objectives of the Upper Passaic River TMDL, distinguishing between 
the Single Source Management Area Approach, in which each source is treated as a 
separate management area, and two alternative management area approaches that group 
sources based on a more limited set of critical areas in the Upper Passaic River Basin.  
These will be referred to as the Multiple Source Management Area - Alternative One and 
the Multiple Source Management Area - Alternative Two, both of which are specific to 
the hydrological structure of the Upper Passaic River Basin and the need to accommodate 
variations in hydrologic flows and associated “diversion scenarios” across seasons. This 
nomenclature will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
The presentation of alternative management area approaches is aided by the use of 
several simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin in Figures 3.6.1-1 to 
3.6.2-1. The schematics are used to capture the basic spatial relationships between 
sources and critical locations in the watershed. 
 71 
 
Single Source Management Area Approach 
Using the Single Source Management Area Approach, all sites in the watershed 
are identified as critical locations. (See Figure 3.6.1-1, the WWTPs represented by black 
dots are overlapped by critical locations represented by red triangles). Therefore, each 
WWTP is treated as a separate management area. Downstream WWTPs are not permitted 
to sell to upstream WWTPs, as their direct physical effect on water quality upstream is 
zero. If WWTPs lie on different tributaries the trading ratio is again set to zero and trades 
of allowances thus do not occur.  Thus, the Single Source Management Area Approach is 
an extreme version of the M.A. Approach that best comports with Hung and Shaw’s 
presentation. 
Analogous to Hung and Shaw’s TRS, the Single Source M.A. is applicable to all 
watersheds, and it meets the water quality objectives at all sites in the watershed 
corresponding to the initial allocation of allowances under the TMDL and NPDES 
permitting program. On the other hand, the trading opportunities under the Single Source 
M.A. Approach may be limited. Since allowances can only be sold downstream in the 
Single Source M.A. Approach, the realization of such trades will occur only if upstream 
WWTPs have lower abatement costs than downstream WWTPs after appropriate 
adjustments for the transfer coefficient. 
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Figure 3.6.1-1 Simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin – All sites are 
identified as critical locations 
 
 
Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative One 
As noted in the previous section, Dundee Lake and Wanaque Reservoir were 
identified as potential phosphorus-induced hot spots based on interpretation of the Omni 
Environmental (2007a) study, providing the critical locations for organizing the 
management areas. Dundee Lake is the natural watershed outlet while Wanaque 
Reservoir is the state's largest reservoir system.  
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An important hydrological feature of this watershed is that the surface water is 
pumped to the Wanaque Reservoir from intake points located near the confluence of 
Passaic River and Pompton River, with the rate of diversion varying with consumer 
demand, water availability and regulatory restrictions. This fundamentally alters the 
hydrology of the watershed, and diversions to the Wanaque Reservoir transform basic 
relationships of upstream and downstream between certain locations in the watershed. 
For example, during a “normal” rainfall season there is no diversion of water, and hence 
the Passaic River is not a source of water to the Wanaque reservoir. However, when the 
Wanaque Reservoir does require high volumes of diverted inflow, the Upper Passaic 
River waters can be diverted to the reservoir and the Upper Passaic becomes "upstream" 
of the reservoir (Najarian Associates 2005). Consequently the Wanaque Reservoir is 
vulnerable to phosphorus-induced hot spots from water quality trading only when surface 
water diversions occur; otherwise, none of the effluents from the 22 WWTPs enters the 
Wanaque Reservoir.  In this way, the watershed hydrology fluctuates with the extent of 
surface water diversions, thus, the dynamic relationships of upstream and downstream 
must be accommodated in the trading models. 
In contrast, the Dundee Lake receives upstream phosphorus loads under all flow 
conditions, regardless of the occurrence of surface water diversions. (Omni 
Environmental 2007a)  Therefore, the lake is always vulnerable to phosphorus-induced 
hot spots from water quality trading and so it is a “must-protected” critical location under 
all hydrological conditions.  The different demarcations of management areas associated 
with the three diversion scenarios are discussed in further details below.  This discussion 
is aided by the use of several simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin in 
 74 
 
Figures 3.6.2-1 to 3.6.3-1. The schematics are used to capture the basic spatial 
relationships in the watershed. 
No diversion: 
In the "no diversion" scenario, the Wanaque South intake is not activated. Thus, the 
Wanaque Reservoir does not receive any phosphorus loads from the 22 WWTPs in the 
trading project, as depicted in the schematic. The Wanaque South Intake is not a Critical 
Location in the No-Diversion hydrological setting. (See Figure 3.6.2-1.) This leaves 
Dundee Lake as the only Critical Location to be protected.  
 
Figure 3.6.2-1 Simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin – one Critical 
Location for no diversion scenario 
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Diversion: 
In the "diversion" scenario, the Wanaque South intake pumping demand is met 
fully by flow in the Pompton River and no water is drawn from the Passaic River.  In this 
case, the Wanaque South intake located on the downstream portion of the Pompton river 
must be identified at as a second Critical Location in addition to Dundee Lake. (See 
Figure 3.6.2-2) This is because water, and hence some effluent, from WWTPs in the 
Pompton river is diverted upstream and flows into the Wanaque reservoir.  
 
Figure 3.6.2-2 Simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin – two Critical 
Locations for diversion scenario 
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Extreme Diversion: 
In the "extreme diversion" scenario, the Wanaque South intake pumping demand 
cannot be met by the Pompton River flow alone, and surface water is diverted to the 
Wanaque Reservoir from both the Pompton and Upper Passaic Rivers. Therefore, it is the 
mixed effluents from WWTPs in both the Pompton and Upper Passaic management areas 
that are diverted upstream to flow into the Wanaque Reservoir. In this case, the water 
quality at the confluence of Passaic and Pompton must be ensured, the resulting critical 
points are demonstrated in Figure 3.6.2-3. 
 
Figure 3.6.2-3 Simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin – two Critical 
Locations for extreme diversion scenario 
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Integrating the Diversion Scenarios: 
Having illustrated the three diversion scenarios separately, it is important to note 
that the activation of the Wanaque South Intake is highly variable both within a year and 
between years. It would be ineffective to expect the WWTPs involved to constantly jump 
from one set of trading ratios to another associated with each diversion scenario: "That 
would likely increase transaction costs, as WWTPs would be forced to keep up to date 
with frequently changing trading restrictions." (Obrupta, et al., 2008, p. 954) One 
alternative approach that could protect water quality under all diversion conditions is to 
merge the three diversion scenarios in a way that protects all three critical locations 
regardless of diversion outcome realized. As discussed previously in this chapter, any 
possible range of water quality trading outcomes that meet the water quality objective at 
the identified critical locations will not lead to excessive loading in other areas of the 
watershed because of other factors that mitigate the impact of phosphorus, such as  flow, 
shade cover and turbidity. Consequently, there would be three management areas (M.A.s) 
delineated, each having one of the three critical locations as its end-point. The grouping 
of M.A.s is shown in Figure 3.6.2-4, in which the following three M.A.s are delineated: 1) 
the Upper Passaic M.A., consisting of 16 Wastewater Treatment Plants
22
 (WWTPs) on 
the Passaic River and its tributaries upriver of the point on the Passaic River immediately 
below the junction of the Passaic and the Pompton Rivers; 2) the Pompton River M.A., 
consisting of three WWTP’s23 above the Wanaque South Intake Point; and 3) the Lower 
Passaic M.A. consisting of three WWTPs
24
 lying on tributaries that join the Passaic River 
                                                          
22
 Coded as D1, D2, D3, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, W1, W2, W3, W4, R1 
23
 Coded as WQ, T1, T2 
24
 Coded as P9, P10, P11 
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between the junction of the Passaic and the Pompton Rivers and the Dundee Lake 
endpoint.  These are indicated in Figure 3.6.2-4 along with allowable patterns of trade 
between management areas indicated by dashed lines: under this management area 
approach WWTPs in the Upper Passaic M.A. and the Pompton M.A. can sell allowances 
to WWTPs in the Lower Passaic M.A. Moreover, WWTPs in the Pompton M.A. can sell 
allowances to those in the Upper Passaic M.A.     
 
Figure 3.6.2-4 Simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin – demarcation of 
management areas – Multiple Source M.A. Approach Alternative One 
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Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative Two 
As discussed earlier, in the "extreme diversion" scenario, some of the effluents in 
the Pompton and Upper Passaic Rivers are diverted from their confluence to the 
Wanaque Reservoir, requiring that the management areas be designed to ensure the water 
quality at the confluence of Passaic and Pompton. This strategy is based on the 
assumption that the water is pumped up in the same proportion as how they are mixed at 
the confluence.  For the purpose of testing the robustness of this modeling assumption, a 
more environmentally protective M.A. configuration is analyzed in this case study as well. 
In this alternative management area approach, water quality is protected at the end-point 
of Pompton and Upper Passaic separately. The way to do so is to identify the end-points 
of both Pompton and Upper Passaic as critical locations, rather than protect the water 
quality at the confluence alone.  The resulting delineation is shown in Figure 3.6.3-1. One 
can see that the grouping of WWTPs remains unchanged in these two alternatives. The 
difference is that, in the previous approach, WWTPs in Pompton river can sell 
allowances to those in the Upper Passaic area as the Upper Passaic M.A. endpoint in 
Figure 3.4.1-4 is hydrologically below the Pompton M.A. However, those type of trades 
are not allowed in the modified M.A. approach. This is due to the fact that the discharge 
from Pompton river no longer affects the water quality at Upper Passaic M.A. end-point 
after the latter is moved above the confluence.  
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Figure 3.6.3-1 Simplified schematics of the Upper Passaic River Basin – demarcation of 
management areas – Multiple Source M.A. Approach Alternative Two 
 
The Trading Ratios -- tki 
The trading ratios tki are also important parameters for the empirical application of 
the effluent trading model. Because these ratios must reflect the attenuation of effluent 
between upstream WWTPs and those downstream, they will affect buyers' decisions to 
purchase allowances.  Following the formula discussed in Chapter 2, trading ratios under 
each trading rule are equal to the relative natural diffusion rates to the end-point of 
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buyer's M.A.
25
  Note that for arbitrage not to occur, the ratios must be sub-multiplicative, 
i.e. the above setting of the trading ratios obtains a sub-multiplicative property, (i.e. 
ijkjik ttt   for any WWTP i, k and j). Such a property eliminates arbitrage 
opportunities in which excessive circular trades can arise when the trading ratio from A-
to-B multiplied by the trading ratio from B-to-C exceeds the trading ratio from A-to-C.  
The natural diffusion rates are measured based on several scientific factors such 
as rate of inflow-outflow of pollutants, bio-physical conditions, and the geography of the 
designated areas. As discussed in Subsection 3.4.1, three potential surface water 
diversion scenarios can occur with respect to the Wanaque South intake due to the 
fluctuations in precipitation and demand for drinking water from the Wanaque Reservoir 
namely "no diversion", "diversion", and "extreme diversion". Each scenario alters the 
hydrological conditions of the watershed, and, as a result, the natural diffusion rates also 
differ with each diversion scenario. Those natural diffusion rates for the Passaic 
Watershed have been estimated by the TRC Omni Environmental Corporation, in 
consultation with the experts from the members of the Passaic Coalition. According to 
the report by TRC Omni, submitted in June 2006, the diffusion rates were derived by the 
distance between the outlet of the point source and the target location, the settling and 
uptake rates of orthophosphate and organic phosphorus occurring in the flow path from a 
given source to a target location, and the ratio of orthophosphate and organic phosphorus 
discharged from the point source.
26
  
                                                          
25
  The M.A end-points are determined according to the trading rule. In contrast, the natural 
diffusion rate itself does not depend on which trading rule is applied.   
26
 TRC Omni divided the watershed into 10 zones, and WWTPs within each zone are clustered 
close enough to be assumed to have one-to-one diffusion rates.  They calculated the attenuation 
rates at the end of each zone. For instance, if the reduction of 100 lbs. phosphorus at zone i is 
 82 
 
Since the natural diffusion rates differ by diversion scenario, each trading rule 
specified in Section 3.4 generates three trading ratio matrices, each corresponding to one 
of the three diversion scenarios. For instance, Tables (3.7-1), (3.7-2) and (3.7-3) contain 
different trading ratios under the trading rule "Multiple Source Management Area-
Alternative One", each associated with "no diversion" "diversion" "extreme diversion" 
respectively.
 27
  (The blank cells indicate trading ratios equal to zero or trades are not 
allowed.)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
equivalent to the reduction of 80 lbs. phosphorus at zone j, then the transfer coefficient between 
zone i and zone j is 0.8. These ratios are applied to each WWTP in zone i and zone j.  
27
 Table (3.7-1), (3.7-2) and (3.7-3) were provided by Josef Kardos, Ph.D, at Rutgers University. 
Because of rounding errors associated with converting files across various electronic formats, 
each of the trading ratios was rounded down at the 9
th
 decimal place. Such rounding preserves the 
sub-multiplicative properties and in turn precludes arbitrage opportunities. 
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As discussed in Section 3.6.2, under the "M.A. approach Alternative One", 
Management Areas are delineated in the way that the end-point of the Upper Passaic M.A. 
is located downstream to the confluence of Passaic and Pompton Rivers. Thus, 
allowances can be sold from the Pompton M.A. to the Upper Passaic M.A. In contrast, 
WWTPs in the Upper Passaic M.A. cannot sell their allowances to the Pompton M.A.. 
This explains the empty block in upper right of the matrices. Moreover, the empty block 
in the lower left of the matrices is attributed to the restriction that both the Upper Passaic 
M.A. and Pompton M.A. can sell allowances to the Lower Passaic M.A., but not vice 
versa. (see Figure 3.6.2-4) 
Assuming that it is undesirable, practicably and politically, for WWTPs to 
constantly jump from one set of trading ratios to another in real trading, the three 
matrices need to be compiled into a single matrix for the actual trading program. For this 
purpose, a protective compiling strategy, "Selection of the Minimum Trading Ratios" is 
adopted. Under this protective compiling strategy, the minimum trading ratio from the 
corresponding cells in the three diversion scenarios was chosen to be the integrated ratio. 
Hence, the resulting trading ratio matrix represents the most conservative ratio 
configuration under all possible diversion scenarios. Note that because the most 
conservative ratios were selected, the sub-multiplicative property of trading ratios still 
holds, precluding the possibility of arbitrage.  
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Further note that, the compiled ratios in Tables (3.7-4) are all associated with the trading 
rule "Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative One)" described in 
section 3.6.2.  Trading ratios under the other two trading rules are also compiled based on 
the same strategy. Tables (3.7-5) contains those under the "Management Area approach 
alternative 2", while ratios under the "Standard Trading Ratio systems" for the TRS are 
given in Tables (3.7-6). 
The empty cells on the rows "WQ", "T1" and "T2"  in Table (3.7-5) reflect the 
fact that WWTPs in Pompton M.A. can no longer sell allowances to those in Upper 
Passaic M.A. under "M.A. Approach Alternative 2". In addition, as discussed previously, 
one important feature of the Standard Trading Ratio System is that the pollution 
allowances can be sold only from upstream dischargers to downstream dischargers. This 
is reflected by the empty cells below the diagonal of the trading ratio matrices in Tables 
(3.7-6).  
           For comparison purposes, two other compiling strategies, "Geometric Average" 
and "90% of the Minimum Ratios" are also applied in this case study. The Geometric 
Average is mathematically desirable in the sense that it provides symmetry in in trading 
ratios between buyers and sellers. However, as an average of ratios it will theoretically 
lead to water quality violations under some of the diversion scenarios. The 90% of the 
Minimum Ratios incorporates an added margin of safety above and beyond the Minimum 
Ratios approach. The detailed results are reported and discussed in the Appendix Two. 
Estimating the Abatement Cost Functions 
As argued in Chapter 2, in order to attain the optimal trading pattern with explicit 
consideration of the capital investment decision, the total abatement costs need to be 
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decomposed into the Operating and Maintenance cost (OM) and the Capital Investment 
cost (CC).  To implement the mixed integer model empirically, both annual OM costs 
function as well as capital cost functions need to be estimated.   
Estimating OM Cost and Capital Costs 
Because most of the wastewater treatment plants in the watershed currently have 
little or no capacity to remove phosphorus, they are unable at the present time to provide 
data on phosphorus abatement costs, particularly those necessary to achieve the TMDL 
standard. As a proxy for direct cost estimates from each plant, the cost functions for both 
yearly OM costs and capital costs used in this analysis are estimated from data on 104 
treatment plants located in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. The report from the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed provides complete OM and capital cost estimates for 104 
municipal WWTPs located in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, West 
Virginia New York, and District of Columbia. (Report for Chesapeake Bay Program 
2002) The estimates are for two target levels of effluent concentration, 1mg/L and 
0.1mg/L, sufficiently encompassing those implied by the TMDLs under study. These data 
are also appropriate as the basis for the cost estimation because of the geographic 
proximity and other similarities between the Chesapeake Bay and Passaic Watersheds.  In 
addition, the cost of land, labor and materials are likely to be similar in northeastern 
watersheds that encompass or are near large population centers.   
The Chesapeake Bay data are not completely ideal in the sense that, the 
Chesapeake study is only for WWTPs that rely on chemical technologies to remove the 
phosphorus. Although the inexpensive chemical technology can be assumed to be 
adopted by the plants that currently have no capacity to treat phosphorus, there are three 
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plants in the Passaic Watershed (W1, W2, R1) that already operate biological phosphorus 
removal processes.
28
  In order to accommodate the different technologies, this thesis 
draws also on the data from an extensive simulation analysis by the University of Georgia 
for eight designs of wastewater treatment facilities representing a wide range of 
phosphorus removal. The important characteristic of the Georgia study is that it estimates 
costs for differentiated phosphorus removal technologies, such as chemical precipitation, 
biological removal, ion exchange, and combinations of various technologies. Further, the 
Georgia study examined these technologies for five different effluent concentrations: 
2mg/L, 1mg/L, 0.5mg/L, 0.13mg/L; and 0.05mg/L. (Jiang, et al. 2005).  While it is 
necessary to use the results from the Georgia study to adjust the cost functions for 
different technologies, these data do not have the advantage of proximity to the Upper 
Passaic River Basin that was previously argued for the Chesapeake Bay data. The 
Georgia data are further limited because the Georgia study was conducted on only one 
plant, the Athens#2 WWTP.   
Having considered the pros and cons of the two data sources, the abatement cost 
functions for this thesis are estimated by pooling the Chesapeake and Georgia data, while 
using a regional binary variable "R" to account for the differences between the two data 
sources and another binary variable "T" to account for different technologies. 
For the model building, the "General-To-Simple" strategy (downward reduction 
of the model to the preferred specification) is adopted.  The most general model is 
specified in equation (3.8.1-1). 
 
                                                          
28
 This assumption is consistent with the advice of other members of the study team. 
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-------(3.8.1-1) 
 
In the above equation, OM is annual operating cost, C is final phosphorus 
concentration, in mg/L, and F is daily flow in million gallons per day. To isolate the 
effect of technology on the annual OM costs, the technology of reference was assumed to 
be that associated with using chemical technology to remove phosphorus.
29
  Thus a 
binary variable for technology, T, was created: if an observation corresponds to chemical 
technology, T=0; if phosphorus is removed by a biological process, then T=1. Similarly, 
R is created as the regional indicator: if an observation is from the Georgia study, R=1; if 
the observation is from Chesapeake study, R=0. The coefficients 1 to 12  are parameters 
to be estimated. 
Whether the OM cost function of a single WWTP differs at the alternative facility 
levels remains an open empirical question. In the contexts of the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 2, variables indicating the facility upgrade levels should also be 
included in this regression so that the statistical significance of the impact from facility 
upgrade could be tested and upgrade-specific "OM" cost functions could be estimated. 
Unfortunately, such upgrade specific cost functions are not estimable with the existing 
data.  The data from the Chesapeake Bay study provide insufficient information on the 
level of facility upgrades for each plant and only provides information for two treatment 
levels. Therefore, I make an untestable, limiting assumption that a WWTP's facility 
upgrade does not affect its OM (variable) cost function.  
                                                          
29
  The chemical removal technology is commonly referred to as activated sludge. 
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Assuming the error term, 0u , is normally distributed, the general cost function in 
equation (3.8.1-1) is in the "translog flexible form" which can be seen as the second order 
Taylor approximation for the unknown general form ),,ln,(lnln RTFCfOM  .
30
 This 
flexible form enables the testing of the second-order effects such as cost elasticities. 
Specifically, the elasticity of cost of phosphorus removal with respect to one 
characteristic depends on the level of the other.  
Another concern with the data is the failure to account for multiple observations 
from each WWTP which will result inefficient standard errors. Specifically, the 
Chesapeake data are based on 208 observations from 104 WWTPs, with cost data for 
each plant to treat to 0.1 mg/L and 1 mg/L. Hence, each pair of data observed from the 
same plant may not be independent, which may affect the variance-covariance matrix, 
and enlarge standard errors.  One way to address with this intra-plant dependency issue is 
to separate the plant-specific effect by applying a One Way Fixed-Effects Model. 
However, since the cost function contains a limited number of variables whose values do 
not vary within each group, applying a Fixed-Effect model would inevitably result in 
dropping these group-specific variables. Moreover, estimating multiple plant-specific 
cost functions using a Fixed-Effect Modesl also contradicts the original intention of 
finding an universal cost function for the 22 WWTPs in Passaic Watershed. 
An alternative way to adjust the calculation of the variance-covariance matrix is 
to directly adjust the standard errors allowing for intra-group correlation. This method 
(Froot, 1989), can be seen as a straightforward generalization of the White correction, 
                                                          
30
 Boisvert (1982) and Vinod (1972) discuss the general properties of a translog functional form, 
and of special cases of the form similar to those used here. Boisvert and Schmit (1997) as well as 
Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) apply the translog flexible form to estimate the abatement cost 
functions for drinking water treatment and delivery system. 
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and is accomplished by applying the "VCE-cluster" option in STATA for equation 3.8.1-
1.
31
 (See STATA reference Manual 2007, released 10, VCE Options.)  The estimated 
result using the VCE cluster option is reported in column (1) of Table 3.8.1-1.   
Overall, the general specification seems to fit the data from the Chesapeake study 
quite well. Based on the R square coefficient, the regression explains about 95% of the 
variation in the logarithm of the cost of removing phosphorus. At the same time, 
controlling the Type One Error at 5%, the t tests indicate that four terms "T*lnF", 
"T*lnC*lnF", "R*lnC" and "R*lnF" are statistically insignificant, suggesting these terms 
might be redundant.  To test the relevance of these terms, a  joint F test with these four 
targeted variables is conducted. The results from these tests confirm the joint 
insignificance of the four terms (F(4,108)=1.45, Prob>F=0.22). 
To further check this result, two joint F tests are conducted sequentially. The first 
of which reconfirm the joint insignificance of the two terms ""R*lnC" and "R*lnF".  
(F(2,108)=0.43, Prob>F=0.65) After dropping the terms "R*lnC "and "R*lnF", the new 
estimation is reported in column (2) of Table 3.8.1-1. 
Subsequently, a joint F test is used to estimate the relevance of the two term 
"T*lnF" and "T*lnC*lnF". The result of this test suggests that these two terms could also 
be reduced from the OM cost function (F(2,108)=0.45, Prob>F=0.64). 
After dropping TlnF and TlnClnF, the OM cost function comes to its final 
specification (Equation 3.8.1-2). 
                                                          
31
 VCE-cluster relaxes the usual requirement that the observations be independent. That is, the 
observations are independent across groups (clusters) but not necessarily within groups.     
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---------(3.8.1-2) 
Based on the test statistics reported in column (3) of Table 3.8.1-1, the standard 
errors suggest that the coefficients for all the remaining explanatory variables are 
independently statistically significant. Combined estimated model explains more than 
95% of the total variation. To a great extent, this high explanatory power of the model is 
due to the fact that a large proportion of the Chesapeake data are created from 
engineering models.  
Some possible concerns motivate the following post-regression investigation. To 
begin, the correlation between error term and independent variables is tested to check 
whether the estimation results in column (3) of Table 3.8.1-1 are unbiased. The 
correlation between the residual and the independent variable was found to be zero to the 
fourth decimal point in all cases, providing evidence that the estimation is unbiased. 
Moreover, the potential impact of multicollinearity is evaluated using the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) test. The mean VIF is "3.77", far below the rule of thumb alert 
level (Mean VIF greater or equal to 10); thus, the result basically eliminates the worries 
of Multicollinearity. (see STATA reference manual,  release 10, VIF test). 
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Table 3.8.1-1 Regression Result (OM Costs) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
R-squre 0.953 0.952 0.952 
LnC -0.996** -0.993** -0.990** 
  (.019) (.019) (.020) 
LnF 0.785** 0.800** 0.796** 
  (.060) (.043) (.030) 
LnC*LnF 0.043* 0.049** 0.046** 
  (.018) (.015) (.014) 
T 0.707** 0.693** 0.650** 
  (.140) (.133) (.083) 
T*LnC 0.287** 0.358** 0.314** 
  (.063) (.040) (.022) 
T*LnF -0.037 -0.022 - 
  (.022) (.042)   
T*LnC*LnF -0.007 -0.022 - 
  (.007) (.023)   
R 1.177** 1.188** 1.180** 
  (.253) (.193) (.179) 
R*LnC 0.074 - - 
  (.106)     
R*LnF 0.0308 - - 
  (.068)     
R*LnC*LnF -0.054* -0.045 -0.050* 
  (.021) (.026) (.020) 
Constant 9.870** 9.872** 9.876** 
  (.061) (.060) (.058) 
(.) gives the robust standard error adjusted for intra-plant 
correlation 
* denotes 5% confidence level.     
** denotes 1% confidence level.     
 
The same strategy used to specify the OM cost functions is also used to estimate the 
capital costs function. Following to the "translog flexible form", the natural logarithm of 
capital cost from the Chesapeake study was regressed on the logarithms of concentration, 
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logarithms of flow levels, binary variables T and R and the interaction terms. The starting 
general form is specified in equation (3.8.1-3): 
 
012111098
7654321
lnlnlnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
vFCRFRCRRFCT
FCTTFCFCCC
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

   ------(3.8.1-3) 
 
where CC is capital investment cost; C is final phosphorus concentration, in mg/L; F is 
daily flow in million gallons per day; T is the technological dummy, R is the regional 
dummy, 0v  is error term assumed to be normally distributed, and 1 to 12 are parameters 
to be estimated. Since the fixed cost estimation has the issue of intra-group correlation as 
well, the VCE-cluster is also applied to adjust the standard errors. The estimated 
parameters are shown in column (1) of Table 3.8.1-2.                                                  
Using the 5% Type-One Error as a criterion, the t tests show that four terms 
"RlnC", "R*lnF" and  "R*lnC*lnF" are statistically insignificant, suggesting these terms 
might be redundant.  To test the relevance of these terms, a joint F test was conducted, 
which confirms the joint insignificance of the three terms (F(3,108)=1.62; 
Prob>F=0.1885). 
To double check this result, the terms are dropped in a subsequent fashion. 
Another F test is conducted with "RlnF" and "RlnClnF", which reconfirms the joint 
insignificance of the two terms ""RlnF" and "RlnCnF" (F(2,108)=0.24; Prob>F=0.7863). 
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After dropping the terms "RlnF" and "RlnClnF", the t statistics indicate that the 
term "RlnC" becomes insignificant, and so it is dropped in subsequent estimations.
32
 (The 
new estimation is reported in column (2) of Table 3.8.1-2.) 
After dropping "R*LnC", the capital cost function comes to its final specification 
(Equation 3.8.1-4).  
                         
---(3.8.1-4) 
          The test statistics are reported in column (3) of Table 3.8.1-2; the standard errors 
suggest that all remaining explanatory variables are statistically significant allowing for 
10% Type One Error.  Note that the regression fits the data extraordinarily well, with R-
squared as high as 0.97. As with the OM cost this is largely because the capital cost data 
from both studies are engineering data, so the above regression essentially recovered the 
capital cost functions used for the engineering estimation.  
Similar to the post-regression analysis done for the OM costs, the correlation 
between error term and independent variables are tested to verify the unbiasedness of the 
estimation. The correlation between the residual and the independent variable was found 
to be zero to the fourth decimal point in all cases. The results show that the explanatory 
variables are independent from the residuals, therefore the OLS estimation should be 
unbiased.  
                                                          
32
 The selection criteria are set to control the probability of Type One Error at 10%. 
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In addition the potential impact of multicollinearity is evaluated using VIF test. 
The mean VIF is "5.41", a fairly moderate level, (VIF=10 is the rule of thumb alert level) 
showing that the impact of multicollinearity, even if exists, is likely to be mild.  
Table 3.8.1-2 Regression Result (Capital Costs) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
R-squre 0.970 0.970 0.969 
LnC -0.995** -0.996** -0.985** 
  (.005) (.005) (.010) 
LnF 0.302** 0.313** 0.347** 
  (.005) (.016) (.041) 
LnC*LnF -0.164** -0.158** -0.128** 
  (.005) (.008) (.031) 
T 0.878** 0.788** 0.996** 
  (.160) (.286) (.230) 
T*LnC 0.281** 0.245* 0.442** 
  (.052) (.102) (.044) 
T*LnF 0.292** 0.324** 0.290** 
  (.067) (.019) (.038) 
T*LnC*LnF 0.131** 0.144** 0.114** 
  (.033) (.011) (.031) 
R 0.809* 0.900* 0.680 
  (.317) (.455) (.368) 
R*LnC 0.171 0.208 - 
  (.094) (.149)   
R*LnF 0.044 - - 
  (.069)     
R*LnC*LnF 0.019 - - 
  (.031)     
Constant 11.879** 11.879** 11.889** 
  (.005) (.006) (.011) 
(.) gives the robust standard errors adjusted for intra-plant 
correlation 
* denotes 5% confidence level.     
** denotes 1% confidence level.     
 
Given geographic proximity and other similarities between the Chesapeake Bay 
and Passaic watersheds, the Chesapeake data are thought to provide the preferred 
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baseline for cost estimates. To accomplish this, the regional dummy R is set equal to "0" 
for the 22 firms in the Passaic watershed. Accordingly, the abatement cost functions in 
this case study can be specified by the following four equations:  
 
For firms (WWTPs) using Chemical Removal Technologies (T=0): 
FCFCOM lnln046.0ln796.0ln990.0876.9ln  -----------(3.8.1-5) 
FCFCCC lnln128.0ln347.0ln985.0889.11ln   --------------(3.8.1-6) 
For firms (WWTPs) using Biological Removal Technologies (T=1): 
FCFCOM lnln046.0ln796.0ln676.0525.10ln  -----(3.8.1-7) 
FCFCCC lnln014.0ln637.0ln543.0885.12ln  ------- (3.8.1-8) 
Cost Elasticities 
Due to the flexibility of the "translog" functional form, the cost elasticity with 
respect to one characteristic depends on the level of the others. The elasticities of both 
OM cost and Capital cost can be derived by taking the logarithmic partial derivatives of 
above equations. 
The cost elasticity for chemical plants (with respect to the concentration level)  
FCOM ln046.0990.0lnln    -----------------(3.8.2-1) 
FCCC ln128.0985.0lnln      -----------------(3.8.2-2) 
The cost elasticity for biological plants (with respect to the concentration level) 
FCOM ln046.0676.0lnln     -----------------(3.8.2-3) 
FCCC ln014.0543.0lnln        -----------------(3.8.2-4) 
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The general properties of the cost elasticities (both OM cost and capital cost) with 
respect to the concentration level follow directly from above derivatives: (1) The 
elasticities for both OM cost and Capital cost are negative over the range of flows in this 
study, indicating that as final concentration goes down, both costs would rise; (2)  The 
OM cost is more elastic for smaller plants (with lower discharge flow) than for larger 
plants; and (3) The capital costs required to retrofit facilities are more elastic for larger 
plants. All these properties conform to the basic economic intuition as well as common 
sense.  In addition, one can easily see that the coefficients for the biological plants shift 
the cost functions upward but at the same time, the cost elasticities with respect to 
concentration decline. This difference conforms with the results obtained from the 
Georgia study. Biological removal processes generally incur higher operating cost and 
more intensive investment, but they are more efficient in abating the phosphorus to low 
concentration levels than the chemical process.  
To highlight these results, the plant specific cost elasticities are reported in table 
(3.8.2-1) and table (3.8.2-2). In the tables, the "average flows" are sorted in an ascending 
order. 
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Table 3.8.2-1 Cost Elasticity for Plants using Chemical Removal Technologies 
 Plant Code Average Flow OM Cost elasticity Capital cost elasticity 
 P4 0.120  -1.088  -0.714  
 D2 0.150  -1.077  -0.742  
 D3 0.310  -1.044  -0.835  
 P2 0.360  -1.037  -0.854  
 T1 0.860  -0.997  -0.966  
 P6 0.900  -0.995  -0.972  
 P1 1.000  -0.990  -0.985  
 WQ 1.000  -0.990  -0.985  
 P11 1.260  -0.979  -1.015  
 P3 1.570  -0.969  -1.043  
 D1 1.760  -0.964  -1.057  
 W3 2.030  -0.957  -1.076  
 P5 2.410  -0.950  -1.098  
 P10 2.460  -0.949  -1.100  
 P7 2.610  -0.946  -1.108  
 P8 3.750  -0.929  -1.154  
 T2 5.330  -0.913  -1.199  
 P9 7.470  -0.897  -1.242  
 W4 12.580  -0.874  -1.309  
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Table 3.8.2-2 Cost Elasticity for Plants using Biological Removal Technologies 
 Plant Code Average Flow OM Cost elasticity Capital cost elasticity 
 W1 1.900  -0.646  -0.552  
 W2 3.030  -0.625  -0.559  
 R1 8.810  -0.576  -0.573  
 
The "translog flexible form" gives a convenient derivation of the cost elasticities 
with respect to the phosphorus concentration. However, in terms of solving the 
optimization model, it is also important to look at the marginal OM cost with respect to 
the final effluent in units of pounds, as trading is partially driven by the incentives for 
allocating abatement to firms with lower marginal OM costs.
33
   
Marginal OM Cost---Transforming the Annual OM Cost Functions 
Recall that OM costs are specified as the following form in the regression analysis: 
CTTFCFCOM ln314.0649.0lnln046.0ln796.0ln990.0876.9ln  ---(3.8.3-1) 
However, as listed in the beginning of this chapter, the argument of OM cost 
function )( ii eOM  is the final effluent measured in pounds per year.  This type of 
specification is convenient for optimization purposes. Also, the specification of final 
effluent in pounds per year is consistent with the unit of discharge allowances and the 
environmental standards.  To transform equation (3.8.3-1) to a function of the final 
effluent measured in pounds per year, the variable, "C", in equation (3.8.3-1) is replaced 
                                                          
33
 It is also partially driven by the incentive to avoid the capital upgrades.   
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by 
i
i
i
F
e
C


063.3046  
(where 3046.063 is a coefficient to adjust the measurement unit). 
The equation can be transformed into the following form (equation 3.8.3-2) by taking the 
exponential on both sides. (The detailed derivation is provided in Appendix Three) 
in
iiii emeOM  )exp()(                    ------------------------(3.8.3-2) 
where  
iiiii TLnFTFm 870.1)314.0417.1()(ln046.0817.17
2   ----------(3.8.3-3) 
iii TFn 314.0ln046.0990.0    -----------------------(3.8.3-4) 
In this way, the firm-specific parameters in the transformed functions embody the 
differences in daily flows across the WWTPs. The converted coefficients are shown in 
Table (3.8.3-1). 
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Table 3.8.3-1 Parameterization of the OM Cost Functions 
Code Average Flow m n 
D1 1.760  18.603  -0.964  
D2 0.150  14.963  -1.077  
D3 0.310  16.094  -1.044  
P1 1.000  17.817  -0.990  
P2 0.360  16.321  -1.037  
P3 1.570  18.447  -0.969  
P4 0.120  14.606  -1.088  
P5 2.410  19.028  -0.950  
P6 0.900  17.667  -0.995  
P7 2.610  19.134  -0.946  
P8 3.750  19.610  -0.929  
W1 1.900  16.636  -0.646  
W2 3.030  17.113  -0.625  
W3 2.030  18.797  -0.957  
R1 8.810  18.129  -0.576  
W4 12.580  21.110  -0.874  
WQ 1.070  17.913  -0.987  
T1 0.860  17.602  -0.997  
T2 5.330  20.059  -0.913  
P9 7.470  20.480  -0.897  
P10 2.460  19.055  -0.949  
P11 1.260  18.142  -0.979  
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From Table (3.8.3-1), one can easily see that the exponential parameters "n" are 
always negative. Therefore, the annual OM cost functions )( ii eOM are strictly convex 
for all WWTPs in the Passaic Watershed, which is convenient in terms of the 
mathematical programming.
34
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the cost minimization problem 
D is formulated based on a Mixed-integer nonlinear programming model. In this case 
study, the optimal allocation of allowances is solved on the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) which provides an algorithm "DICOPT" designed for 
solving mixed-integer nonlinear programming problems that involve linear binary and 
linear and nonlinear continuous variables. The OM cost function being convex satisfies 
one of the necessary conditions for this algorithm to work effectively
35
.   
The marginal OM cost with respect to the final effluent ie  follows directly from 
the new specification: 
|)exp(||)(|
1
 i
n
iiiiii emneeOM    ---------------------(3.8.3-5) 
Let final effluent equal to the permitted effluent iie  , the marginal OM cost of each 
plant at its TMDL is equal to: 
|)exp(|)(
1
 i
n
iiii TmnTMC   ---------------------(3.8.3-6) 
The marginal cost of each firm at the corresponding 0.4mg/L is listed in tables (3.8.3-2) 
and (3.8.3-3). Sorting the "average flow" in an ascending order, one can easily see that, at 
the initial 0.4mg/L allocation for the discharge allowances, WWTPs with larger discharge 
                                                          
34
  Strictly concave on the whole domain  
35
 One of the necessary condition for DICOPT to work effectively is that the upper contour set of 
OM cost function must be pseudo-convex. The concavity of OM cost function guarantees the 
upper contour set is convex, which is a special case of pseudo-convex. 
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flows have smaller marginal OM cost. This conforms to the basic economic intuition that 
large firms are more effective in removing phosphorus. In this sense, one could expect 
that, holding other conditions equal, large firms are more likely to sell their allowances to 
small firms.  Moreover, it can be shown that, by comparing the marginal OM costs 
between, say, "W3" and "W1", biological plants have higher marginal OM cost than 
chemical plants with similar flow levels. This also conforms to the findings from Georgia 
study that biological phosphorus removal is more costly than removal by the activated 
sludge (chemical) method.  
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Table 3.8.3-2 Marginal OM Cost for Chemical Plants at the TMDL 
Code Average Flow Marginal OM cost wrt Effluents 
P4 0.120  72.476  
D2 0.150  67.955  
D3 0.310  55.073  
P2 0.360  52.733  
T1 0.860  40.914  
P6 0.900  40.374  
P1 1.000  39.149  
WQ 1.070  38.381  
P11 1.260  36.587  
P3 1.570  34.300  
D1 1.760  33.168  
W3 2.030  31.805  
P5 2.410  30.239  
P10 2.460  30.056  
P7 2.610  29.536  
P8 3.750  26.540  
T2 5.330  23.916  
P9 7.470  21.634  
W4 12.580  18.521  
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Table 3.8.3-3 Marginal OM Cost for Biological Plants at the TMDL 
Code Average Flow Marginal OM cost wrt Effluents 
W1* 1.900  31.321  
W2* 3.030  26.994  
R1* 8.810  19.127  
 
 
The discrete nature of capital upgrade---transforming the capital cost function 
Before progressing to solve the optimal allocation of discharge allowances in the 
next chapter, it is important to make several comments with respect to capital upgrade 
costs.  
Capital Level " ix " 
In the regression analysis above, capital cost functions were estimated to be 
continuous in both concentration and actual flow. While the continuity is convenient 
from an estimation point of view, the annual capital upgrade costs )( ii xCC  specified in 
the mixed integer model depend on one of small number of capital levels ix . This comes 
with the fact that most capital upgrades in  reality would be "lumpy" rather than changing 
continuously with every specific concentration.  In this case study, the WWPTs are 
arbitrarily assumed to be able to target their capital upgrade at six discrete concentration 
levels; they are: 1.5 mg/L, 1mg/L, 0.5mg/L, 0.25mg/L, 0.1mg/L and 0.05 mg/L.
36
 Each 
of these target concentrations is associated with a required capital level ix , which takes 
the value from one of the six integers, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.  
                                                          
36
  0.05 mg/L is assumed to be the minimum concentration achievable by the current technologies.  
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In practice, a WWTP may abate to any concentration above the target level, but it 
cannot reduce its final concentration to levels below the range. In this sense, the target 
concentration level is associated with the maximum abatement capacity that the treatment 
facility is designed for.  This constraint is imposed in the mixed-integer model by 
inequality (2.5-6) in Problem D, where )( ii x  denotes the target concentration level 
which is the lowest concentration can be reached by discharger i with capital level ix .  It 
is assumed that a bigger ix  is associated with a smaller )( ii x . Specifically, this 
relationship is described by a piecewise correspondence shown in table (3.8.4-1):  
Table 3.8.4-1 Maximum Capacity for Each Capital Level 
Capital Level Xi Feasible Concentration
0               mg/L
1                         mg/L
2                         mg/L
3                         mg/L
4                         mg/L
5                         mg/L
1
5.0
25.0
1.0
5.1
05.0  
Implicit in this strategy is the assumption that even the firm with the minimum 
capital level can treat to a concentration of 1.5 mg/L. Moreover, note that this 
correspondence is not "one-to-one".  For example, if a WWTP plans to treat phosphorus 
emission to 0.6 mg/L, the lowest capital level required is "2". However, the firm could 
upgrade to capital level 4 and still abate at 0.6 mg/L concentration, a case of "over-
investment" which incurs unnecessary capital cost. It is also important to acknowledge 
that the minimum concentration associated with each capital level is chosen arbitrarily 
here, as no information is available regarding the capital investment schedule specific to 
each WWTP, and the specific value or range of values corresponding to each firm’s 
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capital investment edges. Nonetheless, the lumpy nature of the capital upgrade is evident 
in reality, and as will be argued in the next chapter, it plays an important role in 
explaining how the allowance trading is motivated.    
Annualizing the Capital Cost  
The capital cost functions were estimated as equation (3.8.1-6) for chemical 
plants and equation (3.8.1-8) for biological plants. For each WWTP, its target 
concentration level and actual flow are substituted into the function to determine the 
capital cost.
37
  Note that )( ii xCC  is specified in the mixed integer model as the 
"annualized" capital upgrade cost, whereas the capital cost estimated in the regression 
analysis is the total capital cost.  To annualize the capital cost of facilities upgrades, the 
amortized payment must be calculated, based on a prescribed interest rate and some 
assumed useful life or years to pay off. The annualized capital upgrade cost is calculated 
as: 
N
ii
ii
r
xCCr
xACC



)1(1
)(
)(                 -------------------(3.8.5-1) 
where r is an interest rate, and N is the useful life of the investment. The duration of 
payments and annual interest rates would depend on the particular circumstances in every 
plant. For simplicity, I assume that plants uniformly pay back the capital investment over 
15 years. In addition, the interest rates can be as low as for municipal bonds, as 
dischargers are municipal waste water treatment plants. Thus, the interest rate is assumed 
to be 5%.  With r=0.05 and N=15, the Annualized Capital Cost of each WWTP, 
associated with six capital levels are listed in table (3.8.5-1). 
                                                          
37
 Note that the "C" in equation (3.8.4-2) and (3.8.4-4) is the target concentration instead of the 
final concentration.  
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Table 3.8.5-1: Annualized Capital Cost of each WWTP, associated with six capital levels 
WWTP
Capital level 0 1 2 3 4 5 Annual 
capital cost 
per million 
gallon**
Target 
concentration
1.5 1 0.5 0.25 0.1 0.05
Discharge flow Annualized Capital Cost
P4 0.12       5,034.54           6,723.88         11,026.48         18,082.30         34,771.72           57,022.09    289,764.36 
D2 0.15       5,377.23           7,265.20         12,152.42         20,327.21         40,125.12           67,116.82    267,500.81 
D3 0.31       6,661.85           9,346.45         16,673.75         29,745.41         63,934.48         114,056.97    206,240.26 
P2 0.36       6,962.40           9,844.21         17,796.29         32,171.99         70,373.58         127,220.79    195,482.17 
T1 0.86  n/a  n/a  n/a         50,795.02       123,057.95         240,332.63    143,090.64 
P6 0.9       9,124.12         13,529.02         26,529.01         52,020.66       126,701.00         248,447.63    140,778.89 
P1 1       9,412.27         14,032.79         27,775.29         54,976.00       135,563.90         268,323.43    135,563.90 
WQ 1  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a       135,563.90         268,323.43    135,563.90 
P11 1.26      10,076.59         15,204.52         30,717.96         62,060.04       157,237.07         317,668.85    124,791.32 
P3 1.57  n/a  n/a         33,807.77         69,648.52       181,075.17         373,038.99    115,334.50 
D1 1.76      11,121.03         17,074.07         35,533.18         73,948.81       194,848.52         405,503.16    110,709.39 
W1* 1.9  n/a  n/a         83,836.23       122,912.50       203,823.08         298,825.52    107,275.30 
W3 2.03      11,599.42         17,940.94         37,813.04         79,696.29       213,537.30         450,059.80    105,190.79 
P5 2.41      12,201.90         19,041.62         40,748.55         87,200.77       238,394.48         510,157.61      98,918.87 
P10 2.46      12,276.07         19,177.79         41,114.78         88,144.94       241,556.75         517,867.44      98,193.80 
P7 2.61      12,492.37         19,575.75         42,188.92         90,923.98       250,908.36         540,748.36      96,133.47 
W2* 3.04  n/a  n/a       113,615.33       167,333.18       279,162.98         411,152.52      91,829.93 
P8 3.75      13,902.44         22,198.97         49,405.71       109,956.61       316,604.91         704,631.21      84,427.98 
T2 5.33      15,422.39         25,079.47         57,585.11       132,221.50       396,741.24         910,959.77      74,435.51 
P9 7.47      17,037.72         28,195.92         66,708.98       157,827.38       492,698.07      1,165,678.77      65,956.90 
R1* 8.81  n/a       151,932.61       226,089.50       336,441.68       569,001.53         846,725.86      64,585.87 
W4 12.58      19,870.57         33,785.72         83,717.18       207,441.62       688,403.53      1,705,785.52      54,722.06 
* WWTPs that are using biological treatment technologies 
** The average annual capital cost is calculated as the annualized capital cost at capital level 4 divided by discharge flow  
Sorting the "average flow" in an ascending order, one can easily see that the 
average capital cost per gallon, which is often referred to as levelized cost, falls with flow 
level. These economies of scale again conform to the basic economic intuition that large 
firms should be more effective in removing phosphorus, which is also consistent with the 
result for OM costs. Moreover, it concurs with the findings from Georgia study that the 
minimum investment for biological facilities is more costly than the chemical facilities, 
but biological facilities are much more effective in abating to low concentration levels.  
Existing Capacities and Irreversibility  
As introduced in the beginning of this chapter, Six WWTPs "T1, WQ, P3, W1, 
W2, R1" currently have existing capacity to remove phosphorus. Based on the additional 
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assumption that the capital investment is NOT reversible, the capital levels of these six 
plants cannot be smaller than their existing level, which explains why some of the capital 
levels are shown "not applicable (N/A)" in table (3.8.5-1).  Moreover, the cost of capital 
upgrades for those six WWTPs are calculated as the incremental capital cost, which is 
equal to the final capital cost minus the existing capital cost.
38
     
Finally, to provide some perspective on this strategy for developing the annual 
capital upgrade costs, table (3.8.6-1) provides the elements needed to calculate the annual 
capital upgrade cost in the no trade scenario. Using WWTP "P3" which has current 
concentration at 0.60 mg/L as an example, the calculations are as follow: from table 
(3.6.4-2), P3's existing capital level is identified as level 2, associated with existing 
capital cost of 33,807.77 in U.S. dollars.
39
  In the no trade scenario, P3 must upgrade its 
capital level to at least level 3 in order to independently meet the 0.4mg/L requirement. 
This means that P3 has to incur the capital upgrade cost of 35,840.75 USD (69,648.52 
minus 33,807.77) to upgrade its capital from level 2 to 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
  To keep notation consistent, )( ii xCC is the annualized incremental capital cost for these six 
plants, although it does not affect the final solution from the optimization point of view.  
39
 Assume P3 did not over-invest.  
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Table 3.8.6-1: Costs on Capital Upgrade 
D1 3.13 0 0 0.4 3 73,948.81 73,948.81
D2 1.85 0 0 0.4 3 20,327.21 20,327.21
D3 1.91 0 0 0.4 3 29,745.41 29,745.41
P1 2.63 0 0 0.4 3 54,976.00 54,976.00
P2 1.67 0 0 0.4 3 32,171.99 32,171.99
P3 0.6 2 33,808 0.4 3 69,648.52 35,840.74
P4 1.53 0 0 0.4 3 18,082.30 18,082.30
P5 3.28 0 0 0.4 3 87,200.77 87,200.77
P6 1.48 0 0 0.4 3 52,020.66 52,020.66
P7 2.63 0 0 0.4 3 90,923.98 90,923.98
P8 1.62 0 0 0.4 3 109,956.61 109,956.61
W1* 0.84 2 83,836 0.4 3 122,912.50 39,076.27
W2* 0.56 2 113,615 0.4 3 167,333.18 53,717.85
W3 2.83 0 0 0.4 3 79,696.29 79,696.29
W4 1.46 0 0 0.4 3 207,441.62 207,441.62
R1* 2.98 1 151,933 0.4 3 336,441.68 184,509.06
WQ 0.16 4 135,564 0.16 4 135,563.90 0.00
T1 0.32 3 50,795 0.32 3 50,795.02 0.00
T2 2.14 0 0 0.4 3 132,221.50 132,221.50
P9 2.27 0 0 0.4 3 157,827.38 157,827.38
P10 3.07 0 0 0.4 3 88,144.94 88,144.94
P11 2.25 0 0 0.4 3 62,060.04 62,060.04
* WWTPs that using biological removal technology
Final Capital 
Value
Capital Upgrade 
Cost
WWTP
Current 
Concentration
Existing Capital 
Level
Existing Capital 
Value
Final 
Concentration
Required 
Capital Level
 
There is one additional issue that should be addressed before moving on to the 
next chapter. Based on discussions with members of the study team and others involved 
in program design, it was reasonable to assume that all facilities upgrades would be in the 
form of chemical treatment, unless the plant already was using a biological process. 
There is no information that would suggest it reasonable to do otherwise, and many of the 
plants are likely to adopt chemical technologies in the near future, particularly if a 
0.4mg/L standard is adopted initially. In turn, such a strategy would clearly limit their 
ability to switch to a biological technology, if a more stringent standard were adopted 
several years from now.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MODEL RESULTS 
Introduction  
As discussed in previous chapters, this study endeavors to extend the way that 
water quality trading is typically portrayed in theoretical economic presentations by 
drawing attention to the lumpy nature of capital cost and the configuration of 
management areas. To highlight how the reallocation of pollution allowances might be 
affected by the incentives to avoid lumpy capital spending, two stylized trading scenarios 
are simulated and compared with a no-trade baseline in a case study using data from the 
Upper Passaic River Basin.  
The first scenario resembles the "Marginal Cost Trading" envisioned in traditional 
emission trading theory. It assumes that each Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP) has 
to invest in treatment capacity upgrades so as to be able to independently meet its 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements (at 
0.4mg/L), and then trade their allowances on a spot market.  Hence, there are no 
opportunities for capital cost savings via trading.  As such, any incentives for allowance 
trading are embodied only in the differential marginal Operating and Maintenance (OM) 
costs following the canonical presentation of pollution permit trading. In other words, 
only OM costs are accounted for in determining whether individual WWTPs buy, sell, or 
do not trade allowances.  Assuming that the market is competitive, this “Marginal Cost” 
trading scenario can be viewed in terms of the social planner’s Problem D in Chapter 
Two with the implicit assumption of an immutable set of capital investments, or 
explicitly as the following (Problem D ):  
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where the fixed integer upgrade levels, ).......,( 2221 xxx  are identified in the sixth column 
of Table (3.8.6-1) for each of the 22 WWTPs ( ix  represents the fixed levels of capital, 
corresponding to the minimum capital level that allows plant i to treat to 0.4 mg/l.  See 
Section 3.8.6 for detail.).  Hence, the resulting fixed upgrade costs )( ii xCC  equal those in 
the no-trade baseline, summarized in Table (3.8.6-1). The OM cost functions, expressed 
in equation 4.1-1, are obtained from the parameters in Table (3.8.3-1). TMDL loads for 
each WWTP are drawn from Table (3.3-1). The coefficient 
kit  represents the trading ratio 
matrix, the specification of which will differ across various alternatives of the M.A. 
Approach considered, and thus will be presented in more detail below. At this juncture, it 
suffices to say that each i, j element of the matrix { }ijt represents the number of 
allowances sold from plant i to plant j. 
The "Optimal Trading" scenarios assume that capital upgrade costs are explicitly 
considered in determining the trades. In other words, the watershed total abatement costs, 
consist of aggregate OM costs and aggregate Capital investment (CC) costs are jointly 
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minimized. In this setting, re-allocation of pollution allowances is motivated not only by 
the difference in the marginal abatement costs of pollution abatement, but also by the 
desire to preempt unnecessary lumpy and costly upgrades of the treatment facility. Given 
this extra flexibility to determine the level of capital upgrades one can expect that the 
saving results from the second scenario is to be greater than those in the first scenario.   
The "Optimal Trading" scenarios assume that WWTPs jointly minimize their 
aggregate abatement cost in an optimal way, accounting for the fixed upgrade costs. One 
way to think of "Optimal Trading" is that it is dictated by a benevolent social planner 
with perfect information whose goal is to minimize the watershed’s total costs. In this 
sense, the "Optimal Trading" can be readily characterized by the integer model specified 
in equations (4.1-6) to (4.1-11). (It is the same as problem D in Chapter 2).   
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                             ki , 0ik                ki,                                                          ---(4.1-10) 
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Note that here the capital level ix is no longer fixed, which is now an integer variable to 
be chosen from the corresponding integer set iZ
40
. Therefore, the "Optimal Trading" will 
also result the optimal capital levels ix for each WWTP.  
Following the presentation in Chapter 3, three configurations of the Management 
Areas "Single Source M.A. Approach", "Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative 
One" and "Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative Two" are proposed to compare 
the cost-savings from pollution allowance trading under different trading rules.  For each 
trading scenario (i.e. “Marginal Cost Trading” and “Optimal Trading”), three simulations 
are done based on these three distinct trading rules.  For completeness, I also report and 
compare the simulation results using different compiling strategies (i.e. "geometric 
average" and "90% of the minimum ratios") in the Appendix Two.  
Trading Details 
Before identifying the trades that take place, it is worth noting that the “patterns 
of trades” may not be unique. In other words, there could be different patterns of trade 
which give the same optimal cost savings. Thus, the trading patterns described below aim 
to provide just one example of the set of possible transactions.  
Trading Details for Marginal Cost Trading 
This trading scenario assumes that each WWTP chooses to invest in the capacity 
upgrade to independently meet its NPDES requirement (at 0.4mg/L), and then buys and 
sells allowances based on its marginal abatement cost and the market price. In other 
words, only OM costs are accounted for in determining the trades. 
                                                          
40
 As discussed in section 3.6.6, for most of the plants, the set iZ contains six capital levels. Yet, 
this is not the case for plants which have existing abatement capacity. (see table 3.6.6-2 for detail) 
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Single Source Management Area Approach 
The Single Source M.A. Approach treats each source as a separate management 
area. This extreme version of the M.A. approach best comports with the Hung and 
Shaw’s Trading Ratio System in the sense that, only downstream trades in the same 
tributary are allowed as those with non-zero trading ratios t, corresponding to the 
matrices in Table 3.7-6. The patterns of trades are reported in Tables 4.2.1-1. There are 
eight WWTPs (D1, P1, P3, P5, W2, WQ, T1 and P10) that act as sellers, and eight  
WWTPs (D2, D3, P2, P4, P6, P11, W3 and T2) that buy permits. The rest of six WWTPs 
(P7, P8, P9, R1, W1 and W4) do not participate in trading.  The volume of trades is very 
low due to the limited trading opportunities as a result of prohibiting upstream or cross-
tributary trading and the reliance on marginal OM cost-based trading. In total, there are 
nearly 1,549 units traded, representing just over 2% of the total allowable emissions in 
the watershed. As would be expected with downstream trading，all trades between the 
eight buyers and eight sellers are above the main diagonal in the trading pattern matrices. 
Most of these trades are between immediately adjacent WWTPs.  
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Table 4.2.1-1  Marginal Cost Trading (Single Source M.A. Approach) 
Buyer
Seller
57 71 33
27
57
120
139
731
210
103
D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1 P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
 
 
Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative One  
Under the Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative One, three critical 
locations, Dundee Lake, the endpoint of Pompton River, and the downstream of the 
confluence between Upper Passaic River and Lower Passaic River are identified. The 
trading ratios under this configuration (Table 3.7-4) are specified according to the relative 
effects of each transaction on the buyer's endpoints, in particular, inter M.A. trading is 
allowed from the Upper Passaic M.A. to the Lower Passaic M.A., and from the Pompton 
M.A. to the Lower Passaic M.A. Moreover, trades are also allowed from Pompton M.A. 
to the Upper Passaic M.A., but not the converse. As discussed in Chapter 3, these trading 
ratios no longer have the upper bound of one, indicating that sources can sell allowances 
to firms hydrologically more distant from the relevant critical location.  
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The trading pattern that results from this trading rule is depicted in Table 4.2.1-2. 
Seven WWTPs (P8, P9, P10, W4, WQ, T1 and R1) act as sellers, and 15 WWTPs (D1, 
D2, D3, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P11, W1, W2, W3 and T2) buy permits. In other 
words, all 22 firms participate in trading. Interestingly, most of these trades occur with 
sellers located hydrologically downstream from buyers as indicated by the predominance 
of trading entries below the main diagonal of the trading matrices. This is partially due to 
the marginal cost structure of firms, namely, large efficient firms happen to be located 
downstream. Besides, another factor is that most trading ratios for upstream trading are 
greater than or equal to one, as the discharges from upstream firms have less impact to 
the end-point. The volume of trade increases significantly compared with the Single 
Source M.A. Approach. There are 3,663 units of allowances traded, representing nearly 
5% of the total allowable emissions in the watershed. 
Table 4.2.1-2 Marginal Cost Trading (Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative One)
Buyer
Seller
97 66
339 132 205
280 190 278 98 247 384 231 363
731
210
170
23
P6 P7P2 P3D1 D2 D3 P1 R1 W4 T2 P9WQ T1 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3P4 P5 P8 W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
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Management Area Approach - Alternative Two  
The trading ratios Table 3.7-5 are similar to the other alternative of the 
Management Area Approach. The only difference is that, for this alternative, trades are 
no longer allowed from Pompton M.A. to the Upper Passaic M.A..  
The trading patterns Table 4.2.1-3 of this trading rule are identical to the 
alternative Management Area Approach. This is because the additional restrictions on 
trades between Pompton and Upper Passaic M.A. are not binding at the equilibrium.  
Table4.2.1-3  Marginal Cost Trading (Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative Two)
Buyer
Seller
91 66
339 132 205
280 190 278 98 113 141 384 231 363
731
210
170
23P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
 
Trading Details for Optimal Trading 
In the Optimal Trading scenario, incentives for allowance trading are embodied 
not only in the differential marginal OM costs, but also in avoiding the costly capital 
upgrades. For example, in this setting, it is expected that some WWTPs would purchase 
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enough allowances so that they are able to avoid facility upgrades and maintain a low 
level of capital cost. 
Single Source Management Area Approach 
The trading ratio depicted in Table 3.7-6 is analogous to the Hung and Shaw 
Trading Ratio System (TRS) which treats each WWTP as a separate management area. 
As a result, only downstream trades in the same tributary are allowed as those with non-
zero trading ratios t.  
The pattern of trades is reported in Tables 4.2.2-1. There are nine WWTPs (D1, 
P1, P5, P7, W1, W2, WQ, T1 and P10) act as sellers, and 10 WWTPs (D2, D3, P2, P3, 
P4, P6, P8, P11, W3 and T2) buy permits. The other three WWTP (R1, W4 and P9) do 
not participate in trading. Compared with the marginal cost trading, the optimal trading 
has much larger trading volumes as the incentive to avoid capital upgrade stimulates 
more trades. There are 4,150 units of allowances traded, about 2.6 times as many as in the 
marginal cost trading. This represents about 5% of the total allowable emissions in the 
watershed.  
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Table 4.2.2-1   Optimal Trading (Single Source M.A. Approach)
Buyer
Seller
46 95 35 351 11
77 147 26
274 392
752
115
504
731
210
384
D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1 P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
 
 
Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative One  
As in Marginal Cost Trading, the trading ratios (Table 3.7-4) under this 
configuration of the management areas are specified according to the relative effects of 
each transaction on the buyer's endpoints.  In particular, inter M.A. trading is allowed 
from Upper Passaic M.A. to Lower Passaic M.A., and from Pompton M.A. to Lower 
Passaic M.A. Moreover, trades are also allowed from Pompton M.A. to the Upper Passaic 
M.A. (but not the converse). The trading pattern is depicted in Table 4.2.2-2. Six WWTPs 
(R1, W4, WQ, T1, T2 and P9) act as sellers, and 16 WWTPs (D1, D2, D3, P1, P2, P3, P4, 
P5, P6, P7, P8, P10, P11, W1, W2 and W3) buy permits. As such, all 22 plants participate 
in trading. Compared with the marginal cost trading, the optimal trading has much larger 
trading volumes as the incentive to avoid capital upgrade stimulates more trades. There 
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are 9633 units of allowances traded, nearly three times as many as in the marginal cost 
trading. The volume of trade represents nearly 13% of the total allowable emissions in 
the watershed. 
Table 4.2.2-2  Optimal Trading (Multiple Source M.A. Approach - Alternative One)
Buyer
Seller
301 41 56 178 75 627 68 111 335 822
764 320 649 649 579 927 619
463 45 143 87
58 37 114
21
1021 523
P6 P7P2 P3D1 D2 D3 P1 R1 W4 T2 P9WQ T1 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3P4 P5 P8 W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
 
 
Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative Two  
The trading ratios (Table 3.7-5) are similar to the Multiple Source Management 
Area Approach – Alternative One, except that, for this alternative, trades are no longer 
allowed from Pompton M.A. to the Upper Passaic M.A.  
The trading patterns are depicted in Table 4.2.2-3. There are five WWTPs (R1, P9, 
W4, WQ and T1) act as sellers, and 17 WWTPs (D1, D2, D3, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, 
P8, P10, P11, W1, W2, W3 and T2) buy permits. Again, all 22 WWTPs participate in the 
market. In contrast to the Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative One, this time 
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T2 becomes a buyer. This is not unexpected as T2 is no longer allowed to sell its 
allowances to Pompton M.A.  
Compared with the marginal cost trading, the optimal trading has much larger 
trading volumes. There are 10,269 units of allowances traded, about 2.5 times as many as 
in the marginal cost trading. This volume of trade represents nearly 14% of the total 
allowable emissions in the watershed.  
Table 4.2.2-3  Optimal Trading (Multiple Source M.A. Appoach - Alternative Two)
Buyer
Seller
663 69 400 143 59 1601
105 528 857 320 928 579 927 619
731
210
1021 523
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
 
Cost Savings 
The previous section demonstrates that the pattern of trade varies with the two 
trading scenarios (i.e. Marginal Cost Trading v.s. Optimal Trading) as well as different 
configuration of the Management Area Approach. This section explores the potential cost 
savings from allowances trading under each simulation.  
The Baseline Case---No trade is allowed 
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To estimate the potential cost-savings from allowance trading under each 
simulation, the sum of the annual OM costs, as well as the sum of the annualized capital 
upgrade costs for all 22 WWTPs, need to be compared with a properly defined baseline. 
The appropriate baseline situation for evaluating potential cost-savings associated with 
allowance trading is the no-trade situation in which each WWTP independently meets its 
NPDES defined concentration standard associated with the TMDL. The estimated 
treatment costs for each plant and for the entire watershed are summarized in Table 4.3.1-
1.  
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Table 4.3.1-1 Estimated Abatement Costs for each WWTP 
WWTP 
Annual OM 
Cost ($) 
Annualized Capital 
Upgrade Cost ($) 
Total Annual Abatement 
Cost ($) 
Proportion of Annual Capital 
Expense in the Total Annual 
Abatement Cost (%) 
D1 73,784.01  73,948.81  147,732.82  50.1% 
D2 11,528.82  20,327.21  31,856.03  63.8% 
D3 19,927.36  29,745.41  49,672.77  59.9% 
P1 48,181.90  54,976.00  103,157.90  53.3% 
P2 22,305.14  32,171.99  54,477.13  59.1% 
P3* 67,695.80  35,840.74  103,536.55  34.6% 
P4 9,743.83  18,082.30  27,826.13  65.0% 
P5 93,511.56  87,200.77  180,712.33  48.3% 
P6 44,503.06  52,020.66  96,523.71  53.9% 
P7 99,303.84  90,923.98  190,227.82  47.8% 
P8 130,501.10  109,956.61  240,457.72  45.7% 
W1* 112,158.17  39,076.27  151,234.44  25.8% 
W2* 159,122.85  53,717.85  212,840.70  25.2% 
W3 82,165.23  79,696.29  161,861.52  49.2% 
W4 324,991.54  207,441.62  532,433.16  39.0% 
R1* 356,499.49  184,509.06  541,008.55  34.1% 
WQ* 133,992.62  0.00  133,992.62  0.0% 
T1* 53,735.59  0.00  53,735.59  0.0% 
T2 170,107.38  132,221.50  302,328.89  43.7% 
P9 219,397.56  157,827.38  377,224.94  41.8% 
P10 94,970.37  88,144.94  183,115.31  48.1% 
P11 57,351.88  62,060.04  119,411.92  52.0% 
SUM 2,385,479.08  1,609,889.45  3,995,368.54  40.3% 
* Plants that currently have some capacity to remove phosphorus, whose annual capital 
upgrade cost is computed as the incremental capital cost  
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In treating to a 0.4mg/L standard, it is estimated that total annual costs of 
phosphorus removal would be about 4 million dollars
41
. Of this total, 40.3% would be 
accounted for by the annualized cost of the capital upgrades needed. This percentage 
varies from 0 (for those plants that currently can treat to this level) and 65%. The capital 
costs are a particularly large fraction of total costs for small plants where, given the low 
flows, annual OM costs are relatively small.  
To estimate the watershed cost saving from allowances trading under each case, 
the sum of the annual OM costs, as well as the sum of the annualized capital upgrade 
costs for all 22 WWTPs, are be reported for each case and compared to the costs of a 
baseline case defined above.  
Cost-savings from Marginal Cost Trading 
Under Marginal Cost Trading, no savings on Capital Costs are available. Only 
OM costs are accounted for in the cost minimization problem. 
The cost-savings from Marginal Cost trading under the Single Source 
Management Area Approach is reported in the first column of Table 4.3.2-1.  Total costs 
under this program fall a nominal $23,489, or 0.59% relative to the baseline case, with 
savings being attributed solely to reduced OM costs. Limited trading opportunities and 
the consequent low level of savings can be attributed to the relative homogeneity of waste 
water treatment costs.  Moreover, there are no capital cost savings because each firm is 
assumed to invest in the capacity to independently meet the no-trade TMDL standard.  
The cost-savings from Marginal Cost trading under the Multiple Source M.A. 
Approach – Alternative One and Alternative Two are reported in the second and third 
column of Table 4.3.2-1. Despite the additional trading activity, the cost savings remain 
                                                          
41
 Thus, a 1% savings represents about $40,000 per year.  
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at a relatively meager level. Further, the cost savings under the two Multiple Source M.A. 
Approaches are identical, as the extra trading constraint in Alternative Two is not binding 
at the equilibrium. The total cost savings is $41,385 or 1.04% relative to the baseline. The 
low level of cost saving under both trading rules again can be attributed to the relative 
homogeneity of waste water treatment costs. 
Table 4.3.2-1 Cost Savings under Marginal Cost Trading 
 
Single Source 
M.A. 
Approach 
Multiple Source 
M.A. Approach 
- Alternative 
One 
Multiple Source 
M.A. Approach 
- Alternative 
Two 
Baseline OM Cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM Cost after Trading $2,361,990.48 $2,344,093.14 $2,344,093.14 
Savings on OM Cost $23,488.61 $41,385.94 $41,385.94 
Percentage Savings on OM Cost 0.98% 1.73% 1.73% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
Savings on CC Cost $0 $0 $0 
Percentage Savings on CC Cost 0% 0% 0% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,971,879.93 $3,953,982.60 $3,953,982.60 
Total Savings $23,488.61 $41,385.94 $41,385.94 
Percentage Savings on Total Cost 0.59% 1.04% 1.04% 
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Cost savings from Optimal Trading 
The Optimal Trading scenario assumes optimal capital upgrades, that is, the 
aggregate watershed costs of abatements consisting of both aggregate OM costs and 
aggregate Capital upgrade costs are jointly minimized through allowances trading.   
The cost-savings from Marginal Cost trading under the Single Source M.A. 
Approach is reported in the first column of Table 4.3.3-1.  The watershed capital costs 
fall a considerable $237,787, amounting to a 15% reduction relative to the baseline 
capital costs. Interestingly, the watershed OM costs after the trades is even slightly higher 
than the no-trade baseline, as many allowances are sold from high marginal cost WWTPs 
to low marginal cost WWTPs driven by the incentive to avoid capital upgrade cost. The 
resulted total cost-savings is $221,927 (or 5.55% relative to the no trade baseline), with 
all savings being attributed to the reduced Capital Costs. This level of total savings is 
about 10 times of those attained under the Marginal Cost Trading.  
The cost-savings from Optimal trading under the two alternative M.A. approaches 
are reported in the last two column of Table 4.3.3-1. Trades under these two M.A. 
approaches generate significant capital cost savings, to the order of $538,141.51 (or 33% 
relative to the baseline capital costs). Since the benefit of avoiding capital upgrade costs 
outweigh the rise in variable abatement costs, the watershed OM costs after the optimal 
trading are slightly higher than those in the no-trade baseline for both Multiple Source 
M.A. approaches. In total, the cost savings for Multiple Source M.A. Approach – 
Alternative One and Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative Two are $523,417.16 
(13.10% relative to the baseline total costs) and $519,982.72 (13.01% relative to the 
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baseline total costs). The level of total savings is nearly eight times that of the Marginal 
Cost Trading.  
 
Table 4.3.3-1 Cost Savings under Optimal Trading 
  
Single Source 
M.A. Approach 
Multiple Source 
M.A. Approach - 
Alternative One 
Multiple Source 
M.A. Approach - 
Alternative Two 
Baseline OM Cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM Cost after Trading $2,401,338.95 $2,400,476.44 $2,403,910.88 
Savings on OM Cost -$15,859.86 -$14,997.35 -$18,431.80 
Percentage Savings on 
OM Cost -0.66% -0.63% -0.77% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,372,102.85 $1,071,474.94 $1,071,474.94 
Savings on CC Cost $237,786.60 $538,141.51 $538,414.51 
Percentage Savings on 
CC Cost 15% 33% 33% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,773,441.80 $34,971,951.38 $3,475,385.82 
Total Savings $221,926.74 $523,417.16 $519,982.72 
Percentage Savings on 
Total Cost 5.55% 13.10% 13.01% 
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Prices 
Prices for Marginal Cost Trading 
For any interior equilibrium of the Marginal Cost Trading, the competitive price 
of pollution allowances at each WWTP is equal its marginal abatement cost. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, the pollution allowances are traded to the point where the spatially 
adjusted equil-marginal condition holds. There is a unique price at each location: that is, 
the price of allowances at the seller’s location must be equal to the price at the buyer’s 
location adjusted by the transfer coefficient (i.e. trading ratios). These prices are reported 
in Table 4.4.1-1.  
For example, under the Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative One, the 
allowances price at R1 is equal to 21.2 $/lbs, and the price at D1 is 26.2 $/lbs (see the 
second column of Table 4.4.1-1. Also, from Table 4.4.1-1, we know the trading ratio 
between R1 and D1 is 0.809. These numbers verify the spatially adjusted equi-marginal 
condition at the equilibrium, as 26.2 multiplied by 0.809 is equal to 21.2. 
Comparing the prices in the first column with the last two columns, one can see 
that the allowances prices are more equalized under the Multiple Source M.A. approaches. 
This is because the Multiple Source M.A. Approach provides more trading opportunities 
than the Single Source M.A. Approach. Moreover, note that the allowances prices at WQ 
and T1 cannot be determined because their non-degradation constraints are binding at the 
equilibrium.   
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Table 4.4.1-4 The Price of Allowances at Each WWTP 
WWTP 
Single Source 
M.A. Approach 
Multiple Source M.A. 
Approach - Alternative One 
Multiple Source M.A. 
Approach - Alternative Two 
D1 38.7 26.2 26.2 
D2 38.7 26.2 26.2 
D3 38.7 26.2 26.2 
P1 40.9 26.9 26.9 
P2 40.9 26.9 26.9 
P3 36.4 26.9 26.9 
P4 36.4 26.9 26.9 
P5 32.8 28.4 28.4 
P6 32.8 28.4 28.4 
P7 29.5 28.4 28.4 
P8 26.5 28.4 28.4 
W1 31.3 24.3 24.3 
W2 28.6 24.3 24.3 
W3 28.6 24.3 24.3 
W4 18.5 24.3 24.3 
R1 19.1 21.2 21.2 
WQ n/a n/a n/a 
T1 n/a n/a n/a 
T2 18.6 18.6 18.6 
P9 21.6 22.4 22.4 
P10 32.2 30.5 30.5 
P11 32.2 30.5 30.5 
 136 
 
Prices for Optimal Trading 
In contrast with the Marginal Cost Trading, the prices for allowances may not be 
uniquely determined in each trade, because many WWTPs operate at their maximum 
abatement capacity in equilibrium avoiding upgrading to the higher level. So the 
allowances price could vary as the result from the bargaining and bilateral negotiations 
between seller and buyer.
42
 (See the Kuhn Tucker conditions in Chapter 2 for a detailed 
discussion.)  In this subsection, I shall briefly discuss the cost savings for individual 
WWTP which are then used to give a rough estimation of its Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) 
and Willingness-to-Sell (WTS) of allowances. These metrics on the individual level may 
provide a bit of taste on the potential outcomes of price negotiation.   
Using Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative Two as an example to 
illustrate the point, five multilateral contracts can be assigned in the following way to 
achieve the Optimal Trading outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Although the unique price is not available, the possible range of the price between the 
willingness to buy of the buyer and the willingness to sell of the seller can be identified.  
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Table 4.4.2-1 One Possible Price Negotiation under Optimal Trading 
Seller 
Units of 
allowances 
sold 
WTS per unit 
of allowance  
Buyer 
Units of 
allowances 
bought 
WTP per 
unit of 
allowance 
Possible 
price range 
R1 2935 $24.38 
D1 663 $79.50 
$24.38 to 
$53.13 
D2 69 $160.27 
P1 400 $91.90 
P2 144 $131.85 
P4 59 $161.53 
P8 1600 $53.13 
W4 4862 $26.45 
D3 102 $90.35 
$26.45 to 
$72.89 
P3 530 $92.49 
P5 857 $75.05 
P6 320 $107.37 
P7 928 $72.89 
W1 579 $93.53 
W2 927 $80.31 
W3 619 $154.30 
P9 1543 $25.80 
P10 1021 $63.82 $25.80 to 
$63.82 P11 523 $81.47 
WQ 
& T1 
941 $0.00 T2 941 $20.46 
$0.00 to 
$20.46 
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As shown in Table 4.4.2-1, the top three group contracts are established between one 
seller and multiple buyers. The bottom row shows that the fourth group contract is 
established between two joint sellers WQ, T1 and one buyer T2. 
Further, in order to give a parsimonious estimation of possible price range, I make 
the following simplifying assumption:  (1) a firm would be excluded from the market if it 
chooses not to trade based on this designed grouping; (2) the price negotiation is 
simultaneous in each group and the there will be one uniform price for each group 
contract; (3) everyone in the group must be happy with the contract without any further 
compensation.  With these simplifying assumptions, one can have a parsimonious 
estimation of the WTP and WTS for each firm. Each buyer's WTP is defined as the 
highest price per allowance the buyer is willing to and able to afford in order to have this 
group contract. In other words, a buyer would be indifferent between having this contract 
and being excluded from the market, if the price for each allowance is at his WTP. Thus, 
the WTP is computed as the average cost saving per unit of abatement. For instance, the 
WTP of P5 is $75.05 per unit allowance which is equal to the total cost savings from the 
trade, $64,322, divided by the number of allowances bought, 857. Note that the total cost 
savings, $64,322, is the sum of both removal cost saving, $17,870, and capital cost saving, 
$46,452, relative to the baseline no trade scenario.  
In a similar fashion, the seller’s WTS is defined as the lowest price per allowance 
the seller is willing to sell its allowances based on the group contract. In other words, a 
seller would be indifferent between having this contract and being in the autarky, if the 
price for each allowance is at his WTS. Therefore, the WTP is computed as the additional 
abatement cost incurred divided by the units of allowances sold. For instance, the WTS of 
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R1 is $24.38 which is equal to the additional abatement cost $71,555 divided by the 
additional units of abatement 2935, relative to the no-trade baseline. 
It is worth spending a few more words on the fourth contract, where the WTS is 
recorded at $0.00, and the WTP is recorded at $20.46. The WTS being zero is due to the 
fact that, the current unregulated abatements by WQ and T1 already over-comply with 
the required target. Thus, they can simply dump all their unused allowances without any 
additional cost.  The buyer T2’s WTP is $20.46, the lowest among all contracts. It is 
partially due to the fact that, T2’s cost savings are from variable removal cost alone (i.e. 
it still upgrades). Thus, its WTP is relatively low compared with other buyers.   
The above parsimonious estimation of the possible price range is based on a set of 
simplifying assumptions, whereas the actual market mechanism may be more complex. 
For example, it is assumed that if a firm cannot reach the deal with its designated trading 
partners, it will be excluded from the market, and so it has to independently abate to the 
required environmental standard. Yet, in practice, the firm may be able to form an 
alternative coalition where it can generate a higher cost savings.  In this sense, the above 
example provides a very rough estimate of the range of possible price to demonstrate the 
complications associated with capital cost edges in price negotiation. A refined price 
range can be derived using the concept of "Core" in the cooperative game theory. This 
refined price range should be contained in the price range provided above and is not 
explored further in this study. 
Summary of the case study 
In retrospect, two types of trading scenarios were simulated in the case study. In 
the scenario of Marginal Cost Trading, WWTPs are assumed to expand their abatement 
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capacity to be able to independently meet the NDPES requirement before participating in 
trade. Therefore optimal capital planning is precluded, as the capital expansion is made 
by each WWTP before trading in the spot market. In other words, WWTPs minimize 
only the OM costs of abatement by trading at the equi-marginal point, given the capital 
capacity to meet the abatement standard independently. In contrast, the scenario of 
Optimal Trading stands on the assumption that each WWTP can minimize the total 
abatement cost by choosing the optimally capital upgrade plan.  
The potential cost savings from effluent trading programs reflect differences in 
total abatement cost compared with the no trade baseline case. The estimated potential 
cost savings for both trading scenarios are summarized in Table 4.5-1.  
Table 4.5-1 Saving Summary 
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The following results are reflected by the summary presented above: 
Result 1: The maximum total costs savings from the various Management Area 
approaches are nominal under the Marginal Cost trading scenario, (See the first 
column of table 4.5-1) ranging from 0.59% to 1.04% relative to the no trade scenario. 
This low level of savings follows a priori expectations. Recall that there are only 
two alternative technologies currently existing in the Passaic Watershed, so the 
differences in marginal abatement costs arise primarily from differences in the 
economies of scale based on flow levels. It is not surprising that the volumes of trade 
account for only between 2 to 6 percent of the total allowable emissions in the 
watershed. These small trading volumes and disappointing saving results are 
consistent with the experience from other water quality trading programs where there 
are homogeneous technologies (U.S. EPA, 2006). 
 
Result 2: In sharp contrast with the Marginal Cost trading, the Optimal Trading 
scenario yields a much more optimistic saving result. The trading program that 
supports optimal capital upgrade planning generates about 10 times of the savings as 
the marginal cost trading under the same Management Area approach. With optimal 
allocation of the capacity upgrade, the maximum percentage cost savings from the 
various trading regimes range from 5.6% to 13.1% relative to the no trade scenario. 
The trading volume rises considerably. Specifically, the volume of trade accounts for 
between 5 to 14 percent of the total allowable emissions in the watershed. As the 
result, almost all buyers end up being able to acquire enough allowances to stay 
within the maximum capacity of capital level 2 (i.e. emissions related to higher than 
 142 
 
0.5mg/L concentration). They do not need to upgrade their abatement capital to the 
level 3 as in the no-trade baseline scenario. It is also important to note that, as the 
trading equilibrium deviates from the equi-marginal point, the variable OM costs are 
not necessarily minimized. However, the savings on the lumpy capital costs 
outweigh the loss of efficiencies on the OM costs and thus greater total savings are 
realized.  
Result 3: The percentage savings increase as different alternatives of the M.A. 
Approach become less restrictive. The Single Source M.A. Approach does not allow 
increased phosphorous load at any point in the watershed relative to the original 
NDPES (See the top row of Table 4.5-1). Permitting upstream trade within 
management areas accomplishes twice as much savings as in the Single Source M.A. 
Approach (See the bottom row). These additional cost savings are due in large 
measure to an ability to trade in any direction within an M.A. As a result, some low-
cost downstream plants can now sell permits to high abatement cost plants located 
upstream. When capital planning is feasible, these expanded trading opportunities 
also allow some high-cost upstream plants to avoid the capital costs of treatment 
upgrades. In addition, allowing trade from the Pompton M.A. to the Upper Passaic 
M.A. (i.e. the Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative One) can further 
increase the savings slightly. 
Another way to think about these trading rules is that the Single Source M.A. 
Approach treats all points in the watershed as critical locations, whereas the two 
alternative Multiple Source M.A. Approaches relax these constraints to 
accommodate the hydro-ecological reality and impose only three critical locations.  
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In fact, the key message to convey here is that the Single Source M.A. Approach, 
and hence the standard Trading Ratio System may be overly restrictive, if, under the 
physical reality of some watersheds (such as the case of Passaic Watershed), only a 
few but not all locations are of water quality concern. The Multiple Source 
Management Area Approach could potentially generate much higher cost savings 
without putting the water quality at the critical locations at risk. Again, these 
possibilities are due to the nature of the watershed, and they may not generalize.  
 
The results above suggest that moderate cost savings from trading phosphorus 
allowances can be achieved through the Multiple Source Management Area approach 
(Results 3) and that substantial gains are possible if trades can facilitate the efficient 
allocation of fixed cost investments across WWTPs (Result 2). The former issue is 
primarily driven by the hydrology of a particular watershed and whether managing water 
quality in a flexible way to protect a selected number of locations is deemed appropriate. 
The later issue is more of a humble suggestion to environmental policy makers as it 
offers a new perspective on the market mechanisms of water quality trading (with 
particular emphasis on the fixed cost planning).  In the concluding chapter, I will discuss 
further about why a more structured trading approach may be desirable to achieve the 
capital cost savings. 
                       
 
 
 
 144 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
                        CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The case study suggests that substantial cost savings are possible for water quality trading 
if trades can facilitate the efficient allocation of fixed cost investments across WWTPs.  
In large, fluid pollution allowance markets with many traders, such as the nation-wide 
U.S. acid rain program, the issue of fixed costs is expected to have little practical 
significance. This is because an individual discharger’s decision to upgrade its facility is 
likely to have no noticeable effect on the market supply or demand for permits.  
However, in watersheds like the Upper Passaic River Basin, there are a small 
number of potential traders, with discrete and homogeneous abatement technologies 
across firms. Most, if not all, firms do not have the present capacity to meet the specified 
standard. In such an environment, firms that do not upgrade are not guaranteed that a 
supply of permits will be available as a substitute at any price. Therefore, firms that 
would defer or do not want to upgrade their systems fully would have to make the 
premature investment nonetheless. As a result, the actual upgrade decision made by each 
firm may well deviate from the optimal portfolio of capital investments. If the firms’ 
managers are highly risk averse or the penalty for not being able to meet the 
environmental standard is sufficiently large, a likely outcome is consistent with the 
scenario of Marginal Cost Trading – all WWTPs will have to upgrade fully so as to be 
able to independently meet their NPDES permit requirement.  
Based on the simulations of Marginal Cost Trading, cost savings accomplished 
under an open market mechanism range from 0.59% to 1.04% of total costs relative to the 
no-trade baseline. Given positive transactions costs, it is unlikely that a vibrant trading 
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market would result in such circumstances. These results and conjectures are consistent 
with the disappointing level of water quality trading observed to date.  
On the other hand, the simulation results of Optimal Trading results suggest that if 
WWTPs are able to jointly optimize their capital investment levels, the costs savings can 
increase dramatically (up to 13.10% of the baseline total cost). Thus, in practice, the 
achievement of such cost savings for the typical watershed might necessitate a movement 
away from the open market exchange approaches such as implemented by the U.S. acid 
rain program. The major remaining policy issue is: what type of market mechanism is 
best suited for typical water quality trading programs? 
Appropriate Market Mechanisms and Policy Implications 
To derive a suitable market mechanism for typical water quality trading programs, 
it is necessary to look at the features of the optimal abatement allocations reflected in the 
Optimal Trading Scenario. Using the Optimal Trading under Multiple Source M.A. 
Approach – Alternative Two as an example, one possible grouping of the trading partners 
is summarized in Table 5.1-1.
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Table 5.1-1 One Potential Grouping of Trading Partners 
Seller Buyer 
R1 D1, D2, P1, P2, P4, P8 
W4 D3, P3, P5, P6, P7, W1, W2, W3 
P9 P10, P11 
WQ & T1 T2 
                                                          
43 The trading ratios under the Multiple Source M.A. Approach – Alternative Two is designed to protect the water 
quality at the endpoints of Upper Passaic River, Lower Passaic River and Pompton River at all possible hydrological 
conditions.  It is likely that this will be the actual configuration of the watershed for trading purposes. Therefore, I am 
particularly interested in the cost savings from this scenario.  
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Among the five sellers, WQ and T1 are currently abating to less than 0.4mg/L, over-
complying with the prospective NDPES requirements. Therefore, they can simply dump 
their excess allowances into the market.
44
 The other three sellers, W4, R1, P9, do not 
have present capacity to meet the NDPES. It is expected that they will upgrade their 
abatement capacities fully and then sell the leftover allowances to the buyers. On the 
other hand, the sixteen buyers can avoid upgrading their facilities fully (e.g. to level 3) by 
acquiring allowances from the sellers.  This pattern of trade, which conforms to a priori 
expectations, can be summarized as follows: Large firms (taking advantage of economies 
of scale in capital treatment costs), that are well positioned (in terms of trading ratios 
relative to ambient measurement points) become sellers, allowing the higher than average 
cost, capital intensive smaller WWTPs to avoid full upgrades. Specifically, among the 
three WWTPs who decide to upgrade fully and become sellers:   
 W4 is the largest (and most efficient) WWTP in the watershed;  
 R1 is the second largest WWTP in the watershed, and, due to external factors it 
has already adopted a biological treatment technology which has relatively lower 
cost elasticity of abatement than the chemical technology (i.e. more efficient 
when treating to a low concentration level) ;  
 P9 has the highest flow in the Lower Passaic M.A.  
Based on this optimal allocation of fixed-cost upgrades, the market can be cleared 
at the minimum overall abatement cost for the whole watershed.  In practice, however, it 
is very difficult for firms to achieve the optimal fixed-cost upgrade under standard spot 
market conditions. Due to the lumpy nature of the capital upgrades, firms cannot 
                                                          
44
 Remember that WQ and T1 cannot abate less because they are bounded by the non-degradation 
principle (discussed in the chapter 2). However, they can sell their excess allowances through 
market trading.  
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instantaneously adjust their abatement capacities according to the actual trading outcomes 
in the market. Instead, firms need to make ex ante capacity choices before entering the 
spot market.  In some cases where too few WWTPs choose to upgrade, the market cannot 
be cleared at any price. Moreover, since the capital investment is irreversible, even if the 
market is cleared at some price, it is unlikely to be optimal (For example, the scenario of 
Marginal Cost Trading gives the savings estimates in the case of a precautionary over-
investment).   
Therefore, the market mechanism must be modified such that all WWTPs can 
efficiently come to an agreement on which firms should to allow for excess allowances to 
be sold to firms that could as a result avoid what would now be unnecessary upgrade. In 
this sense, I believe a more structured market approach is necessary to replace the laissez 
faire market model based on the ideal of marginal cost trading. Specifically, two critical 
implications on the market structure are discussed below:  
          (1) For firms to be able to make the inter-temporal optimal investment decisions, 
the market must secure a long term stable demand of permits for those that would 
undertake upgrades as well as an ample supply for others that would not upgrades, 
because the market is so small, the spot trading is unlikely to ensure the stable demand 
and supply in the long term. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate the long-term 
multi-year contracts in the trading mechanism.     
         (2) Another critical element of the fixed-cost trading is the simultaneous 
multilateral contracting. For instance, the optimal solution in planner’s problem 
suggests that W4 should upgrade fully and sell allowances to eight buyers, D3, P3, P5, P6, 
P7, W1, W2, and W3.  However, from buyers' perspective, they would choose not to 
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upgrade fully only if W4 promises to upgrade and guarantee the supply of allowances to 
all of them. On the other hand, from the seller's perspective, W4 would be able to 
guarantee the supply of allowances to all sellers only if W4 has information on total 
demand. Therefore, to secure this arrangement, a multilateral contract must be signed 
between W4 and the five buyers simultaneously.  
The gains from fixed-cost trading opportunities have long been recognized in 
settings where transactions costs associated with open-market trading are high relative to 
the gains from trade (Woodward, Kaiser and Wicks, 2002). A simple example of the 
potential of bilateral transactions in the face of discrete fixed investments is found in 
Breetz et al.’s discussion of the trading program in Bear Creek, CO in which each year a 
large discharger (Evergreen Metro) reduces phosphorus release in a trade of 40-80 
pounds per year so that a smaller discharger (Forest Hills) does not have to undergo a 
costly upgrade to its facilities: 
“It is estimated that Forest Hills saves over $1.2 million, the cost of an expensive 
system replacement that would be necessary to meet their allocation without a 
trade… In exchange for Evergreen Metro reducing their discharge, Forest Hills pays 
an undisclosed amount of money that has been estimated to be around $5,000 per 
year” (p. 28) 
To sum up, my suggestion to the Passaic watershed would be to develop a "structured 
fixed-cost trading program". 
The previous discussion on the features of fixed-cost trading suggest that 
achieving a cost-effective reallocation of abatement responsibilities may require a more 
structured approach than "blind" market house transactions. This is because large, well 
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located WWTPs can engender substantial watershed-wide costs savings by upgrading and 
accepting treatment responsibilities for several smaller WWTPs simultaneously.  The 
sellers, on the other hand, needs joint assurance of future demand from all those buyers.  
Moreover, given that these savings are likely to persist over a number of years, multi-year 
contracting may be a necessity. Facilitating such contracts, in which capital cost savings 
by one firm trading with another is dependent upon the concurrent contracting decisions 
by a number of other firms, may necessitate an organized structure of contracting 
between WWTPs. 
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APPENDIX A 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
Suppose without loss of generality that, there exist n sources in the Management Area K, 
denoted by { nkkk ,....., 21 }and let [K] denote the end-point of K. Further, let ik denote 
the initial allocation of allowances at source ik , thus, the implied environmental target at 
the endpoint  [K] is  
n
i
kKkK ii
TdE
1 ][][
 
The cost-effective benchmark for Intra-M.A. trading is given by problem (B), which is a 
special case of the problem (A-2). 
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On the other hand, the Intra-M.A. trading based on the trading ratio specified by (2.3.3-3) 
can be described by the following cost minimization problem (E).  
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To prove the cost-effectiveness of intra-M.A. trading, it is sufficient to show the 
equivalence of problem (B) and problem (E).  
Let B denote the constrained choice set for problem (B), (i.e. the set of all possible 
vector (
nkkk
eee .....
21
) that satisfies the constraints (B-1) and (B-2). Similarly, let E  
denote the set of vector (
nkkk
eee .....
21
) that satisfies the constraints (E-1), (E-2) and (E-3). 
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Summing the inequalities from 1 to n yields: 







n
i
kKk
n
j kk
n
i
Kkkk
n
j
Kk
Kk
n
i
Kk
n
i
kKk iijiiij
i
j
iii
dd
d
d
ded
1
][1
1
][1
][
][
1
][
1
][
 

  

n
i
kKk
n
i
n
j
kkKk
n
i
n
j
kkKk
n
i
kKk iijiiijjii
ddded
1
][
1 1
][
1 1
][
1
][
 
Also, since: 
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To help the demonstration, the set K is divided into three subset 
K , 
K  and 
0K , 
where 
K  is the set of firms which have positive  , K  is the set of firms which have 
negative  ; finally, 0K is the set of firms which have 0
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(i) If 
K ,that is, if all firms have nonnegative  , then, it is easy to verify that 
there exists a null matrix }0{ 
ij kk
 s.t. (E-1), (E-2) and (E-3) are satisfied. 
 Ekkk neee ).....( 21  
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Now verify the claim: 
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Therefore, constraints (E-1), (E-2) and (E-3) are satisfied. 
For 
 Kki  
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Therefore, constraints (E-1), (E-2) and (E-3) are satisfied. 
Combining (i) and (ii), we know   
Bkkk n
eee ).....(
21
 Ekkk neee ).....( 21  
Since I have already shown 
Ekkk n
eee ).....(
21
 Bkkk neee ).....( 21  
Therefore, I have shown that: EB   
Since the two minimization problems have the same objective function over the same 
choice set, I claim that the result of problem (B) must be the result of problem (E) and 
vice versa. This completes the proof that Intra-M.A. trading constraints support the  cost-
effective allocation of allowances subject to the environmental standard at the M.A. 
endpoint.  QED 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
Without loss of generality, suppose that there are m Management Areas { mKKK ,....., 21 } 
ordered from upstream to downstream in the whole watershed, with in  sources 
},.....,{ 21
i
n
ii
i
kkk   in the Management Area iK . The total number of sources in the 
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watershed is:  
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. Further, let jik denote the initial allocation of allowances 
at the ith source in the jth M.A. Thus, the implied environmental target at the endpoint  
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The cost-effective benchmark for watershed trading subject to the water quality at all 
M.A. endpoints is given by problem (B*) , which is a special case of the problem (A-2). 
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On the other hand, the watershed trading based on the trading ratio specified by (2.3.3-3) 
can be described by the following cost minimization problem (E*).  
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Since the two problem have the same objective function, it is sufficient to show that the 
choice set described by constraints (B1*) and (B2*) (denoted by 
*
B ) are equivalent to 
the set described by constraints (E1*), (E2*) and (E3*) (denoted by 
*
B ).  In other 
words, I will show that for any emissions vector )),..1(),,..1(:( i
k
k njmie
i
j

 
in 
*
B , 
must also be in 
*
E  and vice versa.  
Hung and Shaw has demonstrated the equivalence of the following two sets, namely: 
eff ,the set of emission vector )....,( ][][][ 21 jkkk eee , constrained by (A1) and (A2) 
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and 
TRS , the set of emission vector )....,( ][][][ 21 jkkk eee , constrained by (H1), (H2) 
and (H3) 
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so that (A2) and (H2) are always trivially satisfied. 
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By Hung and Shaw's result, 
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which can be re-written as: 
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Summing the above inequalities over all sources in the hth M.A. we obtain: 
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which is equivalent to (by the associative rule of additions):
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Now, we can find a set of { ]][[ hi KK
 }, where  
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The above inequality can be re-written as: 
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By proposition one , we know there exists non-negative trades such that: 
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Hence: 
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APPENDIX B 
TRADING RATIOS USING TWO OTHER COMPILING STRATEGIES 
For comparison purposes, two other compiling strategies, "Geometric Average" and  
"90% of the Minimum Ratios" are also applied in this case study. The Geometric 
Average is mathematically desirable in the sense that it provides symmetry in in trading 
ratios between buyers and sellers. However, as an average of ratios it will theoretically 
lead to water quality violations under some of the diversion scenarios. The 90% of the 
Minimum Ratios incorporates an added margin of safety above and beyond the Minimum 
Ratios approach. The corresponding trading ratios are presented in Table A2.1-1 to A2.1-
6. 
Table A2.1-1 Compiled Trading Ratios Under Single Source M.A. Approach (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929
1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929
1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000 1.000 0.990
1.000 0.990
1.000
1.000
1.000 1.000
1.000
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
T2 P9 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3 R1 W4 WQ T1P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
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Table A2.1-2  Compiled Trading Ratios Under Multiple Source M.A. Approach - Alternative One  (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.045 1.045 1.045 1.196 1.045 0.718 0.645 0.645
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.045 1.045 1.045 1.196 1.045 0.718 0.645 0.645
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.045 1.045 1.045 1.196 1.045 0.718 0.645 0.645
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
0.836 0.836 0.836 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.874 0.874 0.874 1.000 0.874 0.600 0.539 0.539
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
0.829 0.829 0.829 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.992 0.867 1.000 1.000 0.990 0.595 0.535 0.535
0.829 0.829 0.829 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.992 0.867 1.000 1.000 0.990 0.595 0.535 0.535
0.838 0.838 0.838 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.876 0.876 0.876 1.002 0.876 1.010 1.010 1.000 0.601 0.540 0.540
1.000 0.899 0.899
1.113 1.000 1.000
1.113 1.000 1.000
D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 WQ T1P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 W1 T2 P9 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3 R1 W4
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
 
TableA2.1-3 Compiled Trading Ratios Under Multiple Source M.A. Approach - Alternative Two (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.045 1.045 1.045 1.196 1.045 0.718 0.645 0.645
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.045 1.045 1.045 1.196 1.045 0.718 0.645 0.645
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.045 1.045 1.045 1.196 1.045 0.718 0.645 0.645
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.036 1.036 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.239 1.083 0.744 0.668 0.668
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
1.077 1.077 1.077 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.288 1.125 0.773 0.695 0.695
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
0.836 0.836 0.836 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.874 0.874 0.874 1.000 0.874 0.600 0.539 0.539
0.957 0.957 0.957 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.144 1.000 0.687 0.617 0.617
1.000 1.000 0.990 0.595 0.535 0.535
1.000 1.000 0.990 0.595 0.535 0.535
1.010 1.010 1.000 0.601 0.540 0.540
1.000 0.899 0.899
1.113 1.000 1.000
1.113 1.000 1.000
D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 WQ T1P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 W1 T2 P9 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3 R1 W4
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
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Table A2.1-4 Compiled Trading Ratios Under Single Source M.A. Approach (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795
1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795
1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000 1.000 0.873
1.000 0.873
1.000
1.000
1.000 1.000
1.000
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
T2 P9 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3 R1 W4 WQ T1P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
 
Table A2.1-5  Compiled Trading Ratios Under Multiple Source M.A. Approach - Alternative One  (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.924 0.924 0.924 1.032 0.924 0.539 0.396 0.396
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.924 0.924 0.924 1.032 0.924 0.539 0.396 0.396
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.924 0.924 0.924 1.032 0.924 0.539 0.396 0.396
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
0.728 0.728 0.728 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.750 0.750 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.436 0.321 0.321
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
0.573 0.573 0.573 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.591 0.591 0.591 0.709 0.591 1.000 1.000 0.873 0.343 0.252 0.252
0.573 0.573 0.573 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.591 0.591 0.591 0.709 0.591 1.000 1.000 0.873 0.343 0.252 0.252
0.591 0.591 0.591 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.522 0.522 0.522 0.522 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.731 0.609 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.354 0.260 0.260
1.000 0.661 0.661
0.880 1.000 1.000
0.880 1.000 1.000
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
T2 P9 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3 R1 W4 WQ T1P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
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TableA2.1-6 Compiled Trading Ratios Under Multiple Source M.A. Approach - Alternative Two (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.924 0.924 0.924 1.032 0.924 0.539 0.396 0.396
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.924 0.924 0.924 1.032 0.924 0.539 0.396 0.396
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.924 0.924 0.924 1.032 0.924 0.539 0.396 0.396
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.059 0.947 0.571 0.420 0.420
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.922 0.922 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.112 0.995 0.611 0.449 0.449
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
0.728 0.728 0.728 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.750 0.750 0.750 1.000 0.750 0.436 0.321 0.321
0.834 0.834 0.834 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.523 0.385 0.385
1.000 1.000 0.873 0.343 0.252 0.252
1.000 1.000 0.873 0.343 0.252 0.252
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.354 0.260 0.260
1.000 0.661 0.661
0.880 1.000 1.000
0.880 1.000 1.000
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
T2 P9 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3 R1 W4 WQ T1P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
 
 
TRADING DETAIL FOR MARGINAL COST TRADING 
This trading scenario assumes that each WWTP chooses to invest in the capacity upgrade 
to independently meet its NPDES requirement (at 0.4mg/L), and then buys and sells 
allowances based on its marginal abatement cost and the market price. In other words, 
only OM costs are accounted for in determining the trades. 
Single Source Management Area Approach 
Table A2.2-1  Marginal Cost Trading: Single Source M.A. Approach  (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
56 70 44
19
57
120
139
731
210
103P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
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Table A2.2-2  Marginal Cost Trading: Single Source M.A. Approach (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
60 77
49
57
120
139
731
210
103P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
 
Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative One  
Table A2.2-3  Marginal Cost Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative One (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
61
337 85 181 60
70 116 121 145 47 182 200 152 392 244 370
92 211 428
210
204 292
P8
W1
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3P4 P5 P8 W1 R1 W4 T2 P9WQ T1P6 P7P2 P3D1 D2 D3 P1
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Table A2.2-4  Marginal Cost Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative One (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
42 189 7
192 131 198
43 240 182 204 98 427 295 401
731
210
103
P8
W1
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3P4 P5 P8 W1 R1 W4 T2 P9WQ T1P6 P7P2 P3D1 D2 D3 P1
 
Management Area Approach - Alternative Two  
Table A2.2-5  Marginal Cost Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative Two (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
96
105 217 326 112
312 114 179 191 155 258 15 368 208 348
731
210
204 292
D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1 P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
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Table A2.2-6  Marginal Cost Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative Two (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
42 189 7
192 131 198
43 240 182 204 98 427 295 401
731
210
103
T2
P9
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
P8
W1
W2
W3
P4
P5
P6
P7
D3
P1
P2
P3
P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3 R1 W4P8 W1P2 P3 P4 P5D1 D2 D3 P1 P6 P7
 
 
TRADING DETAIL FOR OPTIMAL TRADING 
In the Optimal Trading scenario, incentives for allowance trading are embodied 
not only in the differential marginal OM costs, but also in avoiding the costly capital 
upgrades. For example, in this setting, it is expected that some WWTPs would purchase 
enough allowances so that they are able to avoid facility upgrades and maintain a low 
level of capital cost. 
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Single Source Management Area Approach 
Table A2.3-1 Optimal Trading: Single Source M.A. Approach  (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
46 95 29 354 16
82 137 21
274 392
752
115
504
731
210
384
D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1 P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
 
Table A2.3-2 Optimal Trading: Single Source M.A. Approach  (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
46 95 31 348 10
84 183
274 392
752
115
504
731
210
384
D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1 P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
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Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative One  
Table A2.3-3  Optimal Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative One (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
274 810
810 579 823 619 2347
437 58 114 122
210
377 136 592 51
835 428
P6 P7P2 P3D1 D2 D3 P1 R1 W4 T2 P9WQ T1 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3P4 P5 P8 W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
 
Table A2.3-4  Optimal Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative One (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
691 67 165 41 406 1424
953 356 1032 295 579 927 619
201 92 369 70
152 58
56 73 60
1134 581
P6 P7P2 P3D1 D2 D3 P1 R1 W4 T2 P9WQ T1 P10 P11
D1
D2
W2 W3P4 P5 P8 W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
W1
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
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Multiple Source Management Area Approach – Alternative Two  
Table A2.3-5  Optimal Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative Two (Geometric Average)
Buyer
Seller
642 71 113 378 136 593 62 946
827 309 69 1287 579 927 619
731
210
835 428
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
T2
P9
P6
P7
P8
W1
W2
W3
D3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3P4 P5 R1 W4P6 P7 P8 W1D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3
 
Table A2.3-6  Optimal Trading: Multiple Source M.A Appoach - Alternative Two (90% of Minimum Ratios)
Buyer
Seller
737 63 130 444 160 696 953
53 427 1032 1564 579 927 619
731
210
1134 581
T2
P9
P10
P11
R1
W4
WQ
T1
P8
W1
W2
W3
P4
P5
P6
P7
D3
P1
P2
P3
P10 P11
D1
D2
WQ T1 T2 P9W2 W3 R1 W4P8 W1P2 P3 P4 P5D1 D2 D3 P1 P6 P7
 
 
SAVING SUMMARY 
The potential cost savings from effluent trading programs reflect differences in 
total abatement cost compared with the no trade baseline case. The estimated potential 
cost savings for marginal cost trading using various M.A. approaches are summarized in 
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Table A2.4-1 to A2.4-3. The estimated potential cost savings for optimal trading using 
various M.A. approaches are summarized in Table A2.4-4 to A2.4-6.  
  
Selection of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
90% of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
Geometric 
Average 
Baseline OM cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM cost after trading  $2,361,990.48 $2,363,747.40 $2,361,610.88 
Savings on OM Cost $23,488.61 $21,731.69 $23,868.21 
Percentage Savings on OM Cost 0.98% 0.91% 1.00% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
Savings on CC Cost 0 0 0 
Percentage Savings on CC Cost 0% 0% 0% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,971,879.93 $3,973,636.85 $3,971,500.33 
Total Savings  $23,488.61 $21,731.69 $23,868.21 
Percentage Savings on Total Cost 0.59% 0.54% 0.60% 
Table A2.4-1: Cost Savings Under Marginal Cost Trading (Single Source M.A. 
Approach) 
  
 
 
 172 
 
  
Selection of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
90% of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
Geometric 
Average 
Baseline OM cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM cost after trading  $2,344,093.14 $2,349,542.98 $2,340,145.25 
Savings on OM Cost $41,385.94 $35,936.11 $45,333.84 
Percentage Savings on OM Cost 1.73% 1.51% 1.90% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
Savings on CC Cost 0 0 0 
Percentage Savings on CC Cost 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,953,982.60 $3,959,432.43 $3,950,034.70 
Total Savings  $41,385.94 $35,936.11 $45,333.84 
Percentage Savings on Total Cost 1.04% 0.90% 1.13% 
Table A2.4-2: Cost Savings Under Marginal Cost Trading (Multiple Souce M.A. 
Approach - Alternative One) 
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Selection of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
90% of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
Geometric 
Average 
Baseline OM cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM cost after trading  $2,344,093.14 $2,349,542.98 $2,340,932.84 
Savings on OM Cost $41,385.94 $35,936.11 $44,546.25 
Percentage Savings on OM Cost 1.73% 1.51% 1.87% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
Savings on CC Cost 0 0 0 
Percentage Savings on CC Cost 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,953,982.60 $3,959,432.43 $3,950,822.29 
Total Savings  $41,385.94 $35,936.11 $44,546.25 
Percentage Savings on Total Cost 1.04% 0.90% 1.11% 
Table A2.4-3: Cost Savings Under Marginal Cost Trading (Multiple Souce M.A. 
Approach - Alternative Two) 
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Selection of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
90% of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
Geometric 
Average 
Baseline OM Cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM Cost after Trading  $2,402,189.42 $2,406,312.09 $2,401,338.95 
Savings on OM Cost -$16,710.34 -$20,833.01 -$15,859.86 
Percentage Savings on OM Cost -0.70% -0.87% -0.66% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,372,102.85 $1,372,102.85 $1,372,102.85 
Savings on CC Cost $237,786.60 $237,786.60 $237,786.60 
Percentage Savings on CC Cost 14.77% 14.77% 14.77% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,774,292.27 $3,778,414.94 $3,773,441.80 
Total Savings  $221,076.27 $216,953.60 $221,926.74 
Percentage Savings on Total Cost 5.53% 5.43% 5.55% 
Table A2.4-4: Cost Savings Under Optimal Trading (Single Source M.A. Approach) 
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Selection of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
90% of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
Geometric 
Average 
Baseline OM Cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM Cost after Trading  $2,400,476.44 $2,426,755.38 $2,408,106.87 
Savings on OM Cost -$14,997.35 -$41,276.30 -$22,627.79 
Percentage Savings on OM Cost -0.63% -1.73% -0.95% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,071,474.94 $1,071,474.94 $1,021,673.67 
Savings on CC Cost $538,414.51 $538,414.51 $588,215.78 
Percentage Savings on CC Cost 33.44% 33.44% 36.54% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,471,951.38 $3,498,230.32 $3,429,780.55 
Total Savings  $523,417.16 $497,138.22 $565,587.99 
Percentage Savings on Total Cost 13.10% 12.44% 14.16% 
Table A2.4-5: Cost Savings Under Optimal Trading (Multiple Souce M.A. Approach - 
Alternative One) 
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Selection of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
90% of 
Minimum 
Ratios 
Geometric 
Average 
Baseline OM Cost $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 $2,385,479.08 
OM Cost after Trading  $2,403,910.88 $2,433,345.11 $2,386,389.10 
Savings on OM Cost -$18,431.80 -$47,866.03 -$910.01 
Percentage Savings on OM Cost -0.77% -2.01% -0.04% 
Baseline CC Cost $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 $1,609,889.45 
CC Cost after Trading $1,071,474.94 $1,071,474.94 $1,071,474.94 
Savings on CC Cost $538,414.51 $538,414.51 $538,414.51 
Percentage Savings on CC Cost 33.44% 33.44% 33.44% 
Baseline Total Cost $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 $3,995,368.54 
Total Cost after Trading $3,475,385.82 $3,504,820.05 $3,457,864.03 
Total Savings  $519,982.72 $490,548.49 $537,504.50 
Percentage Savings on Total Cost 13.01% 12.28% 13.45% 
Table A2.4-6: Cost Savings Under Optimal Trading (Multiple Souce M.A. Approach - 
Alternative Two) 
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APPENDIX C 
THE DETAILED DERIVATION OF EQUATION (3.8.3-2), (3.8.3-3) AND (3.8.3-4) 
Recall that OM costs are specified as the following form in the regression analysis: 
CTTFCFCOM ln314.0649.0lnln046.0ln796.0ln990.0876.9ln  ---(3.8.3-1) 
However, as listed in the beginning of this chapter, the argument of OM cost 
function )( ii eOM  is the final effluent measured in pounds per year. This type of 
specification is convenient for optimization purposes. Also, the specification of final 
effluent in pounds per year is consistent with the unit of discharge allowances and the 
environmental standards.  To transform equation (3.8.3-1) to a function of the final 
effluent measured in pounds per year, the variable, "C", in equation (3.8.3-1) is replaced 
by 
i
i
i
F
e
C


063.3046  
(where 3046.063 is a coefficient to adjust the measurement unit). 
The equation can be transformed into the following form (equation 3.8.3-2) by the 
plugging in 
i
i
i
F
e
C


063.3046
:  
)
063.3046
ln(314.0649.0
ln)
063.3046
ln(046.0ln796.0)
063.3046
ln(990.0876.9ln
i
i
ii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
F
e
TT
F
F
e
F
F
e
OM






 
Then, take the exponential on both sides:  
)]
063.3046
ln(314.0649.0
ln)
063.3046
ln(046.0ln796.0)
063.3046
ln(990.0876.9exp[
i
i
ii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
F
e
TT
F
F
e
F
F
e
OM






 
Re-arrange terms: 
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)]ln063.3046ln(ln314.0649.0ln)ln063.3046ln(ln046.0
ln796.0)ln063.3046ln(ln990.0876.9exp[
iiiiiii
iiii
FeTTFFe
FFeOM


 
)]ln063.3046(ln314.0649.0ln)ln063.3046(ln046.0ln796.0
)ln063.3046(ln990.0876.9ln)314.0ln046.0990.0exp[(
iiiiii
iiiii
FTTFFF
FeTFOM


 
]ln314.0)063.3046ln(314.0649.0)(ln046.0ln)063.3046ln(046.0
ln796.0ln99.0)063.3046ln(99.0876.9ln)314.0ln046.0990.0exp[(
2
iiiiii
iiiiii
FTTTFF
FFeTFOM


 
]))063.3046ln(314.0649.0(ln)314.0)063.3046ln(046.0796.099.0(
)(ln046.0))063.3046ln(99.0876.9(ln)314.0ln046.0990.0exp[( 2
iii
iiiii
TFT
FeTFOM


 
]870.1ln)314.0417.1(
)(ln046.0817.17ln)314.0ln046.0990.0exp[( 2
iii
iiiii
TFT
FeTFOM


 
So, if let   
iiiii TLnFTFm 870.1)314.0417.1()(ln046.0817.17
2   ----------(3.8.3-3) 
iii TFn 314.0ln046.0990.0    -----------------------(3.8.3-4) 
We have: 
in
iiiiiii emmeneOM  )exp(]lnexp[)(              ---------------(3.8.3-2) 
In this way, the firm-specific parameters in the transformed functions embody the 
differences in daily flows across the WWTPs.  
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